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Summary
The present thesis analyses the international activities of British start-up
companies in high-technology industries. The research makes the following
contributions. First, it is the first study that establishes the prevalence of
internationally operating start-up companies in a particular country. Accordingly,
we find that the majority of British high-tech start-ups have engaged in
international activities within a few years since formation. Second, it consolidates
the existing knowledge in the field of international entrepreneurship and subjects
it to empirical testing. Third, it assesses the power of different theories in
international business to explain the cross-border activities of start-up companies.
We analysed the determinants of the decision to internationalise, the degree of
internationalisation and the timing of internationalisation. Our results suggest that
firm size has a positive impact on these dependent variables. However, the
threshold value for a positive likelihood of initiating international sales is well
below the median size of the population, therefore suggesting that scale-related
barriers to internationalisation can be overcome quite easily. Internationalisation is
positively influenced by the international experience of the founders, technology
intensity and the innovativeness of the technology incorporated in the products.
Internationalisation is negatively influenced by a product's degree of client-
specific customisation. External finance and transaction costs during the sales
process did not impact on these dimensions of internationalisation. When looking
at the choice of market entry mode, we find that the innovativeness of the
technology incorporated in a product lead to a higher probability of involving
intermediaries. While this is apparently at odds with theory, we argue that an
intermediary is a mechanism for start-ups to overcome the "liability of alienness"
and to gain legitimacy in foreign markets.
Overall, the research lends support to a resource-based perspective of international
entrepreneurship since the proxies for transaction cost-based arguments and the
internationalisation process theory are of limited explanatory power.
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1.	 Introduction
There are 17 million small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the European
Union which play an important role in economic life. Within this subset,
increasing recognition is being given to "new technology-based firms." In the
literature, different definitions have been put forward to describe the term new
technology-based based firm (Oakey et al 1988; Roberts 1991; Autio 1995; Storey
and Tether 1998). Common denominators include that the activity is based on the
exploitation of advanced technological know-how, the prior affiliation of founders
with research establishments and the entrepreneurial character of the firm.
Research studies in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim have identified
these firms' important contributions in new employment creation, export sales
growth, product and process innovation and structural adjustment (e.g. Rothwell
& Zegveld 1982; OECD 1986; Oakey et al 1988; Acs & Audretsch 1991; Roberts
1991; Coopers & Lybrand 1996).
While there is a growing body of literature on new technology-based firms that
concentrates on strategic issues such as access to financial resources, growth
processes and innovation behaviour (see Storey and Tether 1998, for a review),
there has been relatively little research into the process by which young high-
technology companies have internationalised. Research activity in the latter field
has historically been strongly oriented towards large firms or, more rarely,
towards "traditional transnational SMEs" in the manufacturing sector that often act
as suppliers of bigger firms and are characterised by simple production
technologies and low-technology products (United Nations 1993). Most of these
studies conclude that export and co-operative arrangements rather than
acquisitions or direct investment are the preferred forms for international
engagements of SMEs. (United Nations 1993; Bamberger & Evers 1994).
Frequently, the internationalisation process is a random development - often
initiated by the move of a client abroad or an unsolicited order - rather than driven
'Throughout this thesis, the terms "new, technology-based firm" and "technology-based start-up"
will be used interchangeably.
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by long-term strategic considerations. These studies generally conclude that so-
called stage models adequately explain the foreign activities of small firms and
both size of the SME and its maturity are seen as explanatory variables (e.g.
Bilkey 1978; Cavusgil 1980; Wagner 1995). Furthermore, the notion of "psychic
distance" has been put forward to explain the locational choices of the
internationalisation processes. Thus, SMEs should be more inclined to engage in
cross-border activities with countries that are similar in cultural, economic and
political terms. Studies in several countries as diverse as the US, Great Britain,
Germany, Israel and South Africa have provided empirical evidence for this
sequential internationalisation pattern of small traditional firms (Bilkey and Tesar
1982; Bamberger and Evers 1994; Calof and Viviers 1995; Chetty and Hamilton
1995). Even though these models have been found invalid in a number of cases
(Turnbull 1987; Buckley et al 1988; Welch & Loustarinen 1988), they are still
regarded as adequate to explain the behaviour of small firms at the beginning of
their internationalisation (Johanson & Vahlne 1990).
There is evidence that the internationalisation pattern of start-up firms in high-
technology sectors is not only different but potentially contradictory to the
prevailing theoretical frameworks in the field of international business. These
firms - labelled "infant multinationals" (Lindqvist 1991), "born globals"
(McKinsey & Company 1993; Knight & Cavusgil 1996) and "international new
ventures" (Oviatt & McDougall 1994) - have received an increasing amount of
attention from researchers over the last couple of years. Despite being relatively
young and small, these firms tend to internationalise from an early stage of their
evolution (Lindqvist 1991; Bell 1995; Murray 1995). Some extreme cases are
even international from inception and can perform different activities along the
value chain in several different countries (Oviatt & McDougall 1994). It is
remarkable that, despite their young age and their limited resources, the observed
start-ups were operating in a relatively large number of different countries on
different continents. In addition, some firms used entry modes ranging from
simple export to the creation of subsidiaries simultaneously in different countries.
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In the light of these findings, two influential contributors to the field of
international entrepreneurship concluded that the emergence of these "born global
firms" is at odds with the established body of theory in the area of international
business (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). They further argued that the field of
international business is in need of refined theoretical foundations to explain the
emergence of these firms and the phenomenon of accelerated internationalisation.
However, they also admit that existing knowledge is largely case study based and
that there has been, to date, no systematic survey of the prevalence of
internationally operating start-up firms in a given country (Oviatt and McDougall
1997).
The present dissertation will try to address this gap. It aims at applying theories
from the field of international business to NTBFs in order to provide some
explanation for the observed phenomenon of rapid internationalisation of high-
tech start-ups. For the purpose of this study, high-tech start-ups will be defined as
firms younger than ten years that operate in high-technology industries as defined
by Butchart (1987). The different aspects of internationalisation that will be
analysed are the decision to internationalise, the degree of internationalisation, the
timing of internationalisation, the choice of market entry mode and the pattern of
market selection. The research will attempt to meet three related objectives.
• First, it will establish the prevalence of internationally operating start-up firms
in high-technology industries in the United Kingdom. To our knowledge, this
is the first study that attempts to reach this objective.
• Second, it will systematically examine the dominant theories of the field of
international business with regard to their relevance for internationally
operating start-up firms. In doing so, we will assess whether the existence of
international new ventures can be explained with these theories. We will also
show that there has been little overlap between exploratory, case-study based
work and quantitative research in international entrepreneurship. In order to
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advance this area of research, we will present a review of the existing
published contributions and consolidate their results.
• Third, we will apply both the existing empirical and theoretical knowledge and
develop a set of hypotheses regarding their internationalisation behaviour. We
will collect a dataset of start-ups with international activities and a control
group of domestic start-ups to test our research hypotheses.
In the following chapters, the rationale for these objectives and detailed research
questions will be developed. The next chapter will present a review of the relevant
literature required to discuss the phenomenon of international entrepreneurship.
After that, the research questions and a set of testable hypotheses will be
developed. We will then describe the methods used for obtaining the empirical
dataset. After that, descriptive statistics and tests of the hypotheses in a
multivariate setting will be presented. The dissertation closes with a discussion of
the findings and suggestions for further research.
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2.	 Literature Review
2.1. Technology-Based Start-ups / NTBFs
The surge of interest in new, technology-based firms is to a large extent motivated
by the US experience. Firms like Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Microsoft, Genentech,
Cisco Systems and more recently Yahoo, Netscape, America Online and
Amazon.com have set examples of how firms can grow from small start-ups to
global players that dominate their industries. They all based their activities on the
exploitation of recent technological developments and produced a constant stream
of hitherto unknown products and solutions. These firms are widely credited as
creators of value-added, employment, innovation and as source of structural
adjustment.
In the light of these experiences, European policy makers have put high
expectations on the genesis, growth and economic impact of these firms. One of
the earliest European studies was an Anglo-German comparison, carried out in
1977 by the consultancy Arthur D. Little. Besides coining the term "new
technology-based firm", the study represented the first survey of the existing stock
of this type of firm in Germany and the UK. However, the report was rather
critical, emphasising that, in comparison with the US, both Germany and the UK
were lagging behind in terms of formations of NTBFs and their contribution to the
overall economy (Little 1977). In terms of policy contribution, this study has been
instrumental in highlighting the lack of support infrastructures in the two
countries. The picture painted ten years later was a more optimistic one. Another
study funded by the Anglo-German Foundation set a further milestone by
reporting a significant growth of the formation of high-tech start-ups in both
countries, albeit with a more developed NTBF sector in the UK relative to the size
of the economy. But like in the earlier Arthur D. Little study, this report came to
the conclusion that the considerable gap between the US on the one side and the
UK and Germany on the other persisted. It thus called for a realistic assessment of
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the phenomenon and highlighted the lack of public and private support
mechanisms to strengthen this emerging sector of the economy.
Since then, academic studies have investigated issues such as creation, growth and
survival rates of technology-based start-ups, regional concentration or "clusters"
of NTBF activity, the background of the founders, the availability of finance and
support infrastructures (for reviews see Autio 1997 and the special issue of
Research Policy, November 1998). Yet, the actual performance of European new
technology-based firms remains in striking contrast to the attention from policy
makers, practitioners and academics alike. Today, it becomes increasingly evident
that they have not managed to live up to their earlier promise as panacea for the
economic ills of the "old world." After assessing the empirical knowledge in a
study that involved researchers from all member states of the European Union,
Storey and Tether concluded that, in the absence of dedicated support, "it is very
likely that NTBFs will continue to frustrate the expectations of European policy
makers who look enviously at the United States" (Storey and Tether 1998, p. 944).
A number of explanations have been put forward for explaining why few countries
— Israel appears to be an exception — have been able to emulate the success of the
United States. Above all, cultural issues and the attitude to entrepreneurship are a
key factors to understand the differences. Other researchers have emphasised the
role of tight-knit networks of business relations and support infrastructures to
explain the formation of regional hot-spots of entrepreneurial activity (e.g. Florida
and Kenney 1988; Saxenian 1991). A parallel stream of work has pointed out
towards the dearth of finance for early stage financing in Europe. The late 1980s
saw an influx of venture capital, particularly in the UK, but the subsequent crisis
and decline in the mid 1990s (Murray 1995) resulted in a greater emphasis on the
creation of attractive exit mechanisms such as second tier stock markets which had
been absent so far.
The present research would like to add to the stream of research on European new,
technology-based firms by developing a distinct argument. We argue that there
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has been virtually no systematic research into the process by which new,
technology-based firms have internationalised. Yet, due to the limited size of the
majority of national home markets, European start-ups with the aspiration and
potential to achieve rapid growth will have to consider internationalisation at
inception. Yet, international expansion and the ability to manage growth in several
countries simultaneously adds an additional layer of complexity to the already
considerable managerial challenges which the founders of NTBFs have to
overcome. The broader question thus arises whether there is a systemic market
failure, i.e. whether there is a situation in Europe where highly specialised,
technology-based firms will have difficulties in growing beyond a certain
threshold because their domestic markets are too small and the costs and problems
of international expansion are prohibitive.
We would like to argue that, to date, this consideration has almost been
completely absent in the agendas of researchers interested in European NTBFs.
The available evidence on European internationally operating start-up firms is
largely exploratory. To our knowledge, there is only one quantitative study that
looked at these firms in a European setting (Lindqvist 1991). Similarly, the
phenomenon has, until recently, received only limited attention in the US. This
could be the case because the size of the national market is to a much lesser extent
constraining the growth trajectories of American technology-based start-ups. A
fresh impetus has been provided by entrepreneurship researchers interested in the
growth strategies of new ventures. Yet, only over the past five years, there has
been a significant increase of research that investigates the international activities
of start-up firms.
Unfortunately, an assessment of whether or not European NTBFs are constrained
in their growth trajectories by the limited size of their national home markets
would go beyond the scope of the present research. Nevertheless, we would like to
trigger a discussion and advocate that the managerial complexity of
internationalisation has been overlooked by researchers interested in the growth of
NTBFs. To shed light on those issues, we believe that the first step of a longer
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term research programme should determine to what extent the existing stock of
NTBFs already engages in international activities. This is arguably best achieved
at a national rather than European level. As a next step, it is important to identify
the factors that impact on various aspects of internationalisation and subject them
to empirical testing. In the next sections, we will therefore review the existing
literature in international entrepreneurship and the theoretical contributions of
international business theory in order to establish the current knowledge on
internationally operating start-ups.
2.2. Empirical Evidence on International Entrepreneurship
During the last decade, the phenomenon of globalisation has received considerable
attention and has shaped both the discourse and actions of managers, policy
makers and academics. Research on the topic is rooted primarily in sociology,
cultural studies, political science and economics. A common denominator is the
definition of globalisation as a process in which the constraints of geography on
social, cultural, political and economic arrangements recede (Waters 1995). One
of the manifestations of a globalising world is the emergence of entrepreneurial
start-ups that have an international outlook from inception. Coincidentally, over
the last ten years, these firms have received increasing attention from
entrepreneurship researchers. While there have been several exploratory studies in
different countries conducted independently from each other, the recent increase
of scholarly interest in internationally operating start-up companies emerged after
the contributions of Oviatt and McDougall (1994). This section will summarise
the most important findings of that research stream to date and highlight the
implications for the present research. We will review a number of studies with
regard to their methodological foundations and their content.
The studies have been identified after surveying the relevant journals of
entrepreneurship and international business. In order to be included in the review,
the papers had to deal with the international expansion of young, entrepreneurial
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firms.2 The literature review sections of these papers were then screened for
additional contributions to the field of international entrepreneurship. We
acknowledge that there is a certain random element in this iterative procedure.
Yet, there are a number of obstacles to a more systematic, keyword-based survey
of computerised databases. First, a number of studies surveyed here appeared in
journals that are not included in the standard databases such as the Social Science
Citation Index or ABI Inform. Furthermore, as to be expected in a young field, the
keywords "international entrepreneurship" or the combination of "international"
and "entrepreneurship" and other variants produced only a limited number of
studies. On the other hand, there is substantial support for the procedure chosen
for the current literature review. During the recent conference on Globalization
and Emerging Businesses in Montreal, October 1998, a number of recent papers
on international entrepreneurship were presented. The literature review sections of
those papers suggest that the studies reviewed here constitute a quite
comprehensive overview of the "accepted" body of knowledge in international
entrepreneurship at the time of the conference.
This iterative approach resulted in the identification of 11 empirical papers and
one dissertation devoted to the topic. There have been six papers that are based on
case studies (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1992; McDougall, Shane and Oviatt
1994; Coviello and Munro 1995; Boter and Holmquist 1996; Murray 1996;
Roberts and Senturia 1996) and four papers that are based on quantitative data
collected either through a mail survey or content analysis of IPO prospectuses
(McDougall 1989; McDougall and Oviatt 1996; Bloodgood, Almeida and
Sapienza 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997). Two authors used a triangulation
method that involved case studies and a mail survey (Lindqvist 1991; Bell 1995).
The contributions of these authors are therefore counted both in the case study and
in the survey section of this review.
2 Studies on exporting SMEs were thus not included in the review of international
entrepreneurship studies. Nevertheless, we will refer to the rich body of export management
research and SMEs in the following section that looks at international business theories.
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2.2.1. The Internationalisation of Start-ups: Empirical Evidence from Case
Studies
2.2.1.1. The Studies
Lindqvist (1991)
One of the earliest contributions to the international entrepreneurship literature
was the doctoral dissertation of Maria Lindqvist (1991). The objective of her study
was a closer examination of the internationalisation pattern and processes of
young, technology-based Swedish firms. She carried out 15 cases studies in order
to develop hypotheses for a subsequent mail survey. Lindqvist sees the key
dimensions of the internationalisation process as being speed of market entry,
pattern of market selection and choice of entry mode. A summary of her findings
is reported below.
• Speed of internationalisation:
Eight of the 15 firms were international almost immediately from inception and
attributed this to the limited size of the home market. "International vision" of
the top management team and previous international experience of key
employees were all present among these the early internationalisers. A second
group of firms took between two and four years to internationalise. The
managers of these five firms attributed the time-lag mainly to the transition
period required to transform the technological invention to commercially viable
product. Two firms experienced a lag of five years between inception and first
international sales. In this case, internationalisation has been initiated once the
firm's activities switched from merely distributing products from foreign
manufacturers to developing their own product ranges.
• Pattern of market selection:
Countries that were entered rapidly included Scandinavian and continental
European countries, the US, Japan and Australia. As companies
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commercialised technologically advanced products, most customers were
found in industrialised countries. Some aspects of the market choice can be
attributed by the perceived potential of the market. For example, firms
sometimes entered the US before entering Norway. The initial choice
frequently reflected an opportunistic behaviour that made use of contacts in
various countries. Over time, however, market selection was more planned and
involved evaluations of costs and benefits. Thus, a process of learning as
predicted by behavioural theories has taken place.
• Establishment form:
The main forms used included direct exports (9), independent representatives
(12 local distributors, 2 local agents, 4 Swedish distributors), subsidiaries (8
wholly owned, 6 joint ventures) and licensing (3). Exporting was used by the
majority of firms as initial entry form before the adoption of other forms. A
certain relation with firm size was found here, as the smaller firms preferred
entry modes that were less resource intensive. In markets with a high perceived
potential, more resource-intensive entry forms such as subsidiaries and joint
ventures have been chosen by the larger firms. Over time, direct exports
became of limited importance for almost all of the firms. Only two firms relied
exclusively on exports as their customers were a limited number of OEMs.
Similarly some other firms relied on exporting as the main entry form for
distant markets where it was difficult to find suitable distributors or where it
was perceived as not viable to set up subsidiaries. The most important entry
form was the use of local distributors as it proved to an effective way to
provide product-related services such as installation, training and maintenance
in foreign markets.
After analysing these case studies, Lindqvist concluded that there was
considerable support for the internationalisation process perspective (Johanson
and Vahlne 1977; 1990). Both the pattern of market selection and the choice and
evolution of entry modes were characterised by learning processes that are
expected by that theory. The main surprising feature was that the
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internationalisation process of the firms in her sample happened in an accelerated
fashion. Note, however, that some of the firms included here were subsidiaries of
large established firms. The firms were also up to 25 years old. Strictly speaking,
one cannot include some of these firms as young independent start-ups. Still, the
study produced substantive evidence that the internationalisation processes of
young technology-based firms are proceeding in an accelerated fashion
Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet (1991)
Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet describe four high-technology start-up companies that
challenged incumbent multinational firms. Not only did these companies sell their
products across national boundaries, but they also performed different activities
along the value chain in different countries. Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet identified
a number of commonalties among these firms. They argue that the strategies of
these four firms were based on a combination of the following features:
• All founders had international backgrounds from education and previous work
experience and a "vision" to turn their businesses into globally operating
firms.
• The firms operated in emerging industries such as computer peripherals and
mobile telephony and offered standardised, high quality and innovative
products that were targeted to growing market segments. All four firms rapidly
introduced follow-up products that were developed and commercialised in
parallel with the initial products.
• All firms chose to launch their products in key markets rather than in their
home countries alone to build up volume. Lacking a global distribution
infrastructure, all firms initially concentrated on development and
manufacturing. They used strategic alliances with a limited number of key
customers, mainly large OEMs, who incorporated the new components in their
products. Having built up volume and being indirectly present in three
continents allowed them to move into retail distribution soon after.
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• None of these companies concentrated all their assets in one location. The
companies entered foreign markets almost as soon as their products were
ready for roll-out using entry modes that required direct investments. Rather
than producing the products in their lead markets, they chose the lowest cost
location for manufacturing. Two companies produced in two different
countries with the objective of serving the entire world market from these
locations.
• All firms have been structured as closely linked networks with actors meeting
and communicating on a regular basis. These structures seemed to stem from
the necessity to co-ordinate the different functional areas of the firms that are
spread across different continents.
Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet conclude that the global orientation and organisation
of these start-ups resembles those of strategic business units of established
multinationals. It thus appears that these start-ups reacted boldly within a short
window of opportunity in newly emerging industries. Due to their founders'
insight of anticipating future demand for their products and their swift building up
of a global manufacturing and distribution network, initially by using strategic
alliances, they managed to establish a global presence before incumbent
multinational firms decided to follow.
The article gives four highly interesting accounts of firms that grew extremely
rapidly and built up international presence in several countries within few years.
Unfortunately, Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet provide only a limited description of
the internationalisation process as such. Nor do they report other critical issues,
such as the financing of this rapid expansion. While these cases highlight a
phenomenon that was hardly noticed by scholars and practitioners alike, the
important question arises whether start-ups that perform different activities along
the value chain on different continents are exotic outliers or whether we can
observe a more general trend.
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McDougall, Shane and Oviatt (1994)
McDougall, Shane and Oviatt's influential article is motivated by what they see as
the increasing significance of "international new ventures" (INVs), a type of firms
that they define as a "business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive
significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs
in multiple countries" (p.470). They argue that firms of this type, which can be
observed more and more frequently, represent a challenge for international
business theory.
Altogether, McDougall, Shane and Oviatt report 24 case studies of international
new ventures. Their article is based on two empirical sources. Twelve of these
case studies were carried out by themselves. The remaining 12 case studies are
compiled from conference papers and the above study of Jolly, Alahuhta and
Jeannet (1992). Out of these 24 firms, 21 can be identified as high-technology
firms, 3 are not attributable given the available information in the article. 17 (15
high-tech) firms originated from outside the US. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted with the founders or Chief Financial Officers of these start-ups. In
essence, they describe a number of cases where start-ups decided to build up
international operations from the beginning. Over time, some of these firms
evolved into mini-multinationals with manufacturing and sales activities spanning
over different countries.
They contrast these findings with the prescriptions of the dominant theories of
international business. They briefly review monopolistic advantage theory (Hymer
1976; Caves 1982), product life cycle theory (Vernon 1966), stage theories
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977), oligopolistic reaction theory (Knickerbocker 1973)
and internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson 1976).3 They conclude that none
of the reviewed theories is capable of explaining the formation of INVs.
McDougall, Shane and Oviatt then provide their own explanation of why certain
A detailed review of these theories will be presented in the next chapter.
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ventures internationalise form inception. Their explanation centres around three
arguments.
The first argument focuses on the person of the entrepreneur. Following Kirzner's
(1973) economic theory of entrepreneurship, they argue that markets are not in
equilibrium and that there is no perfect availability of information. Entrepreneurs
are people that are more alert to information about profitable resource
combinations than other economic agents. The entrepreneur thus uses his superior
knowledge or his anticipation of information asymmetries to combine resources in
a profitable way. This alertness is often influenced by previous experiences.
Consequently, McDougall, Shane and Oviatt argue that founders of INVs are
more alert to the possibilities of combining resources from different national
markets because of the competencies that they have developed in earlier activities.
Their second argument tries to explain why these start-ups can compete
internationally. They argue that over time, inertia permeates organisations, and
that inertia is promoted by structural impediments to change, stakeholder
demands, perceptual biases of domestic managers, location of power in
organisations and market stickiness when it comes to the reorganisation of
economic relationships. International entrepreneurs avoid this path dependence
and create firms that, from inception, incorporate routines and organisational
capabilities which enable them to serve a global market place. Thus they
overcome the cost and information disadvantages traditionally associated with
international business environments.
The third part of their argument investigates the structural form of the
international activities of these ventures. Since the process of founding a firm
demands sufficient resources within a short period of time to sustain the initial
negative cash-flows, international entrepreneurs have less discretion to invest in
assets located in foreign countries. The entrepreneurs interviewed in their case
studies rather relied on hybrid or network-type structures of governance or control
assets that they do not own.
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McDougall, Shane and Oviatt's seminal contribution produced a series of rich
insights into why start-ups can compete internationally. Yet, their paper can also
be criticised on two grounds. First, their review of international business theories
is somewhat selective. While they summarise the initial core statement of the
theories, they do not take their subsequent developments into account. In addition,
it might be argued that they only selectively quote the proponents of these theories
in order to support their own argument. An example from their criticism of
monopolistic advantage theory will illustrate the point. McDougall, Oviatt and
Shane argue that
"the tradition of monopolistic advantage theory has been to argue that a firm will engage
in foreign investment after some monopolistic advantage has been developed and
exploited in the home country (e.g., Buckley and Casson 1976). By extending its mature
operations to foreign countries, the advantaged MNE can exploit the already developed
asset at a low marginal cost" (McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994, p.474; italics in
original).
We would argue that this a too narrow interpretation of the monopolistic
advantage theory since it ignores its key feature, namely the notion that firms can
offset additional costs caused by international operations through firm-specific
assets (Hymer 1976). It is the deployment of these assets which leads to rent-
generating differentiation rather than the timing of that deployment or the
sequence of events which is the defining feature of monopolistic advantage
theory.' This approach could seriously weaken McDougall, Shane and Oviatt's
endeavour. On the one side, they provide compelling evidence that the emergence
of international new ventures fits uneasily into the theories of international
business. On the other hand, their theoretical discussion appears too selective and
does not quite lead to an acceptance of the charge that the established body of
theory in international business fails to explain the emergence of INVs.
4 Note that a more thorough discussion of these theories and their application to international start-
ups will be undertaken in the following chapter. We will argue there that the formation of
international new ventures per se is not inconsistent with both internalisation and monopolistic
advantage theory (see also section 2.3.).
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Second, McDougall, Shane and Oviatt provide no detailed tabulated information
that demonstrates the extent to which their three arguments are consistent with
their 24 case studies. Therefore, despite providing intuitively plausible and
theoretically sound rationales for the existence of international new ventures, the
paper can be criticised on methodological grounds. Even so, this is a small
criticism to make, given the paper's rich insights and contribution to theory
development.
Coviello and Munro (1995)
Coviello and Munro applied a network perspective to examine international
activities of New Zealand software firms. To this end, they carried out four
detailed case studies in combination with a short questionnaire sent to 25 firms.
They were interested in finding out how network relationships impact on
international market development and marketing related activities. Coviello and
Munro report that the behaviour of the four case studies substantially departs from
the logic of the internationalisation process model (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
This may be a function of the highly competitive software market which is usually
characterised by short product life cycles and the limited demand in the New
Zealand home market. Coviello and Munro argue that the firms could enter
several markets in rapid succession because they associated themselves with
existing networks lead by powerful players. At the same time, the relationships
developed also constrained their internationalisation efforts.
Though they were initially the focal firms in their networks, the role of these firms
changed over time as their relationships with local dealers and distributors lead to
unsatisfactory international market development. Rapid overseas growth (annual
mean of 83%) was experienced after the firms associated themselves with
powerful multinational players. Today, three of the four firms have been acquired
by these larger partners. When looking at the evolution of marketing activities
over time, the dataset indicates that activities involving product development,
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modification and technology decisions were to a large extent carried out by the
software firms. As expected, activities that were closer to the end customers were
carried out by relationship partners.
Like other contributors to the field of international entrepreneurship, Coviello and
Munro report firm behaviour that is seemingly at odds with the logic of
established internationalisation theories. Their contribution is highly descriptive
and demonstrates how the interactions of software firms with their network
partners influenced the internationalisation process. Overall, they see network
models as additional perspective on internationalisation processes of firms.
Boter and Holmquist (1996)
Boter and Holmquist carried out six case studies in order to investigate the impact
of industry influences on the internationalisation processes in small firms. To this
end they looked at "innovative" versus "conventional" firms, one of each coming
from Norway, Sweden and Finland. Conventional firms were here described as
operating in mature industries (mechanical engineering, caravans, metal
construction) and using an established technologies. Two of these firms were
established SMEs. The "innovative" firms operated in the fields of radar
technology, medical instruments and optical equipment. They were between 10
and 15 years old.
All conventional firms had a very hierarchical organisation with a high degree of
formalisation. Exports were between 5% and 30% of all sales and were directed
mainly to the neighbouring countries. Their culture could be classified as
production-oriented and their technological focus rested on the gradual
improvements of existing products using established technologies. Conventional
firms either appeared to be constrained by the "industry rules" (producing capital
goods that demand far-reaching investments in a market organisation for retail
dealers, customer finance, service and maintenance) or were part of a larger
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supplier-buyer network. Thus they were part of a "tightly coupled business
system."
On the other hand, all innovative companies had well-developed links with other
knowledge-intensive organisations (universities, other firms), highly educated
staff that worked together in a project organisation, and a very high export share
of turnover. In all cases, only between 5% and 10% of their revenues were
generated in their home market. Export markets covered all strong economic areas
of the world. Innovative companies were free to follow any route to
internationalisation, except for constraints stemming from their technology. The
product development process involved close contacts with organisations at the
technological core of the industry, irrespective of their location. The search for
new commercial breakthroughs, new technologies, new products and partners is a
transnational process that involved organisations operating on different continents.
They were thus part of a "loosely coupled" business system which was made up of
independent free-standing actors. The newness of the technology seemed to be a
relevant indicator for how far these firms were able to depart from conventional
industry wisdom.
A major finding was that no important differences between the firms were found
that could be attributed to their nationality. However, there were marked
differences between the two different groups of firms. This suggests the presence
of an industry-specific entrepreneurial high-tech culture that transcends national
borders. What is not clearly developed in this article is how the differences
between the two groups affected on the internationalisation process or pattern.
Though it remains a very insightful account of why and how the two groups differ,
the study is marked by the absence of hypotheses about how these differences
affect internationalisation behaviour.
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Murray (1996)
Murray looked at successfully-exited venture capital backed companies that
received external funding in the early stages of their evolution. Internationalisation
is not the main focus of this paper but the account of the early years of these firms
contains some interesting findings. Out of the six companies examined in the case
studies, five recorded international sales within two years after formation. These
firms respectively developed products in the areas of medical technology, laser-
based rapid prototyping, integrated circuit testing, inkjet printing and
biotechnology.
A common denominator of these firms is that their founders saw their industry as
being independent of national boundaries. The market potential for different
countries was assessed at inception and products were launched internationally.
Without exception, the markets into which the products were launched were large
and growing. In addition, their products required limited or no adjustments for
cross-border commercialisation. Competition was also international. All major
rivals of these firms were based in foreign countries and equally appeared to serve
the world markets from their home-base. A particular feature of the founders of
these firms is that, with the exception of the biotechnology company, all appeared
to have some sort of international experience. The technological specialists all
demonstrated a degree of innovative excellence, which made them known among
their peers at an international level. Without exception, the professional managers
previously worked in larger firms and had business experience in several
countries. This resulted in a high degree of commercial awareness at an
international level and knowledge of foreign partners.
Thus, one can say that these start-ups had an international outlook right from
inception. This "international" mindset can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a
"normal" feature in these high-tech industries. On the other hand, Murray argues
that this attitude is closely related to the presence of the venture capitalists. In
order to achieve their target internal rate of return, the VCs usually back a tiny
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minority of exceptional companies that feature aggressive growth trajectories in
their business plans. Still, while the aggressive growth imperatives imposed by the
venture capitalists automatically required international expansion, particular
competencies of the founders seemed to have helped successful expansion.
Roberts and Senturia (1996)
Roberts and Senturia's study was motivated by exploring the internationalisation
performance of early internationalisers. They argue that internationalisation is
influenced by an "opportunity space" which is in turn determined by the condition
of a particular product and its market, but not by its product life cycle. In addition,
as many authors have done before, they link internationalisation to the attitudes,
commitment and responsiveness of senior managers towards global opportunities.
In order to find further support for their propositions, they carried out interviews
with senior employees of the target companies, a convenience sample of 19
Massachusetts-based computer manufactures and software companies. The firms
were between 5 and 25 years old. Half of these firms started their international
involvement within one year of the domestic product launch. Today, 52% of their
turnover is generated through international sales. Like in the other case studies, a
sub-set of firms decided to move parts of their manufacturing abroad. The
majority of firms, however, saw internationalisation almost exclusively in terms of
commercialisation. Roberts and Senturia's findings can be summarised as follows.
• Management:
Virtually none of the companies had internationally experienced staff at
formation. However, among the firms that considered global markets as
important from inception, usually at least one member of the management team
had prior work experience in a company that was exposed to foreign markets.
The management of these firms - as opposed to the others - felt comfortable
from inception with the idea of overseas expansion.
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• Entry Modes:
Most companies engaged in some form of foreign activity within two years of
their birth. The expansion patters ranged from a merely supporting overseas
markets covered by distributors to simultaneous product launch in major
European and Asian markets. The most popular entry mode was through local
distributors followed by setting up local sales office. None of the 12 companies
that now operate sales offices used that operating mode for their first entry.
After having reached a certain threshold of international sales, they started
supporting local staff or acquired their local distributor. The main motive
behind making this step appeared to be the desire to internalise the
local/regional marketing, distribution and support activities carried out by their
partners. Roberts and Senturia observe the tendency for international activities
to become configured in a way that resembled the domestic business model. In
all cases, this lead to a substantial increase in their non-domestic revenues. Five
of the 19 companies entered their international activities by reactively serving
and supporting foreign markets. This move has usually been triggered by the
initiative of a foreign distributor. These firms were characterised by relatively
low levels of non-domestic revenue.
• Internationalisation Performance:
Roberts and Senturia operationalise performance through the measurement of
the proportion of non-domestic revenues. As expected, a high share of none-
domestic revenues was generated quicker among those firms that that expressed
early interest in international expansion as opposed to firms with a domestic
focus. In addition, companies that progressed to more resource intensive modes
saw sudden increases in their international sales. The least successful
internationalisers had products that required regulatory approval in every
country, technical modifications and extensive support arrangements. A further
finding is that successful globalisation seems to be related to how quickly a
company can create a foreign structure that resembles the domestic business
model. In this context, they note that the use of distributors appeared to retard
quick international expansion. The adoption of technological standards was an
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additional success factor for internationalisation. Roberts and Senturia argue
that a standard or an established technology platform is a way to increase the
legitimacy of small and young firms and to reduce information asymmetries. In
addition, these firms did not have to rely on local distributors. Finally,
companies that successfully entered foreign markets from an early stage on did
not adapt their products to local markets. Localised or tailor-made products
were only introduced at a later stage - accordingly to Roberts and Senturia
mainly with the aim of achieving deeper market penetration and/or rising the
entry barriers for their competitors.
In essence, like all the previous studies, Roberts and Senturia observed young
high-tech firms that made substantial commitments to international activities from
a very early stage of their existence. While, at a superficial level, this seems to be
at odds with stage models or internationalisation process theories, Roberts and
Senturia provide evidence that firms decided to switch to the most resource-
intensive modes only after a certain experience or learning threshold was reached.
While they conclude that the behaviour of the firms in their sample is inconsistent
with established theory, the evidence they produce partly suggests otherwise.
Nonetheless, like the findings of the other studies above, this does suggest that
internationalisation processes do occur in accelerated fashion.
2.2.1.2. Conclusions from the Review of the Case Studies
A number of issues emerge from the discussion of these case studies. Table 1
gives an overview of the reviewed case studies. One can observe a number of
commonalties. Above all, it was striking that every sample was made up of firms
operating in technology- or knowledge-intensive industries. While this may
simply reflect the authors' research and sampling preferences, the choice does
suggest that the phenomenon of international entrepreneurship is particularly
pertinent in high-technology industries.
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Table 1
Overview of Case Studies in International Entrepreneurship
Industry	 Various High-	 IT/Corn hardware Various industries, 	 Software	 Software	 3 "innovative",	 Various High-	 IT hardware and
Tech	 mainly technology	 3 "conventional"	 Tech	 software
intensive
Sampling	 Export directory	 n.a.	 Convenience, n.a.	 selected after	 Convenience	 Convenience	 Successful VC	 Convenience,
Criteria	 questionnaire	 investment and	 Massachusetts-
analysis	 exit	 based
International	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	 no	 no	 Yes
Sales as part of
sampling
criteria
Control group	 RO	 no	 no	 no	 no	 yes, matched pair	 no	 no
Firm Age	 6-25 years	 <= 8 years	 n.a,	 n.a.	 10-15	 10-15 •	 n a	 no
Firm Size	 7-135 employees	 n.a.	 n. a.	 n a.	 25-250	 8-180	 n a	 n a
Focus	 internationalisation 	 start-ups	 review / theory	 internationalisation impact of network	 comparison of	 Characteristics of internationalisation
process	 competing against 	 development	 process	 relationships on	 innovative and	 successful early	 process
multinationals	 internationalisation conventional firms stage technology
VC financed firms
Explicit Focus	 no	 yes	 Yes	 no	 yes	 no	 no	 no
on international
new ventures
Discussion of	 internationalisation no 	 stage models of	 stage models	 process models,	 behavioural	 no	 process and product
International	 process theory and	 internationalisation
	 networking	 approaches to	 life cycle models
Business	 stage models,	 internalisation,	 theories
	
internationalisation
Theories	 internalisation	 oligopolistic
theory	 reaction, product
life cycle
monopolistic
advantage
Key findings	 Evidence of rapid Reports the case of Established 	 Stage models	 "Random"	 internationalisation international	 More rapid and
internationalisation four small start- 	 theories of	 cannot account for involvement in 	 should be	 experience of	 bolder resource
with strong	 ups that became	 international
	 foreign market	 foreign markets 	 understood in	 founder,	 commitment than
resource, but	 global players,	 business fail to	 selection and entry can be attributed	 industry context, 	 international and	 expected by
stronger	 they now perform explain the 	 mode	 to network of	 all innovative	 industry	 international
commitment form different activities formation of
	 contacts,	 companies were	 experience of key business theories,
larger and older	 of their value	 international new
	 more proactive	 managers	 but: incremental
firms	 chain in different ventures	 internationalisers	 pattern
countries
Other findings	 strongest	 international	 background of the product 	 Heavy reliance on concentrated	 deliberate
	 standardisation,
commitment in	 vision,	 entrepreneur, his
	 standardisation	 network	 product scope,	 targeting of large founders'
firms with	 standardised	 international
	 relationships for	 background of	 and growing US	 international
executives with	 products,	 vision and	 marketing related managers 	 market,	 experience, higher
international and	 innovative	 network are
	 activities	 international
	
commitment leads to
industry	 products based on important	 competition,	 higher foreign sales,
experience	 industry shift,	 determinants	 complacency of	 replication of
speed, follow-up	 incumbent large
	 domestic business
products	 firms	 model
Issues	 inclusion of	 no account of	 discussion of	 no account of	 conventional firms no explicit focus 	 selective review of
corporate	 methodology	 international	 methodology	 are established	 on INVs	 international
subsidiaries	 business theories	 SMEs rather than	 business theories
start-ups
* innovative firms only
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All authors reported bold and proactive moves into foreign markets that are
seemingly at odds with the fact that the firms in question were young start-up
businesses. These firms initiated international activities almost from inception and
entered several markets simultaneously in order to launch their products. A
number of factors that are likely to facilitate this process have repeatedly been
identified by the researchers. The internationally operating start-ups have been
founded by individuals with extensive international and industry experience
(Lindqvist 1991; Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1992; McDougall, Shane and Oviatt
1994; Murray 1996 Roberts and Senturia 1996). Furthermore, the founders had
what researchers called "international vision" (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1992;
McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994; Roberts and Senturia 1996), i.e. the drive to
compete with the products in lead markets across the globe, irrespective of their
home countries. Rapid internationalisation was also associated with standardised
products and products incorporating leading-edge technology (Jolly, Alahuhta and
Jeannet 1992; Boter and Holmquist 1996; Murray 1996; Roberts and Senturia
1996). The latter suggests that a high degree of technological differentiation is met
by a certain demand regardless of national boundaries.
In terms of market entry modes, a minority of the start-ups used arrangements that
required direct investment. However, the most popular entry modes were direct
exporting and foreign sales via third parties such as agents and foreign
distributors. Activities closer to the product and technological core were thus
carried out by the start-ups whereas activities closer to the end customer, such as
installation, training and maintenance were handled by local partners. While the
involvement of third parties lead to obvious advantages, i.e. the pooling of
resources and skills, it did not always lead to satisfactory results in terms of
market development (Coviello and Munro 1995; Roberts and Senturia 1996).
When looking at the studies, an additional and quite remarkable feature becomes
apparent. With the exception of Lindqvist (1991) and McDougall, Shane and
Oviatt (1994), none of the authors carried out a systematic review of international
business theories in order to explain the phenomenon at hand. Admittedly, all
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these studies had an exploratory focus. In addition, extreme cases are included on
purpose to highlight the limits of the existing theoretical frameworks (McDougall,
Shane and Oviatt 1994). However, it does appear that the available theoretical
apparatus to explain the phenomenon has not been used to its full extent. Thus,
while a number of authors argue that their results cannot be accommodated by
traditional international business theories, the evidence they produce could also
suggest that firms actually internationalise in an accelerated fashion, but in
accordance with theory (Lindqvist 1991; Roberts and Senturia 1996). A more
systematic application of international business theories to that phenomenon
therefore does seem to be warranted. We will now review the quantitative studies
at hand and report how their results fit into the picture from the case studies.
2.2.2. The Internationalisation of Start-ups: Empirical Evidence from
Quantitative Surveys
2.2.2.1. The Studies
McDougall (1989)
McDougall's 1989 paper is one of the earliest quantitative studies in the field of
international entrepreneurship. Her work was motivated by the lack of research on
how entrepreneurial companies compete internationally. As a starting point, she
developed an early working definition of international new ventures which "see
their operating domain as international from inception of the firm's operation"
(McDougall 1989, p.388). She argued that international new ventures should be
distinguishable from domestic new ventures based on their strategic orientation.
Her mail survey to 2550 firms in the computer and communications hardware
industries generated 250 valid responses. These firms were then grouped into two
classes according to their international sales. Domestic new ventures (90 firms)
did not have any international sales. Firms were classified as international new
ventures (98 firms) if their international sales exceeded 5% of turnover.
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In essence, McDougall's results suggest that the strategy and perceived industry
structure profiles of the domestic firms differ significantly from the international
ones. The strategy content variables contributed more to these differences than the
perceived industry structure variables. The variable that had the highest
discriminatory power was related to the marketing and distribution strategy of
these firms. Rather than being niche providers, international new ventures seemed
to serve customers in numerous different segments.
Overall, the paper does not analyse the international activities of these firms in
more detail. It gives no account on key indicators such as the size of the firms,
entry modes used, timing of market entry or the distribution of the share of non-
domestic revenues. The lack of information on the latter makes the chosen
threshold of 5% international sales for international new ventures appear
somewhat arbitrary. The paper does, however, provide evidence that a quite a
substantial proportion of new ventures in the chosen industries compete
internationally. As such, it is one of the first statements highlighting the
emergence of international start-ups
Lindqvist (1991)
As part of her dissertation, Lindqvist carried out a mail survey in order to test the
propositions derived from her case study work with regard to the speed of market
entry, the pattern of market selection and the choice of entry mode (see also the
preceding section). Firms were identified using both export and industry
directories. The mail survey resulted in a sample of 95 firms with international
activities for which usable questionnaires were obtained. On average, these firms
were 12 years old and employed 56 employees.' Today, the non-domestic revenue
5 Firms that were up to 25 years old were included in the survey. Note that this would be
inconsistent with definition of a young start-up in the majority of US studies (Oviatt and
McDougall 1997).
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of these firms amounts to 60% of total turnover. Lindqvist's findings can be
summarised as follows:
• Speed of market entry:
44% of the firms entered their first foreign market during their first or second
year of operation. 78% of the firms initiated international activities within five
years. However, once international activities had been initiated, the speed of
foreign market commitment differed markedly with the time required to enter
five foreign markets ranging from 0 to 17 years. The multivariate analysis
revealed that the speed of market entry was influenced by the following
factors. Firms entered their first foreign market more quickly when their
management had previous international experience. Firms that characterised
their products as being very innovative were older when they entered foreign
markets for the first time, but quicker at entering five markets. This suggests
that innovative products require more time to develop. Subsequently, they are
then launched simultaneously in several markets. Structural factors such as
firm size and R&D intensity did not have a significant influence on the timing
of market entry.
• Pattern of market selection
On average, the firms in Lindqvist's sample entered six foreign markets. When
looking at the markets entered, it became apparent that the firms followed a
relatively traditional pattern. The majority of entries (both initial entries and
total entries today) were made into relatively close Scandinavian and Western
European countries. In many cases, there has not been a sequential pattern of
market entry, but rather a pattern where firms entered "clusters" of markets
simultaneously.
• Foreign entry modes:
Foreign agents and distributors were the most popular entry modes among the
firms in Lindqvist's sample. They were used by 87 % of the firms. Direct
exports were used by 68 %, subsidiaries by 44 % and licensing by 11 % of the
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firms. This also shows that the majority of firms used several entry modes at
the time. Subsidiaries were most common in large markets such as the US, the
UK and Germany. Note also that these firms were quite old and had extensive
experience before establishing subsidiaries. Most subsidiaries performed sales
and after sales tasks rather than production activities.
Lindqvist concluded that there are a number of results that lend support to the
theoretical prescriptions of the internationalisation process model (Johanson and
Vahlne 1977). While the majority of firms seemed to follow a traditional, albeit
accelerated pattern, there is an important minority of firms whose
internationalisation behaviour deviated. Furthermore, the bivariate and
multivariate regressions did not reveal any structural, firm-specific variables such
as firm size, age or R&D intensity that had an unanimous effect on the different
dimensions of internationalisation. This suggests that internationalisation could
actually be understood as a threshold. Once firms have internationalised, the
variable traditionally associated with that decision can not explain subsequent
internationalisation behaviour.
Bell (1995)
Bell's article reviewed the discussion of the appropriateness of stage theories with
regard to the internationalisation of business firms. The proposition that
internationalisation proceeds in an incremental way is tested with observations of
small software firms from Ireland, Finland and Norway. These countries have
been chosen because of the limited size of their home markets, the resulting
dependence on export markets and the fact that they are relatively isolated from
their target export markets. Using a triangulation approach, the author first
conducted a survey which leads to the collection of data from 98 firms, 88 of
which were exporting at the time of the survey. Subsequently, he chose a sub-
sample of 24 firms to examine the result of the survey in more detail. The results
can be summarised as follows:
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• Market selection:
Some software firms entered foreign markets before selling into their home
market. The survey data seemed to support the "psychic distance" concept, as
the majority of firms chose countries that were geographically and culturally
close for their initial market entries. However, an important minority of firms
chose distant countries for their first market entry. The case studies revealed a
number of explanations for this unusual behaviour. These consisted of
following an existing client abroad, of receiving unsolicited orders, of
strategies that targeted a specific sector for their products irrespectively of the
country of destination and of general trends in the computer industry. The latter
stem from the fact that the computer industry seems to be concentrated in a few
countries and that presence in these countries was judged as strategic necessity
by the respondents.
• Entry Modes:
When looking at entry modes, the survey revealed that 70% of overseas
transactions have been conducted through direct exports or exports using
agents and distributors. Firms that commercialised bespoke or semi-bespoke
products usually did not involve intermediaries. Firms that sold standard, "off-
the-shelf' products were more likely to use intermediaries. Few firms engaged
in foreign direct investment. No subsidiary carried out production or research
and development activities, but this may reflect the peculiarities of the software
industry. The case studies indicated that direct contacts with the clients (i.e. not
involving intermediaries) were chosen especially when the support in terms of
consultancy, systems design, customisation, configuration, installation,
training, up-grading and after sales requirements was needed. Due to the short
expected life cycles (two to three years), direct exporting was perceived by the
interview partners as the quickest way to get access to international markets.
This was especially the case for firms that offered highly specialised niche
products whose sales would not be able to generate high revenues in any given
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national market over a long period. Most firms did not change their initial entry
mode over time.
Bell stated that neither firm age nor size were significantly related to the decision
to internationalise as firms of all size and age groups were found to engage in
cross-border activities. Bell thus concluded that his data represents further
evidence that the prescriptions of the internationalisation process model (Johanson
and Vahlne 1977; 1990) do not correspond to the observed internationalisation
pattern of his sample. In the present case, Bell argued that industry specific factors
seem to contribute more to an understanding of the rapid internationalisation.
However, Bell's study has a number of shortcomings. First, he did not provide any
data on firm age or critical issues such as timing of market entry. Second, he
merely described his dataset instead of testing hypotheses on the
internationalisation behaviour. Third, he gave no account of the selection criteria
for his case studies. If these are mainly composed of the most extreme
internationalisers, then the claim that his data does not correspond to the
behaviour predicted by process models is not remarkable. In the absence of that
information, the study has to face the criticism that there is a certain incongruence
of investigative method and conclusion. Thus, this study mainly highlights the
phenomenon and provides qualitative evidence from interviews on the export
decision, entry modes, location and subsequent evolution of international
activities.
McDougall and Oviatt (1996)
This project is a follow-up study of McDougall's (1989) earlier study on the
difference between international new ventures and domestic new ventures in the
information technology and communications hardware industries. Both authors
were concerned with the performance implications of internationalisation. They
point out that most studies that investigated the impact of internationalisation on
performance are based on cross-sectional datasets. In order to examine
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performance implications over time, they recontacted the respondents of
McDougall's earlier study reviewed above. Usable questionnaires were received
from 62 firms.
McDougall and Oviatt's data suggests that ventures with higher levels of
international sales have a higher level of performance in the subsequent period
when considering relative market share as measure. However, this relationship
was insignificant when taking return on investment as performance indicator. The
results suggest that, although the more international firms have been able to
increase their market share over time, this did not translate into higher
profitability. McDougall and Oviatt's analysis also reveals that firms that increased
their internationalisation had a high association between changes in their strategy
and their performance level. However, the pattern of strategic change is not
consistent. The inability to provide consistent indications of change is explained
by the small sample size due to low response of follow-up and the short period
between initial enquiry and follow-up.
As in McDougall's earlier study, this article less concerned with the
internationalisation pattern and processes rather than with general performance
issues. In that respect, it raises the important point that, although many observers
recommend internationalisation as a performance enhancing strategy, this may not
automatically lead to higher profitability.
Bloodgood, Sapienza and Almeida (1996)
Bloodgood, Sapienza and Almeida examine the strategic and structural
characteristics of internationally operating new high-technology ventures at the
time of their initial public offering (IPO) and the impact of internationalisation on
performance two years after the IPO. Drawing on the resource-based view of the
firm, they argue that internationalisation is a function of top management's
international exposure, sources of competitive advantage, innovation and firms
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size. Their sample consists of 61 venture capital-backed firms that were five years
old or younger at the time of their 1991 IPO. Information was gathered by
analysing the content of IPO prospectuses. The firms came from several different
industries. On average, they had sales of US $79 million (median US $13 million)
and employed 1668 people (median 171). The dataset also contains one firm with
47,000 employees and a turnover of US $660 million which probably accounts for
most of the differences between mean and median. Bloodgood, Almeida and
Sapienza develop hypotheses and operationalise their measures.
Internationalisation is measured using Porter's (1985) value chain concept.
Accordingly, a firm's activities were divided into inbound logistics, operations,
outbound logistics, marketing and sales and service. The researchers then screened
the IPO prospectuses for international activities and assigned scores depending on
how many of those five elements were performed abroad. Performance is
operationalised using sales growth and income before interest and taxes. R&D
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure was used as a measure for
innovation. Control variables include leverage, industry growth rate and industry
profitability.
Their regression results can be summarised as follows. A positive relationship was
found between internationalisation and the number of directors with previous
international work experience. International education of top management did not
have a significant impact. The hypothesis that internationalisation was positively
related to a low cost strategy could not be supported. Pursuing a product rather
than a marketing differentiation strategy lead to higher internationalisation scores.
As opposed to the positive hypothesised relationship, the measure innovation
turned out to be negatively related to internationalisation, albeit only at a
marginally significant level. Firm size (employees) had a positive impact on
internationalisation. With regard to performance, the regressions produced mixed
evidence. Income was affected positively by internationalisation, but negatively
by innovation. Sales growth was not affected by the degree of internationalisation
at the starting period. It was, however, positively affected by a low cost strategy
and a product differentiation strategy, innovation and firm size. No significant
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relationships were found for the remaining variables. Altogether, the impact of the
independent variables on internationalisation and the two performance variables is
not uniform. Furthermore, internationalisation was positively related to income,
but was not related to sales growth. The lack of a significant increase in sales
among the more international firms can, according to the researchers, be attributed
to the fact that those firms were already the largest in absolute terms at the time of
the IPO. This could also mean that most successful firms were also the best at
internationalising their business activities.
Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza mention two issues - their exclusive inclusion
of US ventures and their cross-industry sampling - as primary limitations of their
study. Yet, there are at least two additional points that also merit discussion. The
first point is related to their sampling strategy. All firms included in this study are
venture capital backed firms that have staged an IPO. The sample is thus
composed of a particular type of highly successful firms - "new high potential
ventures" in the terms of the authors, which, compared to the total population of
start-ups of similar age, can almost be regarded as outliers or exceptions. It is
therefore unclear, whether or not the results apply to other samples of
internationally operating start-ups.
The second point is related to the chosen measure of internationalisation. There is
a certain literature concerned with measuring the degree of internationalisation of
the firm which suggest that the most frequently used and arguably most
appropriate measure is the share of non-domestic revenue (Sullivan 1994,
Ramaswamy, Kroeck and Renforth 1996). The operationalisation chosen by
Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza of using Porter's value chain is not without
danger. A firm that manufactures and performs inbound logistics abroad but sells
domestically will get a score identical to that of a firm with a foreign sales and
service subsidiary. Yet, the latter firm may generate a substantial part of its
revenues from foreign sales whereas the former doesn't. Therefore, despite the
identical score, the strategy and structure profiles may be quite different. The fact
that some of the empirical relationships do not correspond to the hypothesised
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relationships may be a side-effect of the measure of internationalisation used.
Finally, despite the fact that higher internationalisation leads to higher sales, it
may not be desirable for a company to perform all activities along the value chain
abroad. Given the prominence of Silicon Valley for the development and
manufacturing of leading edge information technology, it might not be sensible
for a US venture to relocate these activities abroad.
Therefore, while the overall argument of the study is convincing, the results
should be interpreted in the light of the peculiar sample and the operationalisation
of the concept of internationalisation. Nonetheless, this one of the few studies that
discusses several international business theories in order to derive variables and
test their impact on the degree of internationalisation of a firm.
Reuber and Fischer (1997)
Reuber and Fischer's article examines the relationship between the international
experience of management teams of Canadian software firms and their degree of
internationalisation. Their sample includes 49 cases. The firms were on average 11
years old and employed 41 people. On average, international activities were
initiated after five years. Today, 88% of software firms have international sales
(71% outside North America). The mean share of non-domestic revenue amounts
to 54%.
An interesting feature of Reuber and Fischer's work is their indirect modelling of
the influence of international experience on the degree of internationalisation.
Accordingly, international experience is expected to influence two mediator
variables, the use of foreign strategic partners and delay (time lag) in initiating
foreign sales after start-up. In essence, their data does suggest that international
experience leads to a shorter delay of internationalisation and to a greater number
of alliances. Both these factors, in turn, had a significant impact on the degree of
internationalisation. In addition, both firm age and firm size were not significantly
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related to the degree of internationalisation. Overall, the article is very focussed
and contains an insightful discussion on the measurement of the degree of
internationalisation.
2.2.2.2. Conclusions from the Review of the Quantitative Studies
During the review of these quantitative studies, it became clear that there was no
unifying agenda guiding these research projects. Consequently, the majority of the
results are complementary rather than conflicting. While some studies were
concerned with performance issues, others had a defined focus on
internationalisation behaviour. Table 2 gives an overview of common elements of
the studies.
Despite the different objectives of the above studies, it is possible to identify a
number of common denominators. Above all, three of the six studies have
confirmed the influence of top management's international experience on
internationalisation behaviour (Lindqvist 1991; Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza
1996; Reuber and Fischer 1996). Those results corroborate the findings of the case
studies as they largely indicate that this experience facilitates internationalisation
processes and leads to a higher the degree of internationalisation of a firm.
Furthermore, in their conclusions, the authors of two studies also argue that the
internationalisation behaviour of the firms is influenced by industry-specific
factors (McDougall 1989; Bell 1996).
There is relatively little information given on the structural forms that the
international activities of these firms take. Thus, while all papers based on case
studies contain some cases that internationalised rapidly into several markets
using resource-intensive entry strategies, there is, with the exception of Lindqvist
(1991), no quantitative study that investigates the prevalence of this behaviour
with a larger sample of firms. The authors do not provide any information on the
entry modes used.
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n.a.	 Inclusion in	 IPO
McDougall (1989)
n.a.	 no
	
no
no
internationalisation no
process theory and
stage models
Table 2
Overview of Quantitative Studies in International Entrepreneurship
Authors	 McDougall
	
Lindqvist
	
Bell
	
McDougall 8c	 Bloodgood,	 Reuber & Fischer
Oviatt
	
Almeida &
Sapienza
Year published	 1989
	
1991
	
1995
	
1996
	
1996
	
1997
Number of
	
188
	
95
	
98
	
62
	
61
	
49
surveyed firms
Industry	 IT/Comm.	 Various High-Tech
	
Software	 IT/Comm.	 Various Services	 Software
Hardware	 Hardware	 and High-Tech
yes
4
22.6
Performance
Sampling
criteria
International
sales as
sampling
criteria
Control group
Mean firm age
Mean firm size
Focus
Dun & Bradstreet Export Directory
no
	 yes
yes	 no	 no
n.a.	 12	 n.a.
n.a.	 56	 n.a.
Strategy and	 Internationalisation Internationalisation
industry profile	 Process
	
Process
Industry directory
no
not explicitly	 not explicitly
less than 5 years at
	
11
time of IPO
1668
	
41
Determinants of
	
Degree of
internationalisation internationalisation
and performance
yesExplicit focus
on international
new ventures
Discussion of
international
business
theories
yes	 no
no	 internationalisation
process theory and
stage models,
internalisation
theory
yes (?)	 no
internationalisation process model
process model,
monopolistic
advantage
Key findings	 domestic and
international
ventures differ in
terms of industry
and strategy
profile, notion that
INVs are different
observed rapid
international isation
, but market
selection and entry
modes in line with
internationalisation
process theory
Stage models
cannot account for
foreign market
selection and entry
mode
international new
ventures have
higher levels of
market share, but
not ROI, Increased
international sales
only lead to
increased
performance when
accompanied by
strategic change
international work
experience of
managers, product
differentiation and
firm size are
positively rel. to
internationalisation
level of
internationalisation
at IPO is positively
related to earnings
2 years later
international
experience of
management,
mediator effect of
internationalisation
behaviour which in
turn positively
influences the
firm's degree of
internationalisation
Issues	 some old SMEs	 no account of
	
firm size, sample
and corporate	 methodology	 of very successful
subsidiaries	 firms, measure of
included
	
internationalisation
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The review of these studies revealed an additional feature that merits
consideration. With the exception of McDougall (1989) and McDougall and
Oviatt (1986), none of the studies intentionally compares international start-ups
with domestic start-ups. In these two studies, the two groups of firms are
compared in order to identify differences in their strategy and structure pattern.
Possible factors that could cause internationalisation in the first place and
differences in their internationalisation behaviour are not examined. The studies of
Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996) and Reuber and Fischer (1997) do
contain a number of firms without international activities. However, these firms
are not used as a control group. Rather, internationalisation is regarded as a
continuum (teaching from 0 to 1 or from 0 to 100) and no particular attention is
devoted to the non-internationalising firms.' The remaining two studies sampled
only internationalisers.
A further observation relates to the theoretical core of the papers. With the
exception of Lindqvist (1991) and Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996),
none of the studies is discussing different theories of international business in their
literature review. This became apparent, as several studies criticised
internationalisation process theory and stage models. Yet, these are not the only
theories of international business that could be applied to the case of international
start-ups. To date, it has not been tested whether different theories of international
business can account between the differences of internationalisers and non-
international i sers.
The final point emerging from the discussion is related the prevalence of the
phenomenon. The only study using a random sampling procedure within the
chosen industries is the initial study of McDougall (1989). The share of firms with
international activities identified suggests that, in the absence of non-response
'Note that the notion of internationalisation as continuum would be disputed by those scholars
that see internationalisation as "organisational innovation" for a firm (see Andersen 1993 for a
review).
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bias, about half of the US start-ups that manufacture information technology and
communications hardware equipment have generated revenues from international
sales, albeit at a low level. All other studies use non-random sampling procedures.
The study of Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996) only includes data on
exceptionally successful firms. All other studies are based on export directories.
As a result, there is, to date, no reliable information on the prevalence of the
phenomenon of international entrepreneurship in industrialised economies.
To conclude, the lack of overlap between the exploratory case studies and the
quantitative studies was striking. There are a number of issues that have been
raised by the case studies which have not been subject to empirical testing so far.
The only point where the results of these studies converge is the international
experience of the top management of these firms. A reason for this apparent lack
of overlap could be the simultaneous timing of these studies. In any case, it shows
that, in this relatively young area of academic activity, plenty of issues have yet to
be researched.
2.2.3. Conclusions from the Review of Research in International
Entrepreneurship
The main results of the review of the empirical research papers in international
entrepreneurship can be summarised under four broad headings.
First, there is relatively little overlap between the case study based research and
the studies based on mail survey data. With the exception of Lindqvist (1991) who
uses a triangulation approach, the quantitative studies surveyed incorporate few
research hypotheses derived from a review of qualitative studies in international
entrepreneurship. As mentioned already above, this could be a result of the
simultaneous timing of these studies and the fact that even some of the
quantitative studies were exploratory in focus. Therefore, it does not come as a
surprise that there is little common ground between these two groups of studies
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aside from the largely undisputed influence of top management's international
experience on the start-ups internationalisation behaviour.' Yet, there are a number
of additional propositions derived from the case studies that merit further testing.
Second, with the exception of McDougall (1989) and McDougall and Oviatt
(1996), none of the studies has tried to identify differences between
internationalising and non-internationalising firms. Although, McDougall (1989)
and McDougall and Oviatt (1996) are concerned with strategy and structure
profiles and performance issues, they do not investigate the pattern of
internationalisation of the firms in their sample. Consequently, it is currently
unknown whether the case study findings, which are largely based on convenience
samples, can be replicated using large samples, let alone whether they can
discriminate between international and domestic start-ups. Thus, a test of these
propositions should involve a control group of non-internationalisers.
Third, an interesting feature of all reviewed papers on the internationalisation of
start-ups is that nearly all firms were operating in high-technology sectors. Not a
single study focused on low technology firms. This raises the question of whether
there is anything particular about technology-intensive firms that makes them
engage in cross-border operations earlier than other firms. In the context of small
firms in general, this notion of a systematic difference received some support in
the past from a survey that reported that high-technology SMEs were more likely
to engage in international activities than low-technology SMEs (Small Business
Research Centre 1992). A number of points, such as increasing cost of research
and development, shorter life-cycles for technology and the convergence of
demand pattern for technology-intensive goods across countries, can be identified
that speak in favour of high-technology being a special case. Accordingly, various
operationalisations of technology-intensity at industry level have been shown to
be important determinant of the increase of flow of goods across national borders
7 Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996) found that international schooling had no significant
effect on the degree of internationalisation of the firms in their sample. International work
experience, however, was positively related at a significant level.
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(Frank° 1989, Kobrin 1991). Technological change, the same factor that provided
the initial opportunity for a start-up to respond to demand irrespective of national
borders, can also represent its biggest threat. A one-product start-up faces the
danger of obsolescence as soon as technological evolution moves on. This means
that a start-up competing in a narrow market niche may have no choice but to
venture abroad from an early stage in order to generate revenues to pay back the
initial development costs and to finance ongoing development. But how many of
these firms are there? How realistic is the assumption that a start-ups can compete
internationally? Evidence on these questions remains scarce as there is, to date, no
study that systematically surveys internationally operating start-ups in a particular
country.
A final issue became apparent after the review of the empirical studies. In their
influential 1994 paper, based on a discussion of international business theories and
24 case studies of international new ventures, McDougall, Shane and Oviatt make
the following claim:
"Neither monopolistic advantage theory, product cycle theory, stage theory of
internationalization, oligopolistic reaction theory, nor internalization theory can
explain the formation process of INVs. These theories fail because they assume that
firms that firms have become international long after they have been formed, and
they therefore highlight large, mature firms" (McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994,
p.469-470).
However, the majority of subsequent studies published to date have not applied all
existing international business theories to the study of these firms. While several
authors have echoed these criticisms (e.g. Knight and Cavusgil 1996) and argued
that existing international business theories fail to explain the behaviour of
international start-ups, the majority of them discuss one or at best two of the
theoretical frameworks available to explain internationalisation (Bell 1995;
Coviello and Munro 1995; Roberts and Senturia 1996). Notable exceptions
include Lindqvist (1991) and Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996). Note
however, Lindqvist's research includes firms that are up to 25 years old in her
sample. These firms fall outside the definition conventionally used in order to
operationalise "new ventures" (Oviatt and McDougall 1997). The firms in the
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sample of Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza are highly successful ventures that
staged an IPO which raises issues of how representative that sample is.
Furthermore, their research focus was not on testing different international
business theories. The questions thus remains whether there is a need for a new
theory or whether the phenomenon can be explained with existing theoretical
frameworks of the field of international business. As we already pointed out
during the above review of McDougall, Shane and Oviatt's 1994 paper, we have
some doubts as to whether the international business theories reviewed there are
interpreted in the spirit of their original proponents. For McDougall, Shane and
Oviatt's argument to become accepted by a broader community of international
business scholars, a more systematic discussion and application of international
business theories to the phenomenon of international start-ups is required.
While we sympathise with the claim that refined theoretical foundations are
required to explain the emergence of that peculiar type of firm that is international
at inception, we believe that the established theories of international business can
still inform us in explaining the larger phenomenon of start-ups that initiate
international activities during their first years of operation. To this end, we will
undertake a task largely absent in the work of international entrepreneurship
researchers: we will review the dominant theories of the field of international
business and discuss their application to technology-based start-ups.
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2.3.	 Theories of International Business
2.3.1. Overview of Different Theories
The term international business has become the common denominator for a highly
eclectic array of research areas including disciplines such as economics,
management, marketing, organisational behaviour, social psychology, industrial
relations, finance and accounting to name only a few. The literature most relevant
for this research investigates the internationalisation of the firm. Most scholars of
internationalisation have focused on a number of core questions. In essence, these
are:
• Why do firms compete abroad?
• Which firms go abroad?
• What structural forms do their international activities take?
• Which foreign markets do they chose?
• How fast do they enter different markets over time?
• Why can some firms compete in foreign settings despite the obvious
disadvantages whereas others choose to stay in their domestic environment?
These different questions have been addressed through various theoretical and
empirical approaches. Among the theories of internationalisation, one can make a
distinction between research that, on the one side, uses the concepts and tools of
economic analysis and research that stems from a more behavioural perspective on
the other. The former has mainly been built around the notions of monopolistic
advantage, oligopolistic behaviour, product life cycles, transaction costs and
market failure. The latter consists mainly of internationalisation process models,
stage theories and network theories of international business. More recently, the
resource-based and organisational capability perspectives, which draw on both
economic and behavioural concepts, have been applied to international business.
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When looking at these theories and their empirical application, it appears that
some of them provide only limited insights into the internationalisation processes
of small, entrepreneurial start-ups. For example, oligopolistic behaviour theory
has been developed to explain the actions of large multinational firms that
compete on a global scale against a limited number of multinational rivals. It
provides a theoretical explanation for the competitive interaction of these firms
with their rivals (Knickerbocker 1973). While certainly relevant when looking at
established multinationals, it is doubtful whether the "global oligopoly"
assumption can be applied to the objects of the present research.
Similarly, product life cycle will probably be ill-suited to investigate the
international activities of start-ups as it is mainly concerned with the location of
international production of large mature firms. It was originally aimed at
providing an explanation for the failure of the neo-classical theory of comparative
advantage to predict the pattern of international trade and production. In its
various forms (Vernon 1966; Vernon 1979) it distinguishes between several stages
in the life cycle of a product. Its main argument is that a product's life cycle stage
will determine the geographical pattern of its production. At every stage, the
different competitive context, which is usually expected to follow some sort of
commoditisation logic, forces the firm to reduce the product's price. Over time,
this requires different factor inputs. Firms are then expected to locate to those
countries where these production factors are cheapest.
While there is no "network theory of internationalisation" as such in the field of
international business, network theories have become increasingly popular with
researchers of interested in the internationalisation pattern of firms (Johanson and
Mattson 1993; Coviello and Munro 1995; Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson and
Johanson 1996; Welch and Welch 1996). Networks are at the same time an
antecedent and outcome (Welch and Welch 1996) of internationalisation. The
network perspective is a serious contender for inclusion and has in the past been
applied to study the interactions of high-tech start-ups with their environment (e.g.
Coviello and Munro 1995; Yli-Renko and Autio 1998). However, we would like
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to argue that there are a number of problems associated with that approach.
Besides the problem of operationalisation (Borch and Arthur 1995), the approach
arguably lacks normative and discriminative power when applied to
internationalisation. The majority of international activities take place between
business firms and contain therefore some relational element. At the same time, it
is not clear to what extent this relational element triggered internationalisation, as
it is virtually impossible to obtain networking variables on those firms that have
not internationalised. Furthermore, case studies show that there are firms, whose
initial internationalisation decisions cannot be accounted for by network
arguments (Bell 1995). It therefore does not come as a surprise that empirical tests
on the impact of networks on organisational outcomes take both networks and
international activities as given variables (e.g. Coviello and Munro 1995;
Blankenburg Holm, Eriksson and Johanson 1996). Note, however, that this is not
to deny the premise on which many networking studies are based, i.e. that
economic analysis has an undersocialised view of the world which ignores that
most transactions are embedded in a context of social relations (Granovetter
1985). The impact of social control and trust as determinants of organisational
outcomes is also undisputed. Furthermore, there have been important insights
emerging from studies that interpreted networks as mechanisms for resource
leveraging (Yli-Renko and Autio 1998) or reported that the quality and frequency
of a firm's interactions with its environment affects its approach to
internationalisation (Johanson and Mattson 1993). Still, the approach arguably
lacks power to predict the answers of the above-mentioned core questions in
international business. It is therefore probably best applied to studies that compare
the impact of different network characteristics on organisational outcomes or to
case studies concerned with the overall evolution and pattern of international
activities over time, after internationalisation has been initiated.
We would therefore like to argue that the above approaches provide only limited
insights when applied to the present research objective, the internationalisation of
high-tech start-ups. 8 The literature review will thus concentrate mainly on
8 As the above discussion has shown, this does, strictly speaking, not apply to networking theories.
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internationalisation process theories, transaction-cost theory, monopolistic
advantage and resource-based perspectives. Their core elements, criticisms and
implications for high-tech start-ups are discussed in the following sections.
2.3.2. Internationalisation Process Theories and Stage Models
Theoretical Core
Besides those theories of international business that are based on the concepts and
tools of economic analysis, models which are strongly influenced by the
behavioural theory of the firm developed by Cyert and March (1963) have become
influential in explaining cross-border operations of firms. One of the earliest
contributions can be found in the work of Aharoni (1966). In his study of 38 US
firms, he found several factors that influence the internationalisation decision, the
most important being an international outlook of higher executives. Once the
decision to internationalise had been taken, the pattern of foreign activities
followed a learning process during which international operations where gradually
scaled up.
These results served as starting point for a number of Swedish researchers at
Uppsala University in the 1970s whose case studies led to the development of a
more general model of the internationalisation of the firm (Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Johanson and Vahlne 1977). One of the earliest
manifestations of their work became the concept of "economic distance" which in
itself consists of the two factors "physical distance" and "psychic distance." 9 They
showed that economic distance influenced the geographical choice of market entry
and that the firms in their sample initiated their operations in countries that were
However, the methods required for their application are probably incompatible with the main
objective of the present study.
9 The concept has its origins in context of international trade. Introduced by Burenstam-Linder
(1961), it was used to explain why most trade takes place between countries with relatively
similarly factor endowments despite contrary predictions derived from the principle of
comparative advantage. In the management literature, the terms economic distance and psychic
distance are frequently used interchangeably.
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relatively close. Once the entry decision had been taken, the pattern of the foreign
activities followed an "establishment chain" (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul
1975) where firms successively extended their involvement in foreign markets
over the years from no regular exports up to foreign production.
The mechanism behind this increasing involvement was introduced in an
influential article by Johanson and Vahlne (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). They
argued that the establishment chain is the result of a circular learning process
which starts after the decision to venture abroad has been taken. They see
internationalisation as a "process of incremental adjustment to changing
conditions of the firm and the market" (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, p.26). A basic
assumption - like in the economic approaches described above - is that firms have
to deal with costs and uncertainties when entering a foreign environment. These
are caused by the different business culture, language, market structures, to name
only a few. According to Johanson and Vahlne, firms overcome these
disadvantages by gaining direct experiential knowledge of foreign markets over
time.
They propose a dynamic model consisting of change and state aspects where the
outcome of one decision feeds back as input into the next decision. They argue
that the initial decision to commit resources to the commercialisation of products
abroad over time leads to a better knowledge of the foreign environment. This
knowledge, derived from the current international activities, feeds back on the
decision to commit resources for future activities and leads, over time, to a steady
increase of commitment to the foreign market (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). In
their own words "market knowledge and market commitment affect both
commitment decisions and the way current decisions are performed - and these, in
turn, change market knowledge and commitment" (Johanson and Vahlne 1990,
p.12).
According to this view, a firm starts its internationalisation by venturing into those
markets with the lowest perceived uncertainty (or lowest economic distance).
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Arrangements that require relatively few resources, such as exporting, will be the
preferred entry modes. Better knowledge is acquired over time through operating
in that market and thereby uncertainties and information costs present prior to the
initial investment decrease. Based on the new knowledge, the firm might now
reassess its position and increase its involvement in the foreign environment. 10 It
follows then that internationalisation proceeds along a dynamic feedback logic
where the initial involvement reduces uncertainty which may then lead to an
increasing commitment and a scaling up of the foreign operations towards more
resource-intensive modes. Furthermore, the knowledge acquired during the first
foreign market entry influences the choice and entry mode of subsequent market
entries. Employees involved in the internationalisation process will, due to their
greater knowledge of foreign markets, perceive better opportunities and promote
solutions to exploit them. Therefore, Johanson and Vahlne argue that the
internationalisation proceeds irrespective of whether strategic decisions are taken
by management (Johanson and Vahlne 1990). The quasi-deterministic nature is
thus an additional feature of their model.
In a more recent restatement of their model, Johanson & Vahlne (1990) identify
three exceptions to the assertion of incremental involvement in small steps. First,
big firms with a large resource base can be expected to make larger
internationalisation steps. Second, relevant market knowledge can be gained by
means other than first-hand market experience when market conditions are stable
and homogeneous. In this case, firms may also internationalise faster and in larger
steps. Third, firms may generalise experience gained from other markets with
similar conditions. Thus, the process of increasing commitment may not have an
identical pattern in all countries.
Critical Comments
Johanson and Vahlne's work provided the basis for extensive empirical research
from numerous scholars in different countries. Known under the heading "stage
I ° Others have pointed out that better knowledge might equally lead to a reduction of commitment
(see Dalli 1994, Calof and Beamish 1995).
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models" of internationalisation, they support the view of internationalisation as
incremental process (Bilkey and Tesar 1977; Bilkey 1978; Cavusgil 1980; Reid
1981; Wortzel and Wortzel 1981; Czinkota 1982; Barrett and Wilkinson 1985;
Lim, Sharkey and Kim 1991; Moon and Lee 1991; Rao and Naidu 1992; Crick
1995). All studies argued that internationalisation behaviour is best represented by
invoking distinct stages reaching from no foreign involvement to foreign direct
investment. The methodological foundations of these empirical studies using the
concept have frequently been subject to strong criticism (Turnbull 1987, see also
Andersen 1993; Leonidou and Katsikeas 1996 for reviews). Critics point out that
stage models are tautological (Andersen 1993). Instead of reflecting increasing
commitment to internationalisation, the different stages are direct results of the
classification criteria used by the researchers. Their arbitrary definition makes it
difficult to delimit the stages. In addition, all studies have been derived from
cross-sectional samples which makes it impossible to analyse the temporal and
causal logic behind the internationalisation process. Thus, the question of whether
firms' action is as deterministic as claimed by Johanson and Vahlne, i.e. whether
firms really move from stage to stage until they produce abroad, and the
influencing factors behind the moves remains contested. Furthermore, factors that
lead to the initiation of the internationalisation process in the first place and
reasons why firms can operate in foreign environments despite obvious cost
disadvantages against host country competitors are not examined in detail. Finally,
critics have pointed out that stage models are purely descriptive. As opposed to
Johanson and Vahlne's original mechanism, they lack explanatory power as they
fail to develop a mechanism for the transition between stages.
Note that the process view of Johanson and Vahlne does not explicitly expect
distinct stages of internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne 1990). However, the
establishment chain and the pattern of firms entering markets with successively
greater psychic distance over time are seen as "possible indicators" for the
existence of the process as outlined above (Johanson and Vahlne 1990). Besides
the methodological problems associated with the empirical test of Johanson and
Vahlne's mechanism of internationalisation, its theoretical core and behavioural
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assumptions have been subject to criticism. The emphasis on experience as a
principal independent variable and the quasi-deterministic nature of the
internationalisation process, irrespectively of whether strategic action in that
direction are taken by its management, is difficult to reconcile with strategic
management theories based on micro-economic frameworks. Furthermore, none of
the three exceptions to the incremental logic mentioned by Johanson & Vahlne
(1990) applies, that would explain the rapid internationalisation of small, young
firms that operates in fast changing, unstable high-technology markets and that
have no prior experience in international environments (McDougall, Shane and
Oviatt 1994; Oviatt & McDougall 1994). Finally, as better knowledge may not
always lead to increasing commitment, the notion of more appropriate
commitment, after a consideration of the firms resources and its strategic
orientation, is more appealing. This would reconcile the theory with observations
of small firms that enter and leave foreign markets in a flexible manner and make
the model less deterministic (Dalli 1994; Welch and Welch 1996). The combined
criticism has lead one observer to conclude that "the use of only one explanatory
variable (experiential knowledge) is not likely to provide a sufficient explanation
for a firm's choice of entry mode" (Andersen 1997, p.32; parentheses in original).
Despite these criticisms, elements of the original approach of Johanson and
Vahlne have recently been 'rediscovered' by scholars interested in the management
of multinational firms (Madhok 1997). The focus on experience and learning in
the process model bears a certain resemblance to knowledge-based, resource-
based and organisational capability approaches that see the development and
deployment of capabilities as the key sources of competitive advantage (see for
example Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993; Grant 1996; Teece, Pismo and Shuen 1997).
While it is accepted that internationalisation may not proceed in distinct stages,
the basic logic behind the internationalisation process developed by Johanson and
Vahlne is arguably still a powerful model of the dynamics within the
internationalising firm (Melin 1992). The emphasis has thus shifted away from
using it to predict the structural and geographical pattern of international
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operations to seeing it as a model of knowledge accumulation in multinational
companies.
Implications for Technology-Based Start-Ups
The process perspective is widely believed to be of relevance during the early
stages of internationalisation of small firms (Andersen 1993). It should therefore
lend itself to the analysis of the determinants of international activities of start-up
firms. According to this view, one would expect a young and small firm to adopt a
rather cautious attitude towards rapid early internationalisation. One would expect
these firms to be orientated towards the domestic market until a certain degree of
market penetration is reached. After a certain time, probably when the perceived
growth potential in the home market has been realised, the adolescent firm might
then turn its attention towards expanding into foreign markets. Note that it may be
inappropriate at this stage to still speak of a young "start-up." Note also that in the
case of highly specialised technology, the domestic demand can be very limited so
that the firm will consider internationalisation at a very young age. Markets which
are close to the home market in terms of geographical and psychic distance would
be considered for initial market entry. An incremental pattern of increasing
resource commitment to foreign operations, determined by the experienced gained
over time at every stage, might then turn the firm into an international player.
According to the circular process logic, the increased market knowledge would
cause an evolution of the cross-border activities. Given the resource constraints of
the majority of start-ups, one would expect them to start cross-border activities
using entry modes that require the lowest degree of resource commitment.
Initially, this entry mode is likely to be (reactive) direct exporting. Upon
assessment of the foreign market potential, the young firm would over time be
expected to opt for a more proactive market coverage, e.g. through the use of sales
intermediaries. Given sufficient growth potential through international expansion,
the firm would later set up its own sales and production facilities and finally
become a fully fledged multinational co-ordinating activities along the value chain
in different countries. Note that the process logic does not give any indication on
the expected duration of use of each operating mode. Therefore, the use of
51
resource-intensive entry modes by start-ups would, strictly speaking, not be
incompatible with this theory. One would, however, expect that the start-up
initiated international sales using a low commitment entry modes prior to
switching to the current resource-intensive entry mode. Given that the defining
element of start-ups is their young age, it is thus very unlikely - though not
impossible - to observe start-ups that operate in foreign markets using resource-
intensive operating modes.
Given the evidence of start-ups that compete in a number of countries using entry
modes of various levels of resource commitment, Oviatt and McDougall (1994)
concluded that Johanson and Vahlne's model fails to explain the phenomenon of
international entrepreneurship. However, the empirical evidence to date is largely
case based. A more systematic survey should be undertaken in order to assess the
prevalence of the phenomenon of international new ventures.
2.3.3. Internalisation and Transaction Cost Economics
Besides the internationalisation process perspective which is rooted in the
behavioural tradition, concepts of the field of economics have been used to
analyse the determinants of entry modes. The main approaches within the latter
tradition are represented by transaction cost economics (TCE) and the related
concept of internalisation. According to internalisation theory, which is the main
theoretical lens for explaining the establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries by
multinational corporations (Madhok 1997), the international growth of a company
is achieved through the displacement of markets that operate in a less efficient
way than firms. In transaction cost economics, the emphasis is placed on finding
the most efficient institutional or contractual arrangement for economic
transactions (Williamson 1985). Both approaches can be traced back to Coase's
(1937) seminal treatment of the question of why firms exist. Applied to
international business, they have become an explanation of why firms set up
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foreign operations (hierarchies) instead of engaging in cross-border trade
(markets).
2.3.3.1. Internalisation Theory
Theoretical Core
Internalisation theory has been developed to explain why firms set up wholly
owned facilities in foreign countries as opposed to engaging in cross-border
trading relationships. Using Coase's early analysis of transaction costs, it is based
on two premises. First, firms choose the lowest cost location for performing
activities along their value chain. Second, firms grow through internalising
markets until the costs of doing so outweigh the potential benefits (Buckley and
Casson 1976). Generally speaking, a firm is a mechanism to replace market
transactions with internal transactions. In international markets, transactions can
take place between firms (via direct exporting, licensing or through
intermediaries) or involve setting up wholly-owned facilities (production and/or
distribution) in the respective host countries. There may be particular market
imperfections associated with cross-border activities such as difficulties with
regard to the valuation of products and patents or governance costs arising from
dealing with agents and distributors, to name only a few. "Internalising" cross-
border markets by setting up subsidiaries may then lead to a more efficient
allocation of resources than conducting transactions between firms at arms-length
(Buckley and Casson 1976). Firms thereby obtain the opportunity to earn higher
rents and thus offset the costs associated with doing business abroad. For the host
country, this can mean that product markets can be created where none existed
before due to a lack of supply.
One of the main characteristics of this approach is that returns are not seen
primarily as a result of market power (or any collusionary practice) but rather as a
result of increased internal efficiency and better resource allocation due to
internalisation of external economies or diseconomies. Note, however, that the
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emphasis here is on better resource allocation, and not necessarily market-
perfecting behaviour, as the firm may, after its entry in a foreign market, erect
barriers to entry for other firms or invest in other forms of rent seeking and
isolating behaviour (Buckley 1990). Internalisation theory, by implying market
failure, is mainly an attempt to explain foreign direct investment as an operating
mode of international business. In that case, the international growth of a company
is achieved through the displacement of cross-border markets, which operate in a
less efficient way than cross-border hierarchies.
Critical Comments
A number of criticisms have been put forward against the internalisation model.
First, internalisation is a fairly static concept that compares given alternatives at a
given time. It even takes international activities as given and - without the
inclusion of specific propositions - offers no answer for the questions on how the
pattern of international activities evolves over time. Even its proponents admit that
the original theory can only allow for comparative static choices (Buckley 1993b).
Second, it does not incorporate all strategic alternatives available to firms. Its most
recent reformulation has put the emphasis on firms entering foreign markets for
the first time (Buckley and Casson 1998). Yet, it is surprising to notice that, even
in this extension, the entry mode of "direct exporting to end customers," a
frequently used initial entry mode in industrial markets, is absent. Third, the
approach treats all different costs associated with international expansion as given.
Its normative value appears to be somewhat limited as assumed cost types such as
"Cost of building trust of acquiring knowledge through wholly owned
distribution" or "Additional transaction cost incurred in using an external market
for the wholesale market" (Buckley and Casson 1998, p. 544) are difficult to
estimate ex-ante for a managerial decision maker. Furthermore, it does not
incorporate any notion of switching or adjustment costs between different
approaches over time. It therefore remains a static approach. A related criticism is
the failure of the concept to incorporate managerial aspects in its decision rules.
Set in a neo-classical world in which information on the environment is widely
available, the "invisible hand of the market does practically all the management
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required" (Buckley 1993b, p. 201). Thus, a dilemma becomes apparent: While on
the one hand, internalisation is explicitly seen a source of above average rents, it
ignores managerial or competitive action as equal sources on the other. It has
therefore been criticised for lacking managerial relevance as it relegates
management to a "ceteris paribus" condition. Still, it is widely accepted as
powerful explanation for the international growth of firms (Cantwell 1991).
2.3.3.2. Transaction Cost Economics
Theoretical Core
The version of transaction cost economics (TCE) best known to a wider audience
of scholars has been developed by Oliver Williamson (for example Williamson
1981; Williamson 1985)." While this theory is closely related to the concept of
internalisation, one should note a number of differences which impact on their
prescriptions with regard to internationalisation. In TCE, the emphasis is placed
on finding the most efficient institutional or contractual arrangement - or
'governance mechanism' in the jargon of TCE - for economic transactions. Like
internalisation, the logic of TCE would argue that, under certain conditions, a
transaction carried out within a hierarchy can represent a more efficient
arrangement than a market-based contractual arrangement like exporting or
licensing. The crucial difference is that, according to TCE, efficient transactions
may also be of an external kind without necessarily exercising any ownership
rights (Cantwell 1991). This may be the case when a firm is in a position of
controlling a network of production or income-generating assets. Thus, transaction
cost theory can be seen as a more general theory defining the boundaries of the
firm.
" Note that there are transaction cost theories other than Williamson's approach that incorporate
different assumptions (see for example North 1990). However, it is Williamson's approach that has
been most frequently applied to the management area (Goshal and Moran 1996).
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Compared to internalisation which implies market failure by default, TCE is more
concerned with the behavioural conditions that give rise to transaction costs. In
essence, TCE makes the behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and self
interest which may lead actors to behave opportunistically. Safeguarding against
these risks when dealing with a partner as opposed to carrying out the transaction
within a hierarchy gives rise to transaction costs (Williamson 1985). Situations
where bounded rationality and self interest are particularly problematic arise in the
presence of asset specificity and uncertainty or information asymmetries
(Williamson 1985; Anderson &. Gatignon 1986). Asset specificity occurs when
one party of the transaction has to invest into co-specialised assets to make the
relationship work (Teece 1986). This party can subsequently be taken hostage by
the other contracting party due to the sunk costs involved in the arrangement.
Contracts can be devised to minimise the risk of shirking of one of the parties.
Yet, the notion of the 'incomplete contract dilemma' (Klein, Crawford and Alchian
1978) holds that it is unrealistic to specify a situation entirely. Furthermore, the
costs of devising the contracts, monitoring and enforcing them may be prohibitive
for both parties. TCE theorists argue that, in the presence of these conditions, it is
more efficient to carry out economic activity within a hierarchy rather than to deal
with a partner. In essence, the firm's advantage over markets lie in its ability to set
incentives, monitor, settle disputes and refine rewards (Mahoney 1992).
The theory has in the past two decades been widely used and represents one of the
key theoretical frameworks in organisation economics (Conner 1991; Mahoney
1992). In a domestic setting, it has been applied to examine diverse topics such as
make or buy decisions, the degree of vertical integration (e.g. Monteverde and
Teece 1982, Walker and Poppo 1991), distributor management (e.g. John and
Weitz 1988; Heide and John 1994), and strategic alliances and joint ventures (e.g.
Hennart 1988; Robertson and Gatignon 1998). In the field of international
business, TCE has been most successfully applied to the study of entry modes
chosen by multinational corporations (Gatignon & Anderson 1988), service firms
(Erramilli & Rao 1993) and the study of international joint ventures (Hennart,
1990). Entry decisions that were not aimed at establishing foreign production
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facilities but at the commercialisation of goods and services have been analysed
within the field of international marketing. Here, this framework has been used to
study the degree of channel integration in foreign markets (Klein et al 1990;
Aulakh & Kotabe 1997).
Critical Comments
In recent years, the transaction cost framework has increasingly been subject to
criticism from scholars (see for example Granovetter 1985; Goshal & Moran
1996; Kogut & Zander 1996; Madhok 1996). The majority of criticisms are
concerned with the behavioural assumptions that are part of transaction cost
theory. While some argue that TCE provides an accurate, but rarely a complete
picture of the determinants of organisational outcomes (Conner and Prahalad
1996), there are others that go as far as seeing the logic of TCE as
counterproductive for good management practice (Goshal and Moran 1996;
Moran and Goshal 1996).
TCE has been criticised for its "undersocialised" view of economic relations. In
his classic article, Granovetter (1985) argues that economic actions are embedded
in a network of social relations. Social control and trust act as natural safeguards
against opportunism thus making certain prescriptions of TCE with regard to the
design of governance mechanisms redundant. Goshal and Moran (1996) and
Moran and Goshal (1996) make two related points. First, they review a number of
empirical papers that apply TCE and argue that the assumption of opportunism is
not required in order to predict particular outcomes. Second, they argue that the
assumption of opportunism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when accepted for
normative purposes. They subsequently expose the mechanism behind this
circular logic. Increased control and monitoring mechanisms have been shown in
empirical studies of occupational psychology to lead to lower identification of
individuals with organisational entities. Lack of identification, on the other hand,
has been shown to increase the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, the pre-
emptive design of governance mechanisms - a rational managerial decision within
a "Williamson hierarchy" given that TCE assumes opportunism by default - is
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likely to provoke opportunistic behaviour. While not necessarily present in the
first place, this occurrence of opportunism results in an ex post justification of the
governance mechanism. Hence Goshal and Moran (1996) argue that the normative
implications of TCE adversely affect organisational performance.
Criticism has also been voiced by those scholars that developed knowledge-based
explanations of why firms exist (Kogut and Zander 1996; Prahalad and Conner
1996). Kogut and Zander have argued that firm boundaries are more likely to be
determined by "the costs of communication, co-ordination, and new combinations,
not those of transactions" (Kogut and Zander 1996, p.503). TCE therefore lends
insufficient attention to other factors, such as identity and learning effects, that
have an impact on organisational modes. Both Prahalad and Conner (1996) and
Madhok (1996) have argued that the emphasis of TCE on economising on
transaction costs in order to maximise rent ignores an analysis of the creation of
value in the first place. The managerial relevance beyond the truism that
"transaction costs should be minimised, all other things being equal" is therefore
doubted. A related criticism is triggered by the emergence of co-operative
strategies, both domestically and internationally. The upsurge of alliances and
hybrid strategies would be considered sub-optimal according to the TCE
perspective. Yet, the empirical evidence available shows that firms increasingly
engage in such strategies and apparently do so with success (Kogut 1988, Madhok
1997, Gulati 1997). Madhok argues that theoretical approaches need to
incorporate motivations other than economising on transaction costs (i.e. the
generation or exploitation of capabilities and resources) in order to align theory
with managerial practice (Madhok 1997).
A final criticism of both TCE and the internalisation framework is closely related
to the research objects of the present study. Both internalisation and TCE are
comparative static concepts which have been developed with large mature
organisations in mind. Both make the implicit assumption that firms can freely
choose between the different entry and operating modes. Constraining factors
assumed by other theories of organisational economics, such as path dependency
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(Madhok 1997), learning effects (Kogut and Zander 1996) and resource
endowments of firms (e.g. Barney 1991) are absent from the analysis. Both
internalisation and TCE treat learning costs as "cost of information." Both are seen
as exogenous to the firm and are treated as given variables (Buckley and Casson
1998). Resource endowment is of even more critical importance in the case of
technology-based start-ups. Arguably, the latter is a critical constraint on
organisational outcomes and largely reduces the scope of different modes
available for consideration. In fairness, it has to be acknowledged that the most
recent extension of the internalisation approach (Buckley and Casson 1998) does
advance a more sophisticated argument which in principle is compatible with the
limited resource endowments of start-ups. However, given that all cost types that
can occur in international transactions are treated as given, the implications of the
approach for firms that operate on a constrained resource base remain unclear.
Implications for Technology-Based Start-Ups
Despite the criticism, the transaction cost approach promises to be valuable when
applied to the international activities of firms operating in high-technology
sectors. Even its critics acknowledge its value when applied to positive rather than
normative analysis (Goshal and Moran 1996) since the empirical applications of
transaction cost-based approaches usually do not require the notion of
opportunism: 2 However, the other two conditions that give rise to high transaction
costs - asset specificity and information asymmetries - are of particular relevance
in high-technology industries. Furthermore, in his discussion of factors
influencing governance mechanisms, Williamson (1991) identified two additional
12 A short example on the manufacturer-distributor relationship illustrates this point. Without
assuming opportunism of either parties, it can be expected that the sunk costs to build up a
commercial relationship and to train the local distributor's sales and support staff represent a
financial risk that both parties will seek to minimise. These costs may be higher in the case of
technologically advanced products. From the distributor's point of view, the trade-off between the
product's potential to add value to his portfolio on the one side, and the asset specificity and risk of
taking on an unproven solution from a unknown young start-up company on the other ("Will it
fulfil its potential?"), is more likely to determine the terms of the collaboration. Asset specificity
and uncertainty rather than opportunism thus produce a situation that will - according to the TCE
logic - require sophisticated governance mechanisms.
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issues related to technological innovation: the problem of appropriability of rents
and responsiveness.
In high-tech industries, it may be difficult to establish the true value of products
and solutions given information asymmetries between buyer and seller. For
example, an industrial buyer of a complex piece of software will frequently not be
in a position to assess the benefit of the solution to his business before its
installation. Consequently, prices may fail to reduce each party's bounded
rationality. Given this inability to assess the true value of the intangible
technology content of a product, a firm might not be able to appropriate the
potential returns from commercialising a new technology through arms-length
transactions (Magee 1977; Teece 1977; Teece 1983). Furthermore, if extensive
consultation efforts are required to persuade potential buyers of the merits of a
high-technology product, the degree of asset specificity can be expected to be
high. Note that the direct transaction costs required during the entire sales
transaction will also be substantial. In that situation, the governance problems and
costs of using intermediaries are expected to be higher relative to those of setting
up own sales subsidiaries in foreign countries. In accordance with these theoretical
prescriptions, a positive relationship between technological innovation and
vertical integration has been shown empirically (Armour and Teece 1980; Teece
1986). Hence, according to this logic, hybrid arrangements involving parties other
than manufacturer and end-customer should be avoided. Depending on the
frequency of the transaction and the amount of service content to be provided
locally, a high-technology firm would then be expected either to export directly or
to build up a wholly owned distribution facility: 3 Note that this implication is in
stark contrast with the internationalisation process logic which sees first-hand
experiential knowledge as a determinant of the entry mode choice.
At this point, an issue of particular relevance to start-up firms arises. The theory
suggest that there may be situations, where a very innovative start-up companies
operating at the forefront of technological developments can only appropriate
13 This implies that the decision to internationalise is given.
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rents for their activities through setting up subsidiaries in foreign countries instead
of exporting. Furthermore, transaction frequency and the pre- and after-sales
service requirements may require local presence instead of arms-length exporting.
Yet, the average start-up will rarely have the financial resources to set up a
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. As a result, we end up with a dilemma where,
on the one hand, TCE and internalisation theories may recommend under certain
conditions that the start-up internalises a transaction in order to minimise the risk
of market failures typically associated with high-tech environments. On the other
hand, the start-up may lack the resources required for this theoretical prescription.
Nonetheless, it is compatible with transaction cost logic to think of an operating
mode that avoids extensive commitment of resources, i.e. the use more hybrid
structures such as long term contracting or joint ventures. This requires an element
of control over the arrangement in order to exploit and appropriate benefits of
international operations. While the assumed governance costs of such an
arrangement make it a sub-optimal choice compared with either direct exporting
or the setting up of a wholly owned distribution subsidiary, it may be the only way
for a start-up to provide services such as installation and technical maintenance in
distant foreign markets.
A final point related to high technology environments was made by Williamson
himself (1991). Issues such as timing of innovation and product launch are of
crucial importance for firms which experience a short window of opportunity. If
the emphasis is put on responsiveness in real-time rather than equilibrium
contracting, then the prescriptions of TCE should not be the dominant decision
rule. Additional modifications not yet developed are needed to maintain the
predictive ability of the theory (Williamson 1991). Arguably, the defining element
of international new ventures is the rapidity of their cross-border expansion which
suggests that real-time responsiveness is of vital importance. Williamson's
"exception" thus appears to be the norm when looking at new, technology-based
firms. This suggests that additional approaches should be considered when
explaining this phenomenon.
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2.3.4. Firm-Specific Advantages
So far, the distinct prescriptions of the two approaches reviewed have somewhat
conflicting implications when applied to high-tech start-ups. In this section, we
would like to discuss different theories that have the potential to bridge the
prescriptive gap between the process logic and transaction cost-based theories. To
this end, we will briefly review Hymer's monopolistic advantage theory, the
resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and the emerging knowledge-based and
organisational capability (OC) perspectives. Strictly speaking, only the first is a
"genuine" theory of international business. The resource-based view has its origins
within the field of strategic management and is a more general theory concerned
with the sources of competitive advantage, rather than a theory of international
business. Still, it claims to represent a more general theory of the firm. Given its
widespread application to strategy analysis of large mature firms and given that
these firms increasingly compete at an international level, its implications should
have some validity when applied to internationally operating start-ups. The
organisational capability perspective, which is closely related to the RBV, has
recently been extended to discuss international operating modes of firms. We
would argue that these three theories are closely related in several points. Above
all, they are all concerned with explaining organisational outcomes with firm-
specific factors that are difficult to replicate by competitors. In addition, the
theoretical core of all three explicitly draws on Penrose's theory of the growth of
the firm and the notion of firms being bundles of resources (Penrose 1959).
Surprisingly, in the discussion of the phenomenon of international
entrepreneurship, this connection has largely been ignored by other researchers."
" See for example Oviatt and McDougall's (1994) criticism that traditional theories of
international business fail to explain the emergence of international new ventures. While they
include monopolistic advantage theory in their list of "ill-suited" theories, they propose that a
resource-based explanation promises to lead to better insights (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).
Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996) are a notable exception as they discuss both
monopolistic advantage and resource-based approaches jointly.
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2.3.4.1. Monopolistic Advantage Theory
Theoretical Core
Monopolistic advantage theory is frequently associated with the seminal
contribution of Stephen Hymer (Hymer 1976)". Hymer was puzzled by the
inability of the prevailing neo-classical theories of international trade and
international finance (portfolio capital investment) to explain the foreign activities
of firms. According to neo-classical trade theory, highly developed countries
where capital is abundant relative to labour are expected to export capital intensive
goods and import labour intensive goods. Given tariff or non-tariff barriers, these
countries may export capital as a partial substitute to goods thus reaping the
benefits from relatively higher interest rates in developing countries where capital
is scarce and labour abundant. Since 1945, however, empirical evidence had not
been in line with the neo-classical theory. International trade and the flows of
capital are now mainly occurring between industrialised countries with rather
similar factor endowment. Hymer's response was to put forward a microeconomic
approach that stressed the role of the individual firm as main determinant of
international flows of goods and capital. His explanation of foreign direct
investment extended the portfolio investment approach by emphasising that an
element of control over the acquired assets can lead to higher returns than could be
expected according to financial theory.
In international business, however, this approach remains best known for its
attempt to explain why firms can compete in foreign settings against indigenous
competitors. The latter are likely to be in a more favourable position than foreign
firms, as they have better information about their environment and acquiring this
knowledge may be costly. However, some firms acquired advantages in particular
areas that they may find desirable to exploit in other countries. These superior
abilities can stem from technological innovation, manufacturing processes, brand
names, organisational talents, marketing skills (Hymer 1976). By subsequently
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invoking Bain's (1956) classical analysis of barriers to competition in domestic
markets, Hymer identifies superior advantages as imperfections in international
markets. These advantages or abilities can be leveraged in foreign host markets
without substantially higher costs (Caves 1982) and create market imperfections -
"quasi-monopolies." These imperfections subsequently enable multinational
enterprises to reap monopoly rents that outweigh the disadvantages and costs of
competing abroad.
Critical Comments
The market power approach was later extended by industrial economists (Caves
1982; Pitelis and Sugden 1987) who perceived advantages arising from superior
abilities principally as anti-competitive devices which act as barriers to entry to
other firms. In contrast, it should be noted that the international firm is originally
seen by Hymer as an active agent, not a passive agent in the classical industrial
economics tradition, which follows the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 16
(Cantwell 1991). Authors have also expressed concern about the term "monopoly
rents". This notion may be misleading as these advantages can, for example, result
from a more efficient resource allocation by multinationals (Dunning 1993) and
thus rather take the character of "Ricardian rents' which stem from superior co-
ordination abilities. However, a common denominator is that the international
growth of the firm is essentially a result of superior abilities which cannot be
matched by competitors, at least in the short run, thereby creating a market
imperfection. Like internalisation and transaction cost theory, monopolistic
advantage theory is largely static in nature. Its main weakness is that it does not
explain how superior, rent-generating abilities are created in the first place.
15 Hymer's original thesis was completed in 1960, but it was only after his death, in 1976, that it
was published by the MIT. By that time, his ideas had already found widespread acceptance.
16 It thus somewhat pre-empted Porter's (1980) analysis of the sources of competitive advantage.
17 Monopoly rents are defined as returns that stem from the ability of a monopolist to maintain
prices above marginal costs. Social costs arise from the contraction of output below its level under
perfect competition. In contrast, there are no social costs associated with Ricardian rents which are
defined as returns of scarce resources in excess of their opportunity costs (Mahoney and Pandian
1992).
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2.3.4.2. Resources, Organisational Capabilities and Knowledge
Theoretical Core
Monopolistic advantage theory is very close to the resource-based view (RBV) of
the firm and the organisational capability (OC) perspective that see competitive
advantage as stemming from superior resources and capabilities which cannot be
replicated by competitors. The discussion of these more recent theories will be
brief as they are not international business theories per se. However, the RBV has
in the past been applied to study competition of internationally competing firms
(for example Collis 1991; Tallman 1991).
The main difference between monopolistic advantage theory on the one hand, and
RBV and OC on the other, is the latter's elaborate emphasis on the mechanisms
how resources, skills and capabilities are generated, kept and deployed. Based on
Penrose's notion of the firm as bundle of assets, the resource-based view of the
firm (Wemerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Peteraf 1993)
argues that organisational performance is a function of the internal assets of a
firm. If these resources are matched appropriately to the external environment,
then the firm may command a competitive advantage over its rivals. According to
the RBV, firms are inherently different as today's resource endowment is a
function of previous decisions and accumulation processes (Dierickx and Cool
1989). Resources include both physical resources and intangible resources. While
the former can be more easily obtained and imitated, it is especially the latter that
differentiate a firm from its rivals. They include management skills, brand names,
processes, organisational culture and tacit knowledge of employees. It is this
idiosyncratic bundle of intangible resources that will determine how the physical
resources will be deployed thus leading to firm-specific returns.
Scholars also tried to define the characteristics of those resources that lead to
sustainable competitive advantage. Barney argues that, in order to yield
sustainable competitive advantage, resources have to be valuable, rare, imperfectly
imitable and un-substitutable (Barney 1991). Peterafs contribution suggested that
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competitive advantage can be gained when resources are heterogeneous,
imperfectly mobile and when there are ex-post and ex-ante limits to competition.
The concept of "isolating mechanisms" (Lippman and Rumelt 1982) has been put
forward to explain why rents from resources are not competed away under
competition. In their exhaustive review of the RBV, Mahoney and Pandian (1992)
argue that isolating mechanisms stem from bounded rationality (causal ambiguity)
and asset specificity (uncertainty of imitability due to uniqueness of resource
accumulation pattern).
Over the last decade, the resource-based view has developed into several closely
interrelated branches. In addition to the core argument outlined above, there are
different flavours that have emphasised capabilities, organisational routines,
knowledge and learning processes. The organisational capability perspective (e.g.
Madhok 1996; 1997; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) is rooted in an elaborate
framework linking "more common" assets and resources with "more
sophisticated" competencies and capabilities. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997)18
distinguish between factors of production, resources (or firm-specific assets),
organisational routines/competencies, core competencies and "dynamic
capabilities." They argue that new forms of competitive advantage are created
through the latter - the "firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal
and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments" (Teece,
Pisano and Shuen 1997, p.516). These dynamic capabilities can thus be seen as
meta-competencies that are responsible for the development of organisational core
competencies to match environmental opportunities. A discussion of these
dynamic capabilities lead to the insight that, ultimately, the knowledge base of a
firm should become the core of a new theory of the firm (for example Kogut and
Zander 1992; 1996; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996; Spender 1996).The
knowledge base here comprises both the skills, tacit and explicit knowledge of
employees and organisational knowledge, routines and processes. A common
18 Teece, Pisano and Shuen's article was published in 1997. However, their ideas have been widely
known to a larger audience, as the working paper version of the article has been in circulation
since 1990.
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denominator of these approaches is that the generation of value, rather than the
economising on transaction costs, should become the focus of managerial and
academic attention.
Madhok (1997), extended the OC / knowledge-based approach to the discussion of
foreign entry modes. Here, Madhok draws on his earlier distinction between
creation of new capabilities and exploitation of existing ones and the notion of a
generic/embedded knowledge (Madhok 1996). He argues that the OC perspective
manages to explain situations in which the theoretical implications of TCE are at
odds with empirical observations, especially if the actions of firms are motivated
by the development of new capabilities as opposed to the exploitation of existing
ones (Madhok 1997; Teece et al 1997). If the focus is on the exploitation of
existing capabilities, OC prescriptions are in line with those of TCE, although they
are arguably less restrictive. Like TCE, OC incorporates the notion of bounded
rationality, but reaches its conclusions without requiring the notion of
opportunism. When the firm's entry decision is motivated by the creation of new
capabilities, the OC perspective claims to be a powerful model for explaining the
more recent surge in alliances and other hybrid entry modes which is somewhat at
odds with the prescriptions of TCE. In addition, while the transaction cost
approach makes the implicit assumption that firms can freely chose the optimal
entry mode or switch between entry modes at no costs, the notion of path
dependence indicates that the firm's margin of manoeuvre is constrained by its
past decisions and organisational routines (Kogut & Zander 1996). Note that there
are some similarities with internationalisation process theory due to the emphasis
on learning and path dependencies. Thus, organisational capabilities can then be
simultaneously sources of competitive advantage and constraints. This highlights
the need to chose an entry mode which combines the existing capabilities of the
firm with those demanded by a particular foreign market (Madhok 1997). Because
of OC's dual focus on both the development and exploitation of capabilities, it has
the potential to become a useful theoretical perspective to examine the entry
modes of internationally operating firms.
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Critical Comments
The resource-based, knowledge-based and organisational capability-based
approaches have been subject to criticism from various sources. One problem,
which is also evident from the present review, is that resource-based view is "far
from being a coherent perspective" (Foss 1998). On the one hand, the common
denominator of the theoretical contributions outlined above is that competitive
advantage stems from internal assets that cannot easily be replicated due to
isolating mechanisms and path dependency. On the other, there are arguably as
many flavours of the resource-based view with distinct terminologies as there are
theoretical contributions. This makes the theory more difficult to grasp and to
apply. Besides this absence of terminological agreement in the field, Foss (1998)
identified a further incoherence which is more difficult to address. He argues that
there is an inherent tension between a more dynamic, evolutionary perspective that
emphasises dynamic competencies and capabilities (e.g. Teece, Pisano and Shuen
1997) and approaches that examine the conditions for resources to generate rents
in static equilibrium (e.g. Barney 1986; Peteraf 1993). This leads to a dilemma
that the future development of these theories will have to address. The latter group
of scholars has so far not addressed the mechanisms of endogenous competence
creation. They thus run the danger of producing a tautological approach. Or, to use
Porter's words (Porter, 1994, p.):
"At its worst, the resource-based view is circular. Successful firms are successful
because they have unique resources. They should nurture those resources to be
successful. But what is a unique resource? What makes it valuable? Why was the firm
able to create or acquire it?"
On the other hand, those scholars that were more concerned with a dynamic
perspective became engaged in an exercise of increasingly elaborate theorising.
After unravelling the chain of causality, they generally identified meta-
competencies and knowledge as focal points for a theory of competitive advantage
(e.g. Kogut and Zander 1992; 1996; Conner and Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996;
Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). While these contributions are insightful, it
becomes increasingly difficult to translate their propositions into testable
hypotheses because they attempt "generalise about the unique" (Foss 1998).
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As it stands, the resource-based view struggles with some inherent tensions
between analytical clarity and operationalisability. Still, one can see these
criticisms as a healthy development in the effort to create a sustainable theoretical
core for what is regarded as one of the most fruitful areas of future strategy
research (e.g. Madhok 1996). Furthermore, the resource-based / knowledge-based
perspective has helped to put the emphasis back on managerial issues and internal,
firm specific assets. Arguably, this is an important contribution to the field of
strategy as it represents a counter-balance to the more deterministic view
advocated by some theories rooted in industrial organisation and organisational
economics.
Implications for High-Technology Start-Ups
The monopolistic advantage theory has been derived from the observation of
mature multinationals with a large resource base. However, it is consistent with
this approach to think of a young, highly specialised company that offers an
innovative solution that no competitor can match. This solution might stem from a
product or process innovation, it might be an innovative product or a service or
even an organisational ability (such as a particular competitive behaviour, i.e.
selling goods over the internet thus saving distribution time and cost). At a given
moment in time, when no competitor can provide a solution that is of equal use for
the customer, it is thus possible to envisage a small start-up company leveraging
this solution into foreign markets despite its higher costs relative to domestic
operations. These costs can be offset by above-average returns that the start-up
could collect due to the inability of rivals to provide an equal solution. This is
essentially a static view that sees customers as choosing from of a given, known
range of alternative solutions the one that maximises their objectives thus leading
to higher returns for more innovative firms. In a more dynamic world, an
innovative firm has to face the threat of eroding above-average returns due to the
imitation of the solution by rivals or the emergence of more innovative solutions.
But if one includes the potential presence of first-mover advantages, lock-in
effects due to switching costs, inability of competitors to imitate due to causal
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ambiguity, perfect appropriability of returns and successful continuous innovation
into the discussion, it becomes conceivable that a small high-tech start-up can
manage to establish a global presence at a given time and to sustain it over a
longer period.
While the initial monopolistic advantage theory explains why certain firms can
compete internationally - and thus gives an indication of which firms will venture
abroad - the resource-based / organisational capability perspective promises to be
useful when trying to explain the operating modes. Applied to start-ups, the
resource-based perspective seems to put the emphasis on gaining access to
complementary resources and assets in order to achieve growth. This suggests that
inter-firm collaborations are of particular importance for technology-based start-
ups. Furthermore, the OC perspective, with its dual focus on capability creation
and exploitation, promises valuable insights when looking at the structural forms
of international activities. To the author's knowledge, the organisational capability
perspective have not been applied to analyse the entry decisions of entrepreneurial
start-ups.
2.3.5. Conclusions from the Review of International Business Theories
The theoretical approaches reviewed above have a number of common elements.
First, they have all been derived from the empirical observation of large mature
organisations and do not explicitly address factors specific to small firms. One
example of this is the implicit assumption of the economics-based theories that
firms can freely choose the appropriate entry mode. In addition, they all
incorporate the notion that there are costs associated with doing business abroad
that put foreign firms at disadvantage over their competitors. Besides these
common elements, one can identify a number of distinct prescriptions that are not
in line when the unit of analysis is at the same time a young start-up firm and
operating in high-technology industries.
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According to the transaction cost-based theories, one might expect a high-tech
firm - once the decision to expand internationally has been taken - to either export
directly or to use resource intensive entry-modes to minimise the risk of market
failures associated with high-technology environments. However, many start-up
companies do not possess the required resource-base to build up a subsidiary. Yet,
exporting may not always be a feasible option if a product requires local support
for installation, maintenance and repair. On the other hand, the process perspective
holds that small and young firms - if they internationalise at all, which would be
rather unexpected according to this view - establish cross-border operations in a
careful and sequential way leading from low resource commitments to higher
resource commitments. One can clearly see the conflicting prescriptions of these
different theories. This can partly be explained by the fact that these approaches
stem from different research methods and address different aspects of the
internationalisation of firms. A direct comparison should therefore only be
undertaken with caution. However, it is possible to identify cases where the
conflict becomes explicit. The case of a high-tech start-up, whose first move
abroad involves some form of direct investment, is clearly at odds with
behavioural theory. On the other hand, a start-up at the forefront of a technological
evolution that uses distributors to expand into foreign markets is arguably at odds
with transaction cost theory. Furthermore, when taken to an extreme, it is possible
to argue at the same time, depending on the theoretical perspective that one
chooses, that a high-tech start-up can compete globally from inception or why it
cannot internationalise at all. Thus it is possible to explain every single case of
early internationalisation and every case of non-internationalisation - but only ex-
post.
A potential bridging concept between the behavioural process perspective and the
transaction cost logic is the resource-based / organisational capability view. It is
related to the previous approaches in that it incorporates both behavioural
elements (learning, path dependency, tacit knowledge) and concepts emerging
from economic analysis (rent-generating mechanisms, asset specificity). By
emphasising that a firm's competitive position is a result of both its tangible and
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intangible asset base and the evolutionary path it has followed, it allows room for
a less deterministic analysis of the international activities of start-ups. According
to this perspective, even a young start-up can compete globally if its product
offering generates sufficient rents to offset the additional costs of competing
across borders. Furthermore, it emphasises the use of collaborative entry modes as
a means to access complementary resources.
In summary, our literature review shows that international activities of start-ups
are not incompatible with theories of international business per se. However, the
extent to which start-ups compete internationally has to be the starting point of
any evaluation of these theories. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate
the characteristics of high-tech start-ups that stay domestic and those that show
cross-border operations with different patterns and resource-intensities. That
might enable us to uncover more factors that facilitate or prevent
internationalisation and to assess how they fit into these theoretical frameworks.
For this task, we can, to a certain extent, rely on previous work since, with the
exception of the OC perspective, these different international business theories
have been subject to empirical testing. Their joint inclusion in a multivariate
approach should therefore lead to a number of insights.
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3.	 Research Objective and Development of Hypotheses
3.1.	 Research Objective
The literature review has identified a number of gaps in the existing research on
international entrepreneurship. Above all, it is striking how little overlap there is
between the case study research and the quantitative surveys published to date.
The majority of propositions generated by the case studies have, at present, not
been subject to empirical testing. Furthermore, only a minority of the quantitative
studies tried to examine questions at the heart of the field of international business
such as the determinants of the decision to internationalise, the choice of entry
mode or the market selection pattern. An empirical test of the propositions of the
case studies should also include a control group in order to investigate whether
they have the power to discriminate between international start-ups and domestic
start-ups.
Second, the importance of the phenomenon of internationally operating high-tech
start-ups remains unknown. In the light of the largely case study-based evidence
on the internationalisation among international new ventures, two influential
contributors argued that in order to "have a tangible effect on theory rather than
being viewed as anomaly, the existence of a significant number of INVs
[international new ventures], rapid growth in their numbers, or both must be
shown an empirical fact" (Oviatt and McDougall 1997, p. 90-91; explanation
within brackets added).
Third, the majority of empirical studies published to date did not systematically
review international business theories in their attempts to explain the phenomenon
of internationally operating start-ups. Nor have there been serious attempts at
testing these different theories empirically. This is even more striking since
various international business theories have been subject to criticism by
international entrepreneurship scholars (e.g. McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994;
Knight and Cavusgil 1996). We argued in the theory review that the existence of
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international new ventures per se is not inconsistent with these theories. Yet, the
review highlighted an interesting dilemma. The prescriptions of transaction cost-
based approaches and behavioural approaches differ markedly when the unit of
analysis is a firm that is at the same time a young start-up and operating in high-
technology sectors. Theoretical approaches that attribute organisational outcomes
to idiosyncratic firm-specific factors could build a bridge between transaction cost
and behavioural approaches. Thus, a systematic survey of the behaviour of these
firms is needed to achieve this and to shed light into the question to what extent
different theories apply.
The current research aims to address these gaps. It will attempt to integrate
theories of international business with existing, empirically derived knowledge on
internationally operating start-ups. To this end, a cross-sectional research design
was chosen. The author acknowledges that this cross-sectional approach is not
suitable to track the internationalisation process of firms and their underlying
motivations over time. Furthermore, in order to avoid the criticism with regard to
the validity of the findings and the methodological foundations of previous
research into internationalisation processes, longitudinal in-depth studies that
analyse every market entry decision for every country and product would be
required (see Andersen 1993; Leonidou and Katsikeas 1996). Yet, only a limited
number of case studies can be handled using such an approach. Given the already
existing rich insights from the case studies reviewed above, it is argued that
knowledge in the field of international entrepreneurship is best advanced using a
quantitative approach. Above all, this approach is best suited to simultaneously
address the three gaps identified above.
• It can establish the prevalence of the phenomenon.
• It can accommodate a sample of international start-ups and a control group of
domestic start-ups.
• Furthermore, it allows for a simultaneous consideration of different
international business theories and empirical findings from previous case
research in a multivariate framework.
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Internationalisation has been defined as "the process of increasing involvement in
international operations" both inward and outward (Welch and Luostarinen 1988,
p.36). Generally, a firm's decision to extend its activities beyond domestic borders
are motivated by the access to factor input or output markets. While cross-border
sourcing represents a phenomenon of increasing importance, for small firms as
well as for larger ones, it is the growth of the firm through the generation of
revenues from foreign markets that will be central to the present study. Therefore,
we will focus on activities aimed at gaining access to output markets.
Furthermore, this means that the focus of the enquiry lies on commercialising
existing products abroad, and not on extending production to foreign countries.
This choice probably reflects the reality of cross-border operations of very young
firms which usually lack the resources to set up production facilities abroad in a
more accurate way. To this end, we will mainly look at entry modes that represent
substitutes for commercialising a product across borders. For the purpose of this
research, we will examine those dimensions of outward internationalisation, which
have received the most widespread attention among researchers in the past. Like
other researchers before, we will look at the decision to internationalise, the
degree of internationalisation, the choice of entry mode and the pattern of foreign
market selection (Welch and Luostarinen 1988; Nordstrom 1991; Sullivan 1994;
Calof and Beamish 1995). we will also focus on an additional dimension, the
timing of foreign market entry, which has received considerably less attention
from researchers in the past (Tan and Vertinsky, 1996, is a notable exception).
The first part of the analysis will focus on a comparison of start-ups with
international activities and start-ups without international activities. In this part,
we will first determine the prevalence of the phenomenon within the UK. We will
then test the applicability and discriminatory power of various propositions
derived from international business theory and empirical research in international
entrepreneurship. Given the ambiguous theoretical prescriptions with regard to
timing and extent of internationalisation, it is, in the first instance, important to
identify those factors which facilitate or hinder the outward movement of high-
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tech start-ups. This part will therefore consist of comparing high-technology start-
ups that have international activities with those that compete domestically. Thus,
we will attempt to explain why some start-ups engage in cross-border activities
from an early stage of their existence whereas others only serve their home
markets.
The second part of the analysis will look at the international start-ups in order to
estimate the determinants of their degree of internationalisation. The applicability
of different measures of the degree of internationalisation will be discussed. Since
internationalisation could be interpreted as non-linear phenomenon, as
"overcoming a barrier" (Buckley 1993a) or "jumping a threshold", it will also be
tested whether internationalisation can be seen as a continuum or whether it
represents a moment of discontinuous change in the life of a firm.
The third part of the analysis will investigate issues related to the timing of
internationalisation. The unexpected, early or accelerated foreign market entry and
subsequent evolution of international activities is arguably one of the defining
features of internationally operating start-ups. Two different methods will be used
in order to determine the key influence factors on the timing of
internationalisation.
The fourth main part of the analysis will look at the entry decisions of these firms.
It will describe the structural aspects of market entry of the sampled firms. It will
also investigate the determinants of the chosen entry modes. As explained above,
the conflicting prescriptions of different theoretical frameworks become most
apparent when looking at the entry modes of these firms. A set of testable research
hypotheses based on the theoretical and empirical knowledge will be developed
below.
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3.2. Research Hypotheses
3.2.1. Differences between International Start-ups and Domestic Start-ups,
the Degree of Internationalisation and Timing of Internationalisation
In this section, the hypotheses guiding this research will be presented. We will
combine the hypotheses for the decision to internationalise, the determinants of
the degree of internationalisation and the timing of internationalisation, because
the theoretical arguments underlying their development are closely related. A
second section will be devoted to the development of hypotheses on the choice of
entry mode.
3.2.1.1. Operationalisation of Dependent Variables
We will attempt to analyse differences between internationalising and non-
internationalising firms. Several operationalisations of "internationalisation" using
different definitions will be used in order to test the robustness of the findings.
The first measurement of internationalisation classifies firms as "international" as
soon as they have entered one foreign market or generated one percent of their
total revenue through international sales during their last financial year. A possible
criticism is that this operationalisation could include a high share of firms that do
not proactively internationalise and only had a few unsolicited orders from abroad.
We therefore chose two additional cut-offs to operationalise the somewhat fuzzy
notion of "substantial" international activities. Unfortunately, there is no literature
available on what constitutes a reasonable threshold for "substantial"
internationalisation. In comparable study in the US, McDougall (1989) used a cut-
off criterion of 5% in order to classify the firms in her sample as international
start-ups. In a European context, however, a threshold of 5% might be too low.
We therefore choose a more conservative threshold of 10% non-domestic revenue.
The second cut-off criterion includes only firms that have entered at least three
foreign markets at the time of the survey.
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There is considerable debate about the appropriate definition of the degree of
internationalisation of a firm (Sullivan 1994; 1996; Ramaswamy, Kroeck and
Renforth 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997). This controversy was triggered by
Sullivan (1994) who, in an attempt to measure the degree of internationalisation of
a firm, suggested an index composed of several variables. His work, based on a
search of empirical evidence in the literature of internationalisation, was partly
motivated by the inability of previous research to state whether international
diversification improves financial performance of a firm. He argued that the most
widely used measure of the degree of internationalisation, the ratio of foreign sales
to total sales, is problematic in the case of large diversified multinationals which
comprise different business units with quite different strategic orientations.
Sullivan's index is constructed of two structural variables (ratio of foreign assets to
total assets and number of overseas subsidiaries to total subsidiaries), one
performance variable (ratio of foreign sales to total sales) and two attitudinal
variables (top managers' international experience and psychic dispersion of
international operations). This index was subsequently contested by other
researchers who questioned the validity of the employed concepts and its
methodological foundations (Ramaswamy et al 1996). Critics have argued that an
index neutralises any extreme scores of the measures and that the two attitudinal
attributes are difficult to measure. More importantly, the index focuses exclusively
on the later stages of internationalisation by emphasising entry modes that require
foreign direct investment. For these reasons, Reuber and Fischer (1997) argue that
Sullivan's index is of limited use when analysing the internationalisation of very
young and small firms. They propose a revised measure that includes number of
foreign regions entered, share of non-domestic revenues and share of employees
devoting at least 50% of their time on export management. Yet, we argue that the
latter measure is often both cause and effect of internationalisation. It should
therefore not be used as independent variable in a cross-sectional dataset. To
summarise, we agree that internationalisation is a multidimensional construct that
is probably not captured using a single measure such as share of non-domestic
revenue. However, we also agree with those authors that are concerned with the
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loss of information through the construction of an index that combines several
measures (Ramaswamy, Kroeck and Renforth 1996). Furthermore, Sullivan's
criticism of using the share of non-domestic revenue were largely directed to
diversified multinational firms. In the absence of a preferable measure, we will
therefore in the next sections consider the share of non-domestic revenues as key
measure of the degree of internationalisation. This measure has in the past
received the most widespread attention from international business scholars
(Sullivan 1994).
The timing of foreign market entry has received relatively minor attention from
researchers. The only study known to the author analysed the timing of Japanese
multinational firms entering the US market using entry modes that require foreign
direct investment (Tan and Vertinsky 1996). This dearth of empirical research
could be explained by the fact that initial entries are more difficult to observe for
firms that are older and more established. This presents an opportunity since early
initiation of international activities is arguably the defining feature of international
entrepreneurship. Start-ups should therefore represent an ideal test case for
exploring issues related to the timing of the initiation of foreign entry modes. The
dependent variable for this analysis will be the time lag between the first sales of
the firm and the first international sales.
The reader will notice that these three dimensions, decision to internationalise,
degree of internationalisation and timing of internationalisation are closely related.
The first dimension treats internationalisation as a binary choice of the firm. The
second explores whether internationalisation is a continuous phenomenon, i.e.
whether the same factors that discriminate between international start-ups and
domestic start-ups also explain the variation of different levels or degrees of
international activities. The third can be seen as an extension of the first
dimension in a more dynamic context. In essence, it is related to a binary choice,
i.e. it assesses the impact of independent variables of internationalisation, but
allows for observation periods of different duration and censoring of the data. In
the present case, the censoring occurs due to the cross-sectional nature of the
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dataset. The observed time period between start-up and the survey may simply be
too short for some of the youngest firms to get a realistic chance to initiate cross-
border activities. The standard models used to examine the time lag between first
sales and international sales can accommodate this potential bias. The relation
between these three dimensions will be examined in more detail in the sections
that discuss the methodological aspects of the modelling of internationalisation.
3.2.1.2. Hypotheses
The effects of size and age on internationalisation have received much attention
from international business researchers. In accordance with the logic of
internationalisation process models, one would expect older and larger firms to be
more likely to internationalise because they possess the cumulative resources to
overcome the cost and operational barriers of competing abroad (Johanson and
Vahlne 1977; 1990). Empirical export development studies and "stage models"
have reported a positive relationship between firm size on the one hand and the
probability to internationalise and allocate resource commitments to foreign
markets on the other (Bilkey and Tesar 1977; Bilkey 1978; Czinkota 1982). Yet,
these studies are frequently criticised for their weak methodological foundations
(see Andersen 1993, for an overview). More recent analyses which looked at large
populations of firms merely seem to agree that there is no negative relation
between internationalisation and size (Bonaccorsi 1992; Calof 1994). In addition,
one author has argued that the variance explained by size is so small that it can be
neglected for predictive purposes (Calof 1994). However, while we do not want to
deny the presence of micro-firms spanning across national borders, we believe
that, in general, the larger high-technology start-ups will be more likely to have
initiated international activities by the time of the survey. We believe that a
critical mass will be required in order to operate in several markets
simultaneously. Accordingly, we hypothesise:
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Hla: Larger start-ups at the time of formation will be more likely to have
international activities at the time of the survey.
H I b: Larger start-ups at the time of formation will be characterised by a higher
degree of internationalisation at the time of the survey.
Hlc: Larger start-ups at the time of formation will initiate international activities
more rapidly.
Upper echelon theory states that the characteristics of the top management of a
firm have considerable influence on organisational outcomes (e.g. Hambrick and
Mason 1984). In the context of international business, the international experience
of its founders or managers has subsequently been shown to influence the degree
of internationalisation of a firm (Aharoni 1966; Aaby and Slater 1989; Sullivan
1994). Yet, while being intuitively convincing, empirical findings have remained
inconclusive. In the case of multinational firms, Kogut (1989) argues that
competitive advantage stems from the management of the transfer of knowledge
and resource between the dispersed international operations. Following this
argument, Roth (1995) reported that living experience abroad had a significant
effect on performance in firms with a high degree of international
interdependence. However, another finding of the same study was that experience
in managing international activities did not have a significant influence on firm
performance. Studies that have looked at international entrepreneurship more
specifically reported similar findings. McDougall, Shane and Oviatt (1994) report
that the founders of the firms in their sample of international new ventures were
characterised by first-hand knowledge and experience of foreign factor and
product markets. Accordingly, they concluded that 'alertness' to business
opportunities abroad was a vital precondition for the formation of international
new ventures. Reuber and Fischer (1997) found that the degree of
internationalisation of a firm was positively influenced by the international
experience of its managers. In contrast, Roberts and Senturia (1996) report that
none of the top managers of the firms in their sample had direct international
experience from having lived abroad. Still, a majority in their sample had previous
work experience in US companies with international activities. Bloodgood,
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Sapienza and Almeida (1996) found that international work experience was
positively related to internationalisation activity whereas international schooling
was not. In the light of these several findings, the following hypotheses were
constructed:
H2a: Start-ups are more likely to have international activities, if their founders
have international work or education experience.
H2b: Start-ups will be characterised by higher degrees of internationalisation if
their founders have international work or education experience.
H2c: Start-ups will initiate international activities more rapidly if their founders
have international work or education experience.
Increasing attention has been given to the role of external finance during the
growth period of start-up companies. Those companies that obtained venture
capital can benefit from higher levels of external finance than are available
through traditional banks (Moore 1994; Murray and Lott 1995). In addition,
venture capitalists add value to through providing access to their network and
expertise (Sapienza 1992), which can extend to foreign countries. The presence of
external equity finance from venture capitalists and business angels also can be
interpreted as an indicator for the expectations concerning the business plan, the
product and the management team of the venture. It thus represents a valuable
proxy variable to capture technological and managerial quality. In order to fulfil
the ambitious growth targets of venture capitalists, investee companies may
frequently be strongly encouraged to include the commercialisation of foreign
markets in their business plans (Murray 1996). Therefore the hypothesis was
formulated as follows:
H3a: Start-ups with external finance from venture capitalists or business angels
will have a higher propensity to engage in international sales.
H3b: Start-ups with external finance from venture capitalists or business angels
will be characterised by a higher degree of international sales.
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H3c: Start-ups with external finance from venture capitalists or business angels
will initiate international sales more rapidly.
It has become popular to argue that because of spiralling research and
development costs and shortening life cycles for high-technology products, firms
operating in high-technology sectors cannot exclusively rely on domestic markets
(Oakey, Rothwell and Cooper 1988; Ohmae 1990). Empirical investigations seem
to confirm this trend. Kobrin (1991) found that technological intensity (expressed
as a ratio of costs to sales revenue) was the most important structural determinant
of cross-border integration in the industries which he examined. At the firm level,
it has been shown that higher R&D intensity leads to a higher propensity to export
among SMEs. (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1985; Aaby and Slater 1989).
Contradicting those findings, Lindqvist reported that, in her study of Swedish new
technology based firms, higher R&D intensity was not related to higher degrees of
internationalisation in terms of speed of first market entry, resource-intensity of
entry modes, geographical sequence and degree of international sales (Lindqvist
1991). Furthermore, Fujita (1995a; 1995b) provides evidence that many small
high-tech firms did not internationalise due to competitive pressures in their
domestic market. In essence, there is mixed evidence which leads us to propose
that, in the case of start-ups, the relationship may be more complex than
previously thought.
High research and development intensities can indicate that the start-up is still in
its product development phase. During that phase, its management will have a
preference to devote scarce resources to the transfer of its core technology into
commercially viable products. In the absence of contract development for a
foreign partner, the firm will also be expected to concentrate its initial
commercialisation efforts on domestic sales which are likely to be less costly than
international sales. Thus, high R&D intensities are likely prevent firms from
launching their products in international markets. On the other hand, we agree
with authors who argued that high-technology start-ups frequently operate in
specialised niches. Sales to a domestic market may not generate the cash-flow
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required to recover the initial expenditures and to finance the development of next
generation products or upgrades (see for example Roberts 1991; McDougall and
Oviatt 1996). Firms with very low R&D intensities or no research and
development activities will thus be expected to have a lower propensity to engage
in international activities. In summary, we expect a curvilinear or inverted U-
shaped effect of R&D intensity on the various dimensions of internationalisation.
Accordingly, we thus formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows:
H4a: Research and development intensity will have a curvilinear effect on the
propensity to internationalise. This means that, up to a turning point, the
propensity to internationalise will increase with growing levels of R&D
intensity before decreasing with further increases of R&D intensity.
H4b: Research and development intensity will have a curvilinear effect on the
degree of internationalisation. This means that, up to a turning point, the
degree of internationalisation will increase with growing levels of R&D
intensity before decreasing with further increases of R&D intensity.
H4c: Research and development intensity will have a curvilinear effect on the
speed of international market entry. This means that, up to a turning point,
the speed of market entry will increase with growing levels of R&D
intensity before decreasing with further increases of R&D intensity.
Besides firm-specific factors, we argue that characteristics of their products
influence whether or not firms will engage in international sales. Yet, there
appears to be little empirical evidence in the field of international business
regarding the impact of product characteristics on internationalisation performance
(Douglas and Craig 1992; Cavusgil and Kirpalani 1993). We will first look at the
innovativeness of the products in question and then at characteristics that affect
the transaction costs associated with the internationalisation of these products.
The innovativeness or newness of a technology incorporated in a start-up's product
has been shown to be a key factor influencing its market acceptance (Roberts
1991). In the context of international entrepreneurship, it has been reported that
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firms which introduced technological innovations internationalised later but were
subsequently quicker at entering overseas markets (Lindqvist 1991). Jolly,
Alahuhta and Jeannet (1992) reported that the global start-ups in their sample all
commercialised innovative products in new or emerging industries. A
distinguishing feature between the "conventional" and "innovative" firms in Boter
and Holmquist's sample was that the products of the latter incorporated advanced
technology. These firms were the more proactive internationalisers. Similarly,
Murray (1996) reported that the firms in his sample were all developing products
incorporating leading edge technology. He argued that that access to sophisticated
customers abroad was one of the key motivations of these firms. Yet, these
findings contradict research on more established SMEs operating in high-
technology industries. Two studies reported that only a minority of
intemationalisers developed radically new technologies. The majority of firms
which internationalised had based their strategies on the incremental improvement
of existing technologies (Fujita 1995a; Lindell and Karagozoglu 1997). Still, we
expect international sales to be more likely among firms whose products
incorporate highly specialised niche technology since buyers can arguably buy
established technology from indigenous firms in their home countries. When
demand for an innovative solution cannot be met locally, buyers may turn to a
foreign firm, even if the firm in question is an unknown start-up. Accordingly, we
hypothesise the following:
H5a: Start-ups whose products incorporate more innovative technology will
have a higher propensity to initiate international activities.
115b: Start-ups whose products incorporate more innovative technology will be
characterised by a higher degree of internationalisation.
H5c: Start-ups whose products incorporate more innovative technology will be
quicker at initiating international activities.
One variable that has been identified in the case studies in international
entrepreneurship was the degree of standardisation of a product. Several authors
report that the firms in their sample all commercialised standardised products that
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required little client-specific customisation (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1992;
Boter and Holmquist 1996; Murray 1996). However, the degree of product
standardisation did not have a significant impact on the internationalisation
behaviour among the firms sampled by Lindqvist (1991). Still, we expect that
extensive client-specific customisation does represent a barrier to foreign sales. If
a product or a software solution has to be adapted to suit a particular buyer's
specifications, close collaboration between end-customer and manufacturer may
be required. The process of customisation is thus frequently expected to be
resource-intensive. In addition, the closer these customisation requirements are
located to the technological core of the product, the less likely it will be that third
party such as a local distributor can handle these activities (Root 1987). Arguably,
these resources can be more easily deployed in a domestic setting than in foreign
markets. Accordingly, we hypothesise the following:
H6a: Start-ups that sell standardised products that require little client-specific
customisation and adaptation will have a higher propensity to engage
international sales.
H6b: Start-ups that sell standardised products that require little client-specific
customisation and adaptation will be characterised by higher degrees of
international sales.
H6c: Start-ups that sell standardised products that require little client-specific
customisation and adaptation will enter foreign markets more rapidly.
An important impediment to internationalisation can lie in the scale of transaction
costs associated with cross-border commercialisation (Klein, Frazier and Roth
1990). Transaction costs which impact on the commercialisation of high-
technology products can arise for many reasons including consultations prior to
sale, installation costs, maintenance and after sales activity, and training of sales
and front-end personnel (Root 1987; Moriarty and Kosnik 1989; Bell 1995;
Meldrum 1995; Beard and Easingwood 1996). They represent an immediate
obstacle when the firm exports directly to foreign end-customers. When a
distributor is involved, the commercialisation requirements give rise to asset
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specificity which increase the cost of contractual safeguarding. For a small firm,
these additional costs can represent important barriers to internationalisation
(Morgan and Katsikeas 1997).
H7a: High costs of commercialisation will be negatively related to the
propensity to engage in international sales.
H7b: High costs of commercialisation will be negatively related to the degree of
internationalisation.
H7c: High costs of commercialisation will be negatively related to the timing of
first international sales.
In addition to these independent variables, we include firm age as control variable.
Formulating a hypothesis here would be somewhat tautological. Unless all firms
in the sample have initiated cross-border activities at inception, any hypothesis
stating that firms with international sales are older would probably be supported.
Still, as age is likely to account for some of the variation in the data, we include it
as control variable. Age should also be positively related to the degree of
internationalisation. While we accept that certain firms may de-internationalise
over time, we believe that in the majority of cases, internationalisation will be a
process increasing outward involvement where the countries entered or share of
non-domestic revenue increase over time. We also include industry dummy
variables in order to control for any industry-specific effects. With regard to
internationalisation, these can for example capture the level of domestic and
international competition and the presence of lead markets with the most advanced
customers.
Finally, we would like to formulate a summary hypothesis related to the degree of
internationalisation. In the specific context of technology-based start-ups, only
two studies are known to the authors which tried to assess the effects of different
variables on the degree of internationalisation (Lindqvist 1991; Bloodgood,
Almeida and Sapienza 1997). The fact that in Lindqvist's study, neither size nor
age of the firm appeared significantly related to the degree of internationalisation
87
suggests that internationalisation may be best understood as 'jumping a threshold'.
Once the threshold is overcome, the marginal effects of these variables on
internationalisation may well decrease. On the other hand, Bloodgood, Almeida
and Sapienza (1996) found a positive relationship between firm size and degree of
internationalisation. Note, however, that they used a different operationalisation of
the degree of internationalisation of their firms and that their sample included
firms without international activities. The notion of internationalisation as
continuous phenomenon is in contrast with the position of those researchers that
see the initiation of international activities as a discontinuous change or
organisational innovation (see Andersen 1993 for a review). However, the
discussion of the hypotheses above does not suggest that the independent variables
chosen for this research have a different impact on the propensity to
internationalise than on the degree of internationalisation.' We will therefore
hypothesise that the same factors that determine the decision to internationalise
also determine the firm's degree of internationalisation.
H8: The same factors that will account for the differences between
international and domestic start-ups will explain the variation in the degree
of internationalisation.
In summary, we can provide a broad categorisation of the hypotheses presented
here. While most of them have been derived from empirical research in the field of
international entrepreneurship, it is possible to make the link to the theoretical
frameworks in the field of international business. Size has been used previously in
empirical studies to operationalise the propositions of internationalisation process
and stage theories (Andersen 1993; Leonidou and Katsikeas 1996). A resource-
based perspective can be associated with variables describing top management
team's international experiences (McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994; Roth 1995),
19 Note however, that other influence factors not discussed here will certainly have an impact on
these two dimensions of internationalisation. It is also likely that there will be number of factors
that will have a different impact on the dimensions. Yet, as it is one of the main purposes of this
research to integrate previous empirical findings from the field of international entrepreneurship
with the main body of literature from the field of international business, we can only account for a
limited number of independent variables.
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external finance and expertise from venture capitalists and business angels and
R&D intensity (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Mahoney 1992). Note however, that
R&D intensity has been used both in resource-based approaches (Mauri and
Michaels 1998) and in transaction cost-based approaches as proxy for product-
market environments where costs of technology transfer are high (Teece 1986;
Davidson and McFetridge 1988). The use of R&D intensity in resource-based
approaches is somewhat problematic since most operationalisations are based on
input variables such as expenditures or number employees. Sustained investment
in research and development can result in the building up of heterogeneous
resources and capabilities (Dierickx and Cool 1989). When these are embodied in
a firm's end-products, their ability to generate above-average rents may offset the
additional costs arising from cross-border operations. However, a high score along
possible technology indicators does not automatically translate into superior
capabilities. Conversely, a firm may invest relatively little in research and
development but can come up with a highly innovative solution that enables it to
generate above-average rents. For this reason, we argue that product
innovativeness is a more appropriate resource-based measure to capture possible
firm- or product-specific advantages that have a positive impact on
internationalisation. Finally, product characteristics that impact on
commercialisation can be linked with transaction cost arguments. However, we
would like to make clear that a test concerned with the ability of these cost
variables to discriminate between intemationalisers and non-intemationalisers is
not a test of transaction cost theory per se. Since the latter is explicitly aims at
comparing the efficiency of particular governance modes, or market entry modes
in an international setting, it treats the decision to internationalise as a given. A
significant impact of the cost variables on the above dimensions of
internationalisation is therefore not suitable to test for the predictive ability of
transaction cost and internalisation theory.
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3.2.2. The Choice of Market Entry Mode
3.2.2.1.0perationalisation of the Dependent Variable
For the purpose of this study, our dependent variable is defined as the
dichotomous choice between selling abroad by either direct exporting or through
the use of distributors. Three related arguments support this approach. First, we
receive empirical support from previous studies which report that exporting and
the use of intermediaries are in practice the two main alternatives employed by
entrepreneurial high-technology firms (Lindqvist 1991; Bell 1995).
Second, the choice between direct exporting and the use of distributors is of
utmost managerial relevance for technology entrepreneurs. With the singular
exception of the US economy, the finite market opportunities in many countries
may not justify the development expenditures for certain highly-specialised niche
technologies unless international expansion is considered from inception.
Technology-based start-ups therefore face a dangerous dilemma. On the one hand,
they may be forced to venture abroad to help amortise their initial development
expenditures and to generate sufficient revenues to finance ongoing development
activities. On the other hand, as many technology-based start-ups experience
negative cash-flows during their early years, they may lack the necessary human
and financial resources required for the effective commercialisation of their
products on their own. Given these resource constraints, identifying end-
customers and providing pre- and after-sales support services may be better
handled by a local partner. The downside of this arrangement is that revenues have
to be shared between the start-up and the distributor. Additional costs can be
incurred by the start-up because of the need to provide technical training and the
creation of monitoring mechanisms. Early on, technology entrepreneurs therefore
have to make complex and highly strategic trade-offs given that the choice of the
foreign sales mode may have profound implications both in terms of costs and
revenue generation.
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Third, the main theoretical frameworks in the field of international business which
analyse entry modes come to somewhat different conclusions when applied to
firms that are at the same time young (or inexperienced) and operate in high-
technology sectors. Process models (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; 1990) see
commitment to internationalisation as a function of experiential knowledge of
foreign markets. Accordingly, a start-up company would be expected to gain
initial experience through reactive exporting before proactively venturing into
foreign markets. The choice between direct exporting and the use of more
complex and proactive entry modes is thus dependent on firm experience and
foreign market knowledge. Despite having received empirical support, process
models and the subsequently developed "stage models of internationalisation"
(e.g. Cavusgil 1980; Reid 1981) are frequently criticised for being too
deterministic and for failing to take firm-specific factors other than experience
into account (Andersen 1993). A rival approach, the transaction cost economics
(TCE) approach, has been very influential because it provides a decision rule with
regard to individual entry decisions. Firms are expected to choose the governance
or entry mode that minimises the costs of carrying out particular transactions. In
its application, TCE is essentially concerned with comparing different institutional
arrangements for carrying out economic activity (Williamson 1985). As the choice
between direct exporting and involving a foreign distributors is essentially a
choice between an internal arrangement and an arrangement involving an external
third party, the tools of TCE are applicable to model the decision. Yet, the TCE
approach implicitly assumes a capacity for discretionary resource deployment. For
example, the commercialisation of a product incorporating very advanced
technology may require a high degree of asset specificity. If this asset specificity
leads to a substantial increase of the costs of involving a distributor, a firm is
expected to switch from direct exporting to a sales subsidiary once its foreign
sales to a particular country exceed a certain level. However, this may not reflect
the reality of resource constraint start-ups. They may rather be inclined to
establish collaborative relationships with intermediaries in order to get access to
assets, resources and capabilities which they do not own. The widespread use of
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collaborative strategies in technology-intensive industries has triggered the
development of the organisational capability (OC) perspective. Compared to TCE,
its proponents argue that it represents a superior approach for the analysis of
collaborative governance arrangements (Madhok 1997). To date, we do not know
of any study that has applied the organisational capability perspective to the
internationalisation of smaller, entrepreneurial firms.
Given that these three approaches put their emphasis on different variables, we
therefore incorporate some of their elements in our set of hypotheses. This
integrated multivariate approach should provide further evidence of whether or not
they explain the choice of entry modes made by high-tech start-ups. Following
established research practice, we have chosen the entry decision and not the firm
as the unit of analysis. Like other researchers, we argue that entry decisions are a
function of firm-specific factors, product-specific factors and target country
specific factors (Cavusgil, Zou and Naidu 1993; Erramilli and Rao 1993). The
international business theories reviewed above have primarily been applied to
comparisons of exporting, contractual / hybrid entry modes (joint ventures,
alliances, licensing), and direct investment. Yet, the choice between direct
exporting and sales via distributors is a choice between an internalised transaction
or an externalised transaction involving intermediaries. We find ourselves within
the established tradition of researchers that have conceptualised entry modes
choices as a binary choice (see for example Davidson and McFetridge 1984;
Kogut and Singh 1988; Erramilli and Rao 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen 1998).
Based on the theoretical frameworks described above, we will develop a set of
hypotheses to test which variables account for the choice between direct exporting
and exporting via distributors as the two predominant modes of foreign market
entry for technology-based start-ups.
3.2.2.2. Hypotheses
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Firm size is widely seen as proxy for the availability of resources which can be
committed to foreign markets. According to the well known internationalisation
process perspective, larger firms are expected to make bolder commitments to
foreign markets (Johanson and Vahlne 1990). However, the resource implications
of choosing intermediaries over direct exporting to end customers are not clear-
cut. Exporting may involve relatively high cost in identifying and selling to end-
customers (Zacharakis 1997). Yet, once the customers are identified, the operating
costs may be relatively low and - in the best case - represent only the costs of
shipping a product abroad. Selling via a distributor may reduce the cost of
identifying foreign customers considerably. Distributors are also likely to have
invested in long-term relationships with their customers. However, using
intermediaries will normally require certain preparatory costs prior to the first
sales. These can arise for the following reasons. Suitable partners have to be
identified before engaging in a commercial relationship (Root 1994). Formalising
a distribution agreement frequently involves legal and other administrative costs.
The distributor's staff need to be trained in selling the product, installing it and
providing subsequent maintenance or upgrades. Furthermore, there may an
imbalance of bargaining power between both parties, especially if the supplier is,
as yet, an unestablished, young firm (Zacharakis 1997). In this situation it may
well be the distributor who chooses the supplier rather than vice versa. A
distributor will normally have a portfolio of related products and will promote
those products which maximise his net income. Aligning the objectives of the two
parties through appropriate governance mechanisms has been widely studied in a
domestic context (e.g. Anderson and Narus 1990; Heide and John 1994). In a
foreign country, the task of monitoring a distributor is likely to be even more
difficult for a small entrepreneurial firm. Therefore, selling via an established
distributor relationship is likely to require higher up-front investment than
exporting. In the particular case of technology-based start-ups, the availability of
resources is probably an even more crucial predictor of subsequent firm actions
(Oakey, Rothwell and Cooper 1988). Accordingly, we argue that this route to
foreign markets will be employed by start-ups commanding greater resources.
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H9: Firms that sell into foreign markets via intermediaries are larger than firms
that export directly.
A related hypothesis concerns the experience of the firm. The internationalisation
process perspective argues that firms increase their commitment to international
sales over time as their experiential knowledge of foreign markets increases
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977; 1990). According to this logic, firms that are more
experienced in international sales are expected to engage in more complex entry
modes. In addition, some firms may change their entry mode over time, and move
along the establishment chain from direct exporting to more complex or resource
intensive entry modes such as the use of distributors or the setting up of a sales
subsidiary. Following the argument developed for hypothesis 1, we believe that,
from a start-up manager's point of view, using a distributor represents in most
cases a more complex and committed foreign entry mode than direct exporting.
H10: Firms that sell into foreign markets via intermediaries are more
experienced in international operations than firms that export directly.
It is, however, not necessary that experience in international operations has to be
gained by the firm as organisational entity. A young firm initiating its first market
entries cannot be expected to have direct experiential knowledge of international
operations embodied in its processes and routines. As Oviatt and McDougall
(1994) point out, this may not be a disadvantage. For international new ventures,
organisational routines that make no difference whether sales are domestic or
international can be a source of future competitive advantage. In the case of start-
ups, the founders' international experience can be a substitute for organisational
experience. If key staff of the firm who are involved in international operations
have been previously exposed to foreign environments, a firm may initiate cross-
border activities by using more complex entry modes. The international
experience of senior managers has in the past been used to predict the scale and
scope of international activities of start-up firms (Bloodgood, Sapienza and
Almeida 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997).
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H11: Managers of firms which sell into foreign markets via intermediaries will
be more likely to have international experience than managers of firms
which export directly.
The experience of the firm is also a key variable in contributions that applied the
organisational capability (OC) perspective to the choice of entry modes (Aulakh
and Kotabe 1997; Madhok 1997). OC theorists argue that present outcomes are
influenced by past experiences and routines which have become embedded in the
organisation (Madhok 1997). If a firm uses a particular -sales channel in its
domestic market, it may be expected to further exploit this experience (i.e.
negotiation of contracts, incentivising and motivating intermediaries) in foreign
markets. Thus, the higher costs or risks of arranging more complex foreign sales
modes can arguably be reduced through leveraging experiences gained earlier in a
domestic market. Incidentally, Roberts and Senturia (1996) observed that, over
time, the internationally operating high-tech firms in their sample had a tendency
to replicate their domestic sales model in foreign markets. We believe that this is
partly caused by experience or learning effects and hypothesise the following:
H12: Firms will sell into foreign markets via intermediaries rather than export
directly if they already use distributors for their domestic sales.
The OC perspective argues that a firm's value-creating activities are a function of
its resource and capability base. (Madhok 1997; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997).
Madhok distinguishes between activities where the focus is on capability
development and activities where the focus is on the exploitation of an existing
advantage. In the case of start-ups - given our focus on sales modes - we argue that
the objective of their international sales is to exploit to the full the commercial
value of their technological competency in order to ensure their survival. Madhok
also introduces the notions of 'ownership effect' and locational effect'. The
former is represented by the ratio of embedded-to-generic firm-specific know-
how, whereas the latter is defined as the ratio of embedded-to-generic market-
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specific knowledge (Madhok 1997). According to Madhok, a firm will carry out a
transaction itself (internalisation) if there is a high potential for the erosion in the
value of a firm's know-how stemming from the ownership effect. On the other
hand, a firm will have a preference for collaboration, if there is a high potential for
the erosion in the value of a firm's know-how from the locational effect. In
summary, collaborative arrangements will be preferred in countries where the
idiosyncratic ways of doing business erode the value of firm-specific know-how.
Conversely, a firm is less likely to involve third parties if firm-specific know-how
is inimitable or immobile thereby making the sharing of routines with
intermediaries difficult (Hill, Hwang and Kim 1990; Madhok 1997). This suggests
that a firm will have a higher propensity to avoid the use of intermediaries if its
technology is very advanced or unfamiliar with potential users in its target market.
Given the importance of tacit knowledge for such products, market-based support
infrastructures may not be effective or available (Meldrum 1995). Effective
commercialisation may therefore only be possible by internalising the sales
process. Thus, idiosyncratic, country-specific ways of doing business abroad may
represent a lesser barrier than in the case of more established technologies,
especially if the product is sold to industrialised countries. Collaborations are
expected to occur more frequently when the technology is more mature and
established, a proposition that has received some validity in earlier research on
international technology transfers (Davidson and McFetridge 1985).
H13: The products of firms that sell into foreign markets through direct exports
incorporate newer technology than those of firms that sell via
intermediaries.
Previous research on internationalisation has found that product characteristics
affect the way that firms manage their international activities (Cavusgil, Zou and
Naidu 1993; Cavusgil and Zou 1994). They have also been found to influence the
chosen entry modes in the case of young technology-based firms (Lindqvist
1991). The importance of client-specific customisation as a barrier to
internationalisation has been reported in studies that examined product
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characteristics of international start-ups (Murray 1996; Roberts and Senturia 1996;
Lindell and Karagozoglu 1997). The transformation from offering bespoke
technology solutions to standardised or "shrink-wrapped" products in which the
technology is embedded is associated with an increasing market orientation of the
firm (Roberts 1991). Companies whose products are tailor-made for particular
customers have been found to be more likely to sell directly without involving
intermediaries (Bell 1995). Furthermore, it is more probable that the technological
skills required to tailor a particular product to the needs of a customer reside
within the company that developed the product rather than with the distributor in a
target country.
H14: Products sold into foreign markets via intermediaries require less client-
specific customisation than those of firms that export directly.
The tools of transaction cost economics (TCE) have also been widely used to
analyse the determinants of entry mode choices. In essence, TCE is concerned
with finding the most efficient institutional or contractual arrangement for
economic transactions (Hennart 1989). As opposed to following the methods used
by researchers who measured transaction costs indirectly by defining situations in
which asset specificity and uncertainty are supposedly high (see for example
Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Hennart 1990), we follow the approach of Klein,
Frazier and Roth (1990) and attempt to measure the costs involved in the selling
process of high-technology goods directly. During the sales process of high-
technology goods, the vendor may be required to spend considerable time
advising and educating the potential customer on the key features and relative
merits of the product. After the sale, more complex products may require
installation by trained staff, regular after sales service and periodic upgrades (Hutt
and Speh 1992; Cavusgil and Zou 1993). To carry out these tasks, the sales and
technical staff of the vendor will require particular skills. In the case of exporting,
these skills are normally resident within the manufacturer. Selling a product via an
intermediary, however, requires those skills also to be already present within, or
transferable to, the distributor. The producer may therefore have to provide regular
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training to the staff of the intermediary in order to transfer the necessary skills and
routines in order to effectively support the product. High up-front investments into
these specific assets reduces the subsequent bargaining power and margins of the
party incurring these costs. Zacharakis (1997) argues a small entrepreneurial firm
is more likely to be obliged to reduce the distributor's set-up costs through the
provision of training or other transfers than a large established multinational.
Furthermore, a distributor may not be motivated to push a complex product which
requires substantial pre-sale consulting and installation efforts. Therefore,
products and services which incur substantial costs during the sales process should
make it more difficult to align the interests of the stari-up and a potential
distributor. However, selling a technologically advanced product is likely to
require an effective support infrastructure (Meldrum 1995). Using distributors
which can exploit economies of scale and scope not available to the young firm
may be the only way to provide the necessary infrastructure to service foreign
customers. Furthermore, the costs of learning how to perform the relatively
standardised tasks of installation, end-user training and maintenance are likely to
be relatively low when the distributor already has a portfolio of related products in
place. Therefore, we hypothesise that, in international markets, distributors
represent the preferred vehicle for start-ups to ensure effective customer support
for products whose commercialisation is resource-intensive.
H15: The pre- and after-sales transaction costs of products sold into foreign
markets via intermediaries are higher than those of firms which export
directly.
We include R&D intensity as a control variable. It has in the past been used as a
proxy variable in studies that applied the framework of transaction costs to
international market entry choices (Davidson and McFetridge 1985) in order to
operationalise asset specificity and information asymmetries in exchange
relations. We argue that there are two problems with this measure. First, it
constitutes an input variable and may not necessarily have an impact on the asset
specificity required to commercialise the output of the firm. High R&D
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expenditures may not give rise to asset specificity or information asymmetries per
se. Indeed, higher R&D investment may even allow a reduction in transaction
costs by designing out complexity for the customer. Second, it is usually measured
at firm level not at product level because it is difficult to obtain R&D intensity
(R&D expenditure divided by sales) on a product group basis. While high R&D
expenditures and the need to amortise them quickly probably affect the decision to
internationalise, we do not think that this variable has an impact on the entry mode
chosen. Furthermore, instead of being responsible for high levels of asset
specificity, R&D expenditures can actually be an indicator that the firm invests
into features that minimise transaction costs (see Roberts 1991, for a convincing
statement on the R&D expenditures involved to switch from customised solutions
to "shrink-wrap" products). Therefore, we argue that these dimensions are better
represented by measuring transaction costs directly and by measuring the maturity
of the technology (see above). Due to its widespread use in empirical studies,
however, we include R&D intensity as a control variable to detect any firm-level
effects it might have on the choice of entry mode. We do not present any
hypotheses regarding the target country, but also include it as a control variable.
We follow the approaches of Erramilli and Rao (1993) and Barkema and
Vermeulen (1998) and include country risk, absolute size of the target country and
GDP per capita as additional variables. We also include further dummy variables
to control for any industry-specific effects that may impact on the chosen sales
mode (see also section 3.2.1.2.).
To summarise, like other researchers before us (e.g. Cavusgil, Zou and Naidu
1993), we attempt to explain the international entry modes using firm-specific
variables, product-specific variables and variables specific to the environment in
which the firms operate. Firm size and experience in international activities can be
seen as operationalisations of the internationalisation process model. Experience
with the domestic sales mode and the innovativeness of the technology can be
seen as operationalisations of the OC perspectives, whereas product characteristics
are proxies for the transaction cost perspective. We will now discuss the
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methodological approach used for gathering the data and testing the above
research hypotheses.
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4.	 Methodology
As already mentioned in the introduction, the current research is part of a larger
Anglo-German project on the international activities of British and German start-
ups in high-technology industries. The expertise of the German research team was
of particular benefit to the identification of data sources and the sampling process.
A number of methodological issues arose from the comparative nature of the
larger research project. We will, when appropriate, elaborate on them in the
following sections.
4.1. The Survey Instrument
As argued in chapter 3.1., we decided to use a cross-sectional research design in
order to address the research questions identified after a review of the relevant
literature. It was argued that this method could establish the prevalence of the
phenomenon. Not only can it accommodate a sample of international start-ups and
a control group of domestic start-ups, but also allows for the simultaneous
inclusion of different international business theories and empirical findings from
previous case research in a multivariate framework.
Nevertheless, a cross-sectional survey design has a number of limitations.
Foremost among them is the problem of operationalising the theories outlined in
the literature section. Whereas the gathering of information through interviews
allows for a richer operationalisation of the relevant concepts, this approach has
the disadvantage of being very costly and time-consuming. Therefore, unless
extensive resources are committed, this approach is unsuited to generating a
dataset with a large number of cases. A larger number of responses can be
achieved with a mail survey but at the expense of richness of information. The
most appropriate solution to this problem is a careful screening of the literature in
order to identify questions that have been successfully applied by other
researchers in similar contexts.
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Furthermore, there may be problems of understanding the questions. The
respondents may not understand a question in the way that it was intended by the
researchers. We therefore tried to incorporate questions that have successfully
been applied in previous research. In addition, pre-testing of the questionnaire
helps to identify ambiguous questions.
Another problem is the response behaviour of the target sample. If the survey
receives a low response rate, the chances increase that the findings are not
representative of the whole sample. Repeated mailings, pre-paid return envelopes,
phone reminders and the promise to share results are frequently used in order to
increase the response rate. In addition, there can be a sample selection problem,
since only those entrepreneurs that have a particular interest may decide to
participate in the survey. In this type of research, it is problematic if only
relatively successful entrepreneurs respond. In both cases, the results are biased as
the respondents do not reflect the characteristics of the population as a whole. In
order to test for this bias, various non-response bias tests have been developed.
While they cannot correct for a potential bias, they do at least increase the
researcher's awareness to this problem and indicate whether the findings can be
generalised.
Arguably, the above limitations are the price paid for the ability of this approach
to consolidate existing knowledge in the field and subject it to rigorous testing.
We will now discuss the process of obtaining data from the firms. First, we will
discuss how the target group of firms, high-technology start-ups, has been
operationalised to obtain a contactable population of firms. Then we will describe
the data source used in the survey. After that, we will describe the sampling
process and the handling of the survey. Finally, we will assess the possibility of
non-response bias.
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4.2.	 Definition of High-Technology Start-ups
As already stated above, there are a wide number of definitions for the terms high-
technology start-up and new technology-based firm (Autio 1997; Storey and
Tether 1998). In the first study on high-tech start-ups in Europe, sponsored by the
Anglo-German Foundation in 1977, the consultancy Arthur D. Little coined the
term "new technology-based firm." To fulfil this definition of a new technology-
based firm, a company has to meet the following criteria (Little, 1977):
• It must not have been established for more than 25 years.
• It must be established by one or more individuals and not be the subsidiary of
an established firm.
• It must have as main business purpose the exploitation of an invention or a
technological innovation.
This definition excludes subsidiaries of other firms, buy-outs / buy-ins and de-
mergers from existing firms. Note that this definition includes firms which are up
to 25 years old. This is in contrast to internationally accepted definitions of
researchers who have opted for different age thresholds to define start-up
companies or new ventures. In the American literature on entrepreneurship, the
majority of researchers have defined a new venture as younger than eight years or
six years (Oviatt and McDougall, 1997). While the validity of the US definition is
acknowledged, we decided to deviate from this practice by focussing on firms that
were up to ten years old. Due to the lack of data from other studies in the area of
international entrepreneurship, we had no a priori expectations about the share of
firms with international activities among the total population of high-tech start-
ups. However, we expected international activities to be more prevalent among
slightly older and larger firms. As it was vital to obtain data from a critical number
of internationalisers, we opted for a slightly different definition of the term "start-
up" to include older firms.
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The criterion of "high-technology" is more difficult to operationalise. Researchers
have in the past repeatedly highlighted the weaknesses of available definitions
(see Koberg, Rosse and Bergh 1994 for a review). Nonetheless, most researchers
agree on a list of common attributes or dimensions of "high-technology." The
most import of these are the uncertain returns of research and development
investments, the uncertain market reaction, partly due to the difficulty of ex-ante
performance evaluation in the absence of comparable solutions, the short windows
of opportunity due to faster rates of obsolescence and the presence of high levels
of human capital in high technology firms (e.g. Moriarty and Kosnik 1989;
Koberg, Rosse and Bergh 1994; OECD 1997; Storey and Tether 1998).
Definitions also distinguish between market and technology uncertainty (Moriarty
and Kosnik 1989; Meldrum 1995) and product and process innovation (OECD
1997). The problem with these attributes is that they are notoriously difficult to
operationalise. Even if there were objective indicators, considerable measurement
problems exist. Many indicators measure R&D input variables as opposed to
technology or innovation output. Since firms with low R&D expenditures may
develop and manufacture technologically advanced products, the relation between
input and output variables is not straightforward. On the other hand, methods that
use output indicators such as patents ignore those firms that decide not to disclose
their output, i.e. those that don't file patents and trademarks. There is a further
problem of measurement as small and young firms frequently do not record
research and development expenditures separately.
Despite these problems, R&D expenditures as a percentage of total sales and R&D
employees as a percentage of total employees have become the most frequently
used proxy variables to operationalise high-technology (Butchart 1987; Koberg,
Rosse and Bergh 1994; OECD 1997). The majority of experts that developed the
Oslo and Frascati Manuals of the OECD for measuring innovation and R&D
indicators (OECD 1997) agree that these indicators represent reasonable
approximations in order to identify technology intensive or knowledge intensive
organisations. These measures have also found widespread use as indicators in the
field of innovation economics. Furthermore, the weakness of measuring R&D
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input can be addressed by including objective (e.g. patents) or subjective output
measures in a survey.
An operationalised definition of high-technology industries in the UK based on
the above indicators has been proposed by Butchart (1987). He provides a
definition of high-tech industries based on the ratios of R&D expenses per sales
turnover and employees working in R&D per total employees. He thus established
a list of 19 SIC codes of industries that are characterised by "substantially above
average" scores on at least one of the criteria and "above average" scores on the
other (Butchart 1987). A list of these industries can be found in table 3. Like
Butchart himself, we acknowledge that this definition is not an accurate
operationalisation of "high-technology" as there will be a sizeable proportion of
firms in those industries which do not carry out any research and development
activities. However, we argue that, as opposed to targeting low-technology sectors
in the search of high-technology start-ups, including only firms from the above
industries results in an increased likelihood of obtaining responses from firms that
fulfil the specified criteria for inclusion in this study.
To conclude, we are aware of the weaknesses of the established definitions of
technology, but, in the absence of a more appropriate method, stick to
conventional practice and use an industry definition based on average R&D
expenditures. Furthermore, since this definition has in the past been used for a
large European research project on new, technology-based firms (Storey and
Tether 1998), it should therefore improve the comparability of our findings with
previous research.
4.3. Identification of Data Sources: The Use of Credit Rating Data
The next step consisted of identifying suitable sources of primary data in order to
construct a data base of firms from these industries. Start-up firms pose particular
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challenges to researchers since the coverage of both official sources and
commercial data providers of young firms is quite incomplete. However, as
mentioned above, we were particularly interested in identifying the extent to
which British high-technology firms were engaged in international activities. It
was therefore important to identify a data source with a wide coverage of start-ups
firms.
It would, in principle have been possible to compile a contact database using
different industry directories. However, it has not been possible to identify
directories for all high-technology industries using the above definition of
Butchart (1987). Furthermore, industry directories may be biased towards large
and older firms and not contain data on the youngest start-ups in an industry.
Using data from industry directories was therefore ruled out.
Instead, we decided to use data from credit rating agencies. Using credit rating
data is getting increasingly popular in research on start-ups (McDougall 1989;
Small Business Research Centre 1993; Licht and Stahl 1995). The main advantage
of credit rating data is that they offer a degree of coverage similar to official
government data sources, such as the Company House database, while containing
additional information unavailable through public sources. Using this additional
information, researchers can construct more suitable sampling frames and carry
out more accurate non-response analyses. However, it should be noted that
considerable problems exist with credit rating data as well. The data quality can
suffer from recording errors, recording lags or inaccurate information provided
deliberately by the researched firms. The latter is a particular problem with
smaller firms where it is not uncommon to observe that the owner / managers do
not want to reveal information about their company. Yet, while the problems of
credit rating data are well known, experts still believe that they represent the best
starting point for constructing enterprise panels and carrying out large surveys of
entire populations (Licht and Stahl 1995).
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The coverage of any credit rating agency is generally quite exhaustive as far as
larger firms are concerned. When the firms in question are very small, the issues
related to data quality become more important and have to be addressed. First, as
with available public data sources, the reliability of credit rating data and the
proportion of excluded firms within a population increases with decreasing firm
size. Statements about the larger population become more inaccurate when the
survey includes small firms, as the total size of the population is unknown. On the
other hand, with increasing firm size, visibility and the chance of being included
in a credit rating database increase significantly. Accurate information on the rate
of omission is, unfortunately not available. Second, industrial economists
interested in populations of firms are well aware that the large majority of firms in
any industry are micro-firms. Among these micro firms, there is a substantial
proportion with little or no business activity. They may have been set up by their
founders for reasons not related to any business activity. Adopting a cut-off
criteria is likely to exclude the majority of these firms. Furthermore, it
substantially reduces the likelihood of omission from the credit rating database. In
addition, given the objective of the study, one can argue that internationalisation is
not an issue for these firms. Their inclusion in the sampling would therefore
neither produce a target sample suitable for the purpose of this research project nor
be an economically reasonable strategy. Therefore, we decided to chose an
additional cut-off criterion. Target firms needed to employ at least three people at
the time of the latest credit rating to be included in the sample. The exclusion of
firms with fewer than three employees reduces the possibility of a bias due to non-
inclusion in the credit rating agency's database and increases the likelihood of
obtaining responses from target firms for this research.
To summarise, independent new firms with at least three employees, founded
between 1987 and 1996 inclusive, and operating in the 19 UK SIC codes defined
by Butchart (1987) were chosen as target population for the study.
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4.4. The Primary Data Base
Several information providers were contacted in order to obtain information on the
number of eligible firms. We decided to use a database from Dun & Bradstreet,
the leading British credit rating agency in terms of company coverage. After initial
discussions, Dun & Bradstreet generously decided to make the database available.
Dun & Bradstreet offers a number of services to their clients, the most important
being assessment of credit risks and provision of data bases for direct marketing
purposes. Typically, firms are included in Dun & Bradstreet's data base for two
reasons:
• First, D&B proactively gathers information from public sources such as
Company House and telephone directory publishers such as the Thompson
Directory. They do so themselves in to order achieve the broadest possible
coverage for their customers. All companies that have registered with
Company House are included in the database. Registration with Company
House is compulsory for all limited companies.
• Second, customers or suppliers who would like to obtain information on a firm
concerning the financial situation, payment score, etc., can solicit information
from the agency. If a firm is not contained in the data base, it is contacted by a
Dun & Bradstreet researcher to gather the required information.
In both cases, newly included firms are contacted on a regular basis by Dun &
Bradstreet researchers in order to update the available information. The Butchart
definition of high-technology industries relies on 1987 UK SIC codes (Butchart
1987). Dun & Bradstreet, however, uses 1982 US SIC codes on a global basis in
order to classify firms in its database. In order to make the data comparable with
the German classification, the Anglo-German research team chose to translate all
industry classification codes in NACE codes, the recent European standard
classification developed by Eurostat. Based on the description of the Butchart
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definition, all different classifications were translated into the NACE system. The
conversion of the various codes into NACE, Revision 1, is listed in table 3.
4.4.1. The Clean-up of Primary Data
Our inclusion criteria resulted in a primary dataset of 7788 firms. A closer look
revealed that nearly two thirds of the records obtained originate from companies in
the service sector whose business activity is related to computer and software
(NACE codes 7220 and 7260). This distribution is due to classification problems
in the relatively new computer-related industries. Both NACE and SIC codes do
not allow for a more detailed classification of these firms. As a result, these
industry classifications also include companies that sell (wholesale, distribution,
retail) and repair (including various maintenance activities) computers. In
addition, service firms such as systems integrators fall under these "high
technology" industry definitions.
Despite this obvious classification problem, these two sectors were included in the
definition of high-technology sectors by Butchart. Yet, given the core element of
the definition of a high-technology firm, the performance of research and
development activities, the majority — though not all - retailers, system integrators
and maintenance firms can be expected to fall outside the scope of this research
project. In order to increase the probability of obtaining survey data from firms
that meet the inclusion criteria of this study, we decided to exclude these firms.
Using the "line of business description" and an additional classification code (the
Thompson directory classifications) contained in the Dun & Bradstreet source file,
companies unlikely to perform research and development activities were
identified. This was accomplished using various "negative" criteria for a text field
search. For example, companies whose line of business activity or company name
included keywords such as "retail", "distribution", "wholesale", "maintenance"
and "repair" were earmarked. Among telecommunications firms, radio stations
were excluded from the sample as their business activity normally does not entail
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regular research and development activities comparable with those of the other
firms in the sample. Research and development laboratories were also excluded
because the survey instrument would have required substantial modification to
address the peculiar characteristics of these organisations. We examined each of
these earmarked company records in order to ascertain whether an exclusion is
warranted on the basis of the negative criteria. The same procedure was carried
out for firms in the manufacturing sector (negative criteria: retail, distribution,
repair, maintenance, wholesale). However, due to the more precise classification
nomenclature in the manufacturing sector, only a relatively small number of firms
had to be excluded from the original datafile.
Table 3
Dun & Bradstreet Source Data and Cleaned Primary Database
Description (NACE Rev.1)	 NACE	 Description	 '82 US # of firms	 after
Rev. 1 SIC	 clean-up
Plastics in Primary Form 24.16	 Plastic Material and Synthetic Resin 2821 43 42 1.18%
Synthetic Rubber in Primary Form 24.17	 Synthetic Rubber Manufacturers 2822 7 3 0.08%
Pharmaceutical Products and 24.41	 Pharmaceutical Products and Preparations 2834 60 43 1.21%
Preparations
24.42	 (included above)
Office Equipment 30.01	 Calculator Manufacturers 3574 22 12 0.34%
Misc. Office Machinery 3579 6 3 0.08%
Computers and other Information 30.02	 Computer Manufacturers 3573 311 276 7.75%
Processing Equipment
Electric Motors, Generators and 31.10	 Power, Distribution and Transformers 3612 45 44 1.24%
Transformers
Switchgear & Switchboard Manufacturers 3613 120 112 3.14%
Motor & Generator Manufacturers 3621 28 26 0.73%
Electricity Distribution and Control 31.20	 Power, Distribution and Transformers 3622 88 84 2.36%
Apparatus
Electronic Valves, Tubes and other 32.10	 Radio & TV Tubes 3671 3 2 0.06%
Components
Cathode Ray Tubes 3672 14 12 0.34%
Special Purpose Electronic Tubes 3673 4 3 0.08%
Semiconductors 3674 101 89 2.50%
Electronic Capacitors 3675 1 1 0.03%
Resistors, Electronic Application 3676 1 o 0.00%
Electronic Coil and Transformers 3677 23 21 0.59%
Connectors, Electronic Applications 3678 3 3 0.08%
Misc. Electronic Components 3679 309 278 7.80%
Television and Radio Transmitters
and Apparatus for Line Telephony
and Line Telegraphy
32.20	 Telephone & Telegraph equipment
manufacturers
3661 52 49 1.38%
Radio & TV Broadcasting Equipment 3662 249 206 5.78%
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Television and Radio Receivers,
Sound or Video Recording and
32.30 Radio & TV Equipment manufacturers
(excluding Communication)
3651 77 68 1.91%
Reproducing Apparatus
Medical and Surgical Equipment 33.10 X-Ray Apparatus and Manufacturers 3693
and Orthopaedic Appliances 22 21 0.59%
Surgical/Medical Instruments 3841
Orthopedical/Surgical Appliances and 3842
88 85 2.39%
Supplies 164 86 2.41%
Electronic Instruments and
Appliances for Measuring,
33.20 Engineering and Scientific Equipment
Manufacturers
3811 90 87 2.44%
Checking (except Industrial Process
Control)
Environmental Control Devices 3822
Fluid meter and Counting Devices 3824
2z 19 0.53%
Electric Meter Manufacturers 3825
lz 11 0.31%
Misc. Meter and Control Devices 3829
Go 53 1.49%
Electronic Industrial Process
Control Equipment
33.3 0 Industrial Instruments Manufacturers 3823
los
54
95
1.52%
2.67%
Optical Instruments 33.40 Ophthalmic Goods -	 3851
Optical Instruments and Lenses 3832 9 0.25%
Photographic Equipment
Aircraft and Speed craft
Manufacturing
35.30
Photographic Equipment
Aircraft Manufacturers
3861
3721
19
4
9
17
30
9
0.48%
0.84%
0.25%
Aircraft Engine Manufacturers 3724
Misc. Aircraft Part Manufacturers
Guided Missile and Space Vehicle
3728
3761
8
22
6
20
0.25%
0.17%
Guided Missile and Space Vehicle 3764 0.56%
Engines 0.03%
Misc. Guided Missile and Space Vehicle 3769 1 0.00%
Telecommunications 64.20 Telecommunications 4811 87 24 0.03%
Telecommunications 4821 5 2 0.67%
Telecommunications 4832 55 0 0.06%
Telecommunications 4833 25 0 0.00%
Telecommunications 4899 213 145 0.00%
Software Consultancy and Supply 72.20 Computer Programming and Software 7372 2403 1305 36.64%
Services
Data Processing 72.30 Data Processing 7374 55 0 0.00%
Database Activities 72.40
Other Computer Related Activities 72.60 Misc. Computer Services 7379 2457 105 2.95%
Research and Development in 73.10 Research and Development Laboratories 7391 184 0 0.00%
Natural Sciences and Engineering
Total Total 7788 3562
Altogether, this procedure lead to an exclusion of 3904 service companies and 322
manufacturing companies. An industry break-down of the original sample, the
Dun & Bradstreet source file, and the adjusted sample of 3562 firms is shown in
table 3. The services group consists of the telecommunications service codes
(NACE 64.20) and computer related service codes (72.20 - 72.60). As one can see
from table 3, these firms, which represent about 40% of the total cleaned sample,
essentially belong to one industry, namely software. According to the NACE
classification system, the remaining manufacturing firms - about 60% of the
sample - operate in 16 different industries.
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4.4.2. Sampling Procedure
A so-called stratified random sampling approach was adopted in order to select
target firms for the mailing. We will describe the process and elaborate on the
reasoning behind choosing this approach over a standard random sampling. In a
first step, the remaining 3562 companies were stratified into two industry groups
(manufacturing and services) and four size classes (by employees). In order to
obtain the target sample of 2000 firms for the mail survey, we calculated a target
number of firms per cell. Our target was to include 1500 manufacturing firms and
500 service firms. Furthermore, in order to obtain a roughly equal distribution of
firms among different size classes, we also calculated an approximate target
number per size class.
Table 4
Sample Composition After Stratification
(Number of firms per cell and percentage of total)
Employees
Cleaned Sample
Manufacturing	 Services Total
Target Sample
Manufacturing	 Services Total
3-5 673	 742 1415 344	 112 456
19%	 21% 40% 17%	 6% 23%
6-9 474	 370 844 384	 112 496
13%	 10% 24% 19%	 6% 25%
10-19 472	 292 764 427	 132 559
13%	 8% 21% 21%	 7% 28%
20+ 362	 177 539 345	 144 489
10%	 5% 15% 17%	 7% 24%
Total 1981	 1581 3562 1500	 500 2000
56%	 44% 100% 75%	 25% 100%
In the next step, using the above targets as thresholds, a random sample of 2000
companies was drawn to establish the target sample for the mail survey.
Furthermore, we also drew a reserve sample of 671 firms, roughly a third of the
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target sample. The latter was intended to replace firms that ceased to exist or
moved address and whose envelopes were expected to be returned unopened
within a few days of the mailing. The remaining 891 firms were discarded. Table
4 shows the sample composition using the above stratification criteria for the
cleaned Dun & Bradstreet sample and the target sample for the mailing. Table 5
shows the drawing probability per strata.
After having described the procedure, it is of course necessary to highlight the
reasoning for adopting this approach. As one can see from both tables, the
stratified sampling resulted in an artificial over-representation of manufacturing
firms as opposed to service firms and larger firms as opposed smaller firms. For
example, the group of the smallest service firms represents 21% of the cleaned up
Dun & Bradstreet sample, but only 6% of the target sample (Table 4). This
translates into a drawing probability of 15% (Table 5).
Table 5
Drawing Probability per Strata *
Employees Manufacturing Services
3-5 50% 15%
6-9 80% 30%
10-19 89% 46%
20+ 98% 81%
* The table shows the final drawing probability after inclusion of 62
firms from the reserve sample (see section on the mailing below).
Several issues are addressed by this procedure. First, as already mentioned above,
due to the dearth of empirical research in international entrepreneurship, the extent
of cross-border activities among British high-technology start-ups was completely
unknown. Theory, however, suggests that larger start-ups are more likely to have
international activities. As the main research question consists of comparing
internationalisers with non-internationalisers in a multivariate framework, it is
vital to obtain data on a sufficient number of firms with international activities.
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Oversampling larger firms therefore increases the likelihood of realising that
objective. Second, given the size distribution of firms in any given industry, the
majority of responses would be expected from these smallest of firms. If there are
systematic differences firm behaviour related to size, a more balanced sampling
frame that produces a more even distribution of firms across different size classes
is more suitable to pick that effect up. Third, since we are interested in discovering
industry effects at a more disaggregated level than "manufacturing vs. service", it
is not desirable to devise a sampling frame where 36.6% of firms originate from
one industry (NACE 72.20) and the remaining 63.4 % from all other 18 industries.
The stratified random sampling allows for an incorporation of these objectives
through deliberate over- or under-representation of particular strata.
There is, however, an important downside to this approach. The stratified
sampling process deliberately introduces a bias into the data that prevents
researchers from drawing conclusions on the population as a whole without
making further adjustments to the results. In order to correct for that bias, the
standard procedure consists of calculating weights which reflect the different
drawing and response probability per strata. Based on the assumption of absence
of non-response bias within each strata, the descriptive results can easily be
corrected for that bias by incorporating these weights into the calculation. Given
that descriptive results refer to a univariate data pattern, it is not unreasonable to
make that assumption when a sufficient number of firm responded.
In a multivariate approach, however, the impact of stratification and the
appropriability of weighting is more difficult to assess given the multitude of
different multivariate pattern. On the one hand, the stratification deliberately
introduces a bias through over- or under-sampling. On the other hand, as firms are
quite diverse entities, both management and distribution theory suggest that the
individual multivariate pattern are not completely determined by the stratification
criteria. In other words, one does a priori not expect the multivariate vectors of
service firms to be consistently different from those of manufacturing firms unless
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there is an extremely high correlation between the stratification criteria (service
vs. manufacturing) and all other variables in the questionnaire. Consequently, it is
common not to attach weights to the regression models after stratification. To
conclude, the stratification is likely to result in some sort of bias, though it is
virtually impossible to assess its impact on the results. Still, if the number of data
points is sufficiently high, the results of the estimations should not impaired in a
consistent way. The stratified sampling has thus been chosen because the benefits
outlined above outweigh its the potential downside.
4.5. The Questionnaire
In parallel to drawing a target sample for our survey, we developed a four page
questionnaire based on the existing literature in the field, including both
international business in general and exploratory studies in international
entrepreneurship. We first asked respondents about general characteristics of the
firm, characteristics of the founders and their skill sets and product characteristics.
As the questionnaire was designed to operationalise the dominant theories in the
field of international business, variables to measure transaction costs during the
sales process were included. Furthermore, we operationalised variables that have
been used in previous research to operationalise the resource-based view to test
the propositions of internationalisation process models. We also asked
respondents to provide information about the three most important foreign
markets for their best selling product. The latter was done in order to analyse the
market entry as unit of analysis as a function of product characteristics and
country characteristics. Finally, we asked the respondents to rank different
motivations for international activities and the costs and constraints experienced
during this process.
The design of the questionnaire and the individual questions were then discussed
with the German research team. These discussions lead to a number of changes
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reflecting the experiences of the German researchers with German start-up firms.
A copy of the questionnaire can be found in appendix 1. Key questions of the
survey instrument are described in more detail in section 6.1., which deals with
the operationalisation of the independent variables.
4.6.	 The Pilot Case Studies
In order to test the survey instrument, four pilot case studies were carried out in
the UK. Different methods were chosen to test whether the survey instrument was
comprehensive. The first method (2 cases) involved visiting the pilot respondent
and observing him while filling out the questionnaire, asking him to "think
loudly" during the process (Hall and Hofer, 1993). Questions were discussed when
the pilot respondent felt that they were worded ambiguously. During this process,
we took notes which served as basis for further improvements. The second method
(2 cases) did not require our presence. It involved sending the questionnaire
directly to two pilot respondents. After the questionnaire was filled out, we
discussed the answers with the respondents over the phone in order to determine
the comprehensiveness of the questions and whether they effectively measured the
constructs that the we were interested in. The pilot testing resulted in a number of
suggestions for modifications. After discussions with the German researchers who
also carried out pilot-tests, a number of changes to both the layout and wording of
the questions were incorporated.
4.7. Mailing and Response Pattern
The questionnaire and a cover letter explaining the purpose of the project were
sent to the target firms during the last week of September 1997. The cover letter
explicitly stressed that the we were equally interested in responses from
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intemationalisers and non-intemationalisers. Three waves of reminders within
three to four weeks distance from each other were subsequently mailed. The cover
letters of the reminders were worded differently for each mailing (see appendix 2
to 5). After the first reminder, we started contacting a random sample of 75 firms
by phone in order to solicit participation in the survey. As this method did not
yield a substantially higher response rate among the contacted firms, we decided
to send out additional reminders rather than pursuing a telephone follow-up. The
last questionnaires were received in February 1998. Subsequently, we contacted
respondents in all cases where the answers given to important questions required
clarification or were not provided at all. This resulted in the following response
pattern (see also table 6).
Table 6
Response Pattern
Description Return
Code
Number of cases
Abs.	 rel. (%)
Usable Questionnaires 1 362 17.6
Answering only the first questions and then breaking-off 2 7 0.3
Refusal, questionnaire sent back 3 27 1.3
Refusal by mail or telephone 4 34 1.6
Firm responded but does not belong to the target population 5 94 4.6
Firm not known at the address or firm moved and new address
unknown (envelope was sent back unopened)
6 134 6.5
Firm no longer existed or is in receivership 7 9 0.4
No response at all 8 1395 67.7
Total 2,062 100
Out of the 2000 questionnaires that were mailed out, 62 were returned unopened
within four days. The return information provided by the Royal Mail indicated
that the firms in question had ceased to exist or were not known at the given
address. We therefore selected an additional 62 firms from the reserve sample so
that the total number of contacted firms increased to 2062. Out of these, 1919
firms were still in business and received the survey instrument (1919=2062-
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(134+9)). 456 firms sent back completed questionnaires (return codes 1 + 5). This
translates into a response rate of 24 % which is in line with other studies on small
firms based on credit rating data (McDougall 1989; Small Business Research
Centre 1992; Licht and Stahl 1995).20
Two figures in the table merit further comment. First, there was an unexpectedly
high percentage (4.6 %) of firms that filled out the questionnaire correctly but that
had to be excluded from the study because they fell outside the definition adopted
for the purpose of this study (return code 5). This category is made up of three
different groups. Firms of the first group stated that they were more than 10 years
old. The second group stated that they were not founded as independent new
firms, but as subsidiaries, buy-outs or buy-ins. The remaining firms indicated that
they were acquired by larger firms after their formation. A filter question in the
questionnaire was used in order to shed further light on the formation of these
firms. In those cases where the best-selling product was developed after the
current legal incorporation, we recontacted the respondents. Questions concerning
the process of their formation were asked to determine the reasons for the
separation from their previous incubator organisation. Two criteria were used in
order to establish whether these firms could be retained in the database. First, the
de-merger, buy-out or buy-in had to be staged in order to pursue the development
of a new product idea. Second, the customer base of the firm had to be different
than the one of its parent organisation. In 36 cases, both criteria were fulfilled and
the firms were classified as eligible respondents (return code 1) as they actually
constitute new businesses despite "inheriting" some assets from incubator
organisations (see also Katz and Gartner 1988, for a discussion of emerging
organisations). Return code 5 represents all remaining de-mergers, MB0s, MBIs
and subsidiaries that were removed from the analysis.
' The Cambridge surveys yielded a response rate of 32% (Centre for Small Business Research
1993). Licht and Stahl (1995) reported response rates of 25% for their enterprise panel. In
contrast, McDougall's (1989) study based on Dun & Bradstreet data resulted in a 10% response
rate.
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Second, the group of firms with unknown addresses (6.5 %) contains an unknown
number of firms that have entered receivership. The return code 7 ("Firm does no
longer exist") therefore understates the number of firms the have ceased to exist as
it only represents those firms that wrote back to the researchers indicating that
they were in the process of receivership.
4.8. Non-Response Analysis
In order to assess whether the firms that participated in the study systematically
differ from non-respondents, we perform a non-response analysis following the
methods recommended by Armstrong and Overton (1977). Following that
approach, we compare the 456 firms that sent back questionnaires with the
remaining 1606 firms using several variables of the original Dun & Bradstreet
data base. Note that the 94 firms that had to be excluded because they did not meet
the inclusion criteria of the study (return code 5) were included among the
respondents. As mentioned above, these firms were mainly subsidiaries of larger
firms, set up as buy-outs or buy-ins or simply too old to be included. Due to the
different processes of their formation and subsequent management, it is reasonable
to assume that this may lead to different growth trajectories. Yet, given the
unexpected high share of these firms among the respondents, we expect that the
Dun & Bradstreet database also contains a substantial percentage of firms that fall
under that category. As we cannot identify that type of firm ex ante in the source
data, we include them as respondents in the non-response analysis. We then tested
for differences of employees, information quality and credit score. The latter is of
particular interest as it represents a summary proxy variable that credit rating
agencies assign to assess the financial viability of a business. This variable is
therefore likely to be a good indicator of the overall performance of a start-up. The
information rating is a variable assigned by the Dun & Bradstreet researchers in
order to judge the quality and amount of disclosed information. Table 7 shows the
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means, standard deviations and t-values of the respondents and non-respondents of
the different variables selected for comparison.
Table 7
Comparison of Respondents and Non-Respondents
•
Respondents Non-Respondents Standard Error Z P>ItI
Employees 18.38 17.84 1.65 -0.33 0.74
Credit Score 9.25 9.23 0.177 -0.099 0.92
Info Rating 2.94 2.97 0.043 0.816 0.41
When we compare the means of respondents and non-respondents of each of these
indicators, we realised that none of the differences is significant in a statistically
sense. Particularly the financial indicator used to compare the two groups suggest
that there are no performance differences between respondents and non-
respondents. The absence of significant differences in the information rating
variable suggests that the initial Dun & Bradstreet information on those firms that
did participate in the survey was of the same quality as the information provided
by non-respondents. Stated differently, significantly lower score among non-
respondents would have indicated a systematic bias in favour of firms that are
more willing to disclose firm-specific information to outsiders.
A t-test is, however, only a crude way of assessing a potential bias. In order to
improve the analysis of non-respondents, the information on the 75 firms
contacted over the phone during the mailing phase was used. These firms were
asked to provide information on their size by employees and whether they had
international sales. Not all firms wanted to disclose information. For 58 of the
firms, information was available. The average of 16 employees and 38 firms with
international sales are in line with the parameters for the total sample (see section
5.3.1.). We therefore conclude that non-response bias could not be detected using
these tests.
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5.	 Descriptive Data Analysis
5.1.	 Methodological Considerations
In this chapter, we will give an overview of the sample of eligible firms by
providing some basic descriptive statistics and discussion of the results. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, 362 usable questionnaires could be retained for
analysis. Given that our mail sample was generated using a stratified random
sampling procedure (see chapter 4), we deliberately introduced a bias into our
data. For example, there was a deliberate over-sampling of larger firms and a
deliberate under-sampling of service firms. In order to infer from our sample on
the estimated larger population of high-tech start-ups, this bias had to be
neutralised. To this end, the values of the firms in each of the eight strata have
been adjusted using a weighting procedure. The next section briefly discusses how
these weights were calculated.
5.1.1. Calculation of Weights
In order to calculate the weights for each strata, two different factors, the drawing
probability and the response probability, were taken into account. The drawing
probability accounts for the bias introduced through the deliberate over- or under-
sampling due to the stratified random sampling. It is calculated by dividing the
number of firms in the mail sample by the number of firms in the adjusted
(cleaned) Dun & Bradstreet source sample per strata. As we are interested in
inferring from our sample on the total population of firms, we also adjusted these
drawing probabilities with the response probability per strata. The latter is
calculated for each strata according to the same method used to calculated the
overall response probability (see section 4.7.). The weight for each strata is then
given by the inverse of the product of drawing probability and response
probability. Table 8 gives an overview of the drawing probability, the response
probability and the resulting weight for each of the strata.
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These weights were used when basic descriptive statistics were calculated, such as
the mean, the median and the standard deviation. First, the mean of any variable
was calculated for every strata. A weighted average was then calculated using the
different weights in order to estimate the population mean. In practice, this is a
relatively straightforward task as the majority of statistical software packages
allow the incorporation of weights in their calculation routines.
Table 8
Calculation of Weights per Strata*
Strata Drawing Probability Response Probability Weight
Manu 3-5 employees 0.50 0.17 11.84
Manu 6-9 employees 0.80 0.24 5.29
Manu 10-19 employees 0.89 0.25 4.55
Manu 20 + employees 0.98 0.25 4.15
Service 3-5 employees 0.15 0.25 26.25
Service 6-9 employees 0.30 0.27 12.23
Service 10-19 employees 0.46 0.28 7.75
Service 20 + employees 0.81 0.29 4.24
* Weight=1/(drawing probability x response probability)
The following example using the number of employees at the time of the survey
highlights the implications of this procedure. The sample mean is 20 employees.
Given that we deliberately over-sampled large firms, we expected the population
mean to be somewhat lower. Accordingly, we obtain a weighted mean of 15
employees which is an estimation of the mean of the total population of high-tech
start-ups. In the next section, the majority of the descriptive results will be shown
both weighted and unweighted. The discussion is mainly based on the weighted
results but we provide further explanations when substantial differences are
evident.
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5.1.2. Industry Groups
In order to analyse the characteristics of the firms in more detail, they are grouped
in five industry categories. These are services, IT/communications hardware,
electronics, life sciences and "other". Table 9 indicates the classification logic and
the number of firms per industry group. The percentages are shown both weighted
and unweighted and represent the share of the estimated total population and share
of sample respectively.
The classification was motivated by the desire to obtain homogeneous industry
groups. Note that the services / software industry group is mainly composed of
software firms. Furthermore, the line of business description of three of the five
telecommunications firms (such as "interne access provider" or "phone system
management software") reveals that their activity is based around software
solutions. In the following, this group is referred to as "software". The IT and
telecommunications hardware firms mainly consist of two NACE codes. The
product descriptions of firms in these industries suggest that they predominantly
manufacture products in relatively large volumes from commodity components.
The group "engineering / precision engineering" represents those firms which
specialise in the development and manufacture of electronic instruments, control
and measurement devices. The group "life sciences" consists of medical
engineering firms and biotechnology firms. These two NACE codes have been
grouped together because they face somewhat similar challenges during the
development and commercialisation phases of their products. For example, the
products of these firms are in many cases subject to regulatory approval by health
authorities in their target markets. Furthermore, the commercialisation of these
products is usually carried out through medical equipment distributors. As the
project is largely concerned with the internationalisation of these firms, which is
arguably a sales driven process for start-ups, we believe that they represent a
rather homogeneous subgroup.
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Table 9
Sample Composition by Industry
Industry
Groups
# of
firms
%
*)
%
**)
Description (NACE Rev.1)
-
NACE
Rev. 1
# of firms
Services / 104 44.03 28.73 Telecommunications 64.20 5
Software Software Consultancy and Supply 72.20 92
Other Computer Related Activities 72.60 7
IT! 79 17.42 21.82 Office Equipment 30.01 0
Communication Computers and other Information 30.02 30
Hardware Processing Equipment
Television and Radio Transmitters and 32.20 44
Apparatus for Line Telephony and Line
Telegraphy
Television and Radio Receivers, Sound
or Video Recording and Reproducing
32.30 5
Apparatus
Engineering /
Precision
56 12.57 15.47 Electronic Instruments and Appliances
for Measuring, Checking (except
33.20 38
Engineering Industrial Process Control)
Electronic Industrial Process Control 33.30 13
Equipment
Optical Instruments / Photographic 33.40 5
Equipment
Life Sciences 34 6.86 9.39 Pharmaceutical Products and 24.41 3
Preparations
Medical and Surgical Equipment and 33.10 31
Orthopaedic Appliances
Other 89 19.12 24.59 Plastics in Primary Form 24.16 8
Synthetic Rubber in Primary Form 24.17 2
Electric Motors, Generators and 31.10 20
Transformers
Electricity Distribution and Control 31.20 12
Apparatus
Electronic Valves, Tubes and other 32.10 42
Components
Aircraft and Speedcraft Manufacturing 35.30 5
Total 362 100.00 100.00 362
*) Weighted share of estimated population **) Unweighted share of the actual sample
All remaining firms were classified as "Other". We do admit that it appears
somewhat arbitrary when merely looking at the different NACE descriptions
ranging from synthetic rubber to aircraft manufacturing. However, there is a logic
behind this classification. First, the inclusion of some of these NACE codes in the
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other four groups would arguably lead to lower degree of homogeneity among
these. Second, and more important, the product description of these firms revealed
that the majority, 67%, produce components for other products. This compares to
19% for the other industry subgroups. We therefore believe that there is some
homogeneity even in this more eclectic subgroup.'
We will now turn to a description of the firms, both at start-up and at the time of
the survey, and discuss the characteristics of their products. Certain indicators will
be shown at an industry level using the five industry groups described above.
Furthermore, for certain indicators, a break-down by the different size classes will
be provided. Size is here defined in terms of employment. The groups are identical
to the size groups used for the stratification procedure (1-5 employees, 6-9
employees, 10-19 employees and 20 and more employees).
In this chapter on descriptive analysis, We will use the method of kernel density
estimation in order to explore the distribution of several continuous variables. This
method is a non-parametric estimation very similar to a histogram. The main
difference between the two is that a histogram divides the data in several non-
overlapping intervals, so-called bins. The observed pattern therefore depends to a
large extent on the chosen number of bins. On the other hand, a kernel density
estimator allows intervals to overlap and estimates the centre point of these
intervals. It thus approximates the density of the value for a particular dependent
variables, i.e. the frequency at which it occurs. As a result, the distribution of the
dependent variable is approximated as a continuous line. It can be overlaid with a
normal distribution around the mean in order to explore the distribution of the
dependent variable (for a detailed explications of this method see, for example,
Tapia and Thompson 1978).
21 During our descriptive analysis, we received further evidence that this firm is quite distinct from
the other firms along a number of dimensions.
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5.2.	 Descriptive Data Analysis: General Firm Characteristics
5.2.1. Firm Characteristics at Start-up
Table 10 shows descriptive statistics of the firms at the time of start-up. A
breakdown of the number of founders reveals that 70% of firms have been set up
by at least two founders. This distribution applies across all different industry
groups and size classes. Including the founders, the mean number of employees at
start-up was four employees with a median of two. As one would expect from a
population of start-ups, the distribution of this variable is highly skewed to the
right with values ranging from 1 to 50. 88% of the firms had five employees or
less at the time of start-up. At industry level, there are certain differences with
regard to start-up employment. Average start-up employment varied between 3.0
(IT/Corn hardware and engineering) and 4.60 ("other"). Software firms started
with an average of 3.9 employees and life sciences firms with 4.1 employees.
Table 10
Firm Characteristics at Start-up *
Weighted
	
Unweighted
Mean	 Median	 SD
	
Mean	 Median	 SD
Founders
Employees at
start-up
Sales in first
year (in 000)
2.13 2 1.21 2.16 2 1.27
3.78 2 5.42 4.36 3 6.45
216 100 405 274 124 507
* Employment in full-time equivalents; sales data in thousands of pounds
In their first financial year, these firms generated a mean turnover of £216,000.
The average firm, however, had a much lower level of sales (median £100,000).
This distribution becomes less skewed when excluding the "de-merged start-ups."
The remaining population had mean sales of £179,000 with values ranging from 0
to £2,175,000. Note that there is sometimes a gap of several years between the
year of formation and the first financial year. This is largely due to the long
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development cycle of certain products and the fact that some new organisations
take a number of years to "emerge" (Katz and Gartner 1988). While 87% of firms
generate their first sales within their first or second year of operation, the
remaining 13% of the start-ups experienced a lag ranging from two to six years.
5.2.2. Firm Characteristics at the Time of the Survey
The target firms for the sample were founded between 1987 and 1996 inclusive.
At the time of the survey, the responding firms were on average 5.4 years old
(base year: 1997). Figure 1 reveals that the age distribution is somewhat uneven
with the highest percentage of responding firms centred around the mean age.
Figure 1
Firms by Year of Formation
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The slightly lower share of older firms among the respondents (left tail of the
distribution) is probably due to the likelihood of survivor bias inherent in any
dataset on entrepreneurial start-up firms. This "drop" is already present in the Dun
& Bradstreet source dataset. When looking at the right end of the tail, one can
observe a slightly lower than expected percentage of responding firms starting
from the formation year 1994. A likely explanation for this decline could be the
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lack of interest in the survey topic among the youngest firms or greater demand on
management during the start-up period.
Table 11 provides information on firm size at the time of the survey. During the
period between start-up and the time of the survey, the firms created on average 12
additional jobs with values ranging from -17 to 167 (median 6). Accordingly, a
start-up employed on average 15 people including the founders (full-time
equivalents). These figures are in line with previous studies on the employment of
new, technology-based firms (for reviews of existing empirical data see Autio
1997; Storey and Tether 1998). As one can see from the table, the firms generated
average sales of £1,380,000 (median £650,000) with values ranging from £16,000
to £16,100,000. The average annual sales per employee were £59,300 with values
ranging from £2,600 to £ 250,000. We also asked the respondents to state their
sales forecast for the current financial year, which usually coincided with the
financial year at the time of the survey. The firms in our sample had a very
optimistic outlook on the future with 93% of firms expecting an increase of their
sales during the following financial year.
Table 11
Firm Size at the Time of the Survey *
Mean
Weighted
Median SD
Unweighted
Mean	 Median SD
Age 5.41 5 2.67 5.74 6 2.64
Employees today 15.36 8 20.84 20.01 12 24.18
Sales in last year 923 480 1508 1246 654 1799
Sales per Employee 59.3 49 45.21 62.6 52 44.26
Expected sales next year 1264 600 2054 1608 860 2225
* Sales data in thousands of pounds; Employee data in full-time equivalents
When looking at firm size by industry (table 12), a number of differences became
apparent. In terms of both employment and sales, the firms in the engineering
industry group were smaller than the other firms. Note also that the life sciences
firms indicated relatively low sales figures compared to the sample average
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despite having the highest average number of employees. Their low ratio of sales
per employee suggest the presence of a number of firms that are still in the
development process or that have launched their products without yet reaching
their full sales potential. Software firms reported the highest projected sales
increase from their last financial year to the year-end forecast of the financial year
at the time of the survey. The growth rates of the firms will be discussed in more
detail in section 5.2.7.
Table 12
Firm Size by Industry*
Total
Sample
Software IT/Corn
Hardware
Engineer. Life
Sciences
Other
Employees today 15.36 15.32 16.37 11.44 17.44 16.35
Sales in last year 923 890 1222 731 771 923
Sales per Employee 59.3 58.1 77.6 63.9 44.2 56.5
Expected sales next year 1264 1308 1693 971 889 1109
* Weighted results; employment in full-time equivalents; sales in thousands of pounds
5.2.3. External Finance:
Venture Capital, Business Angels and Public Grants
We asked respondents to indicate whether they received any form of external
finance to start their firm. We asked them whether they benefited from
investments from venture capitalists and business angels or successfully applied
for government grants. Table 13 reports the results to this question.
The figures show that 7.4% of the firms received venture capital at start-up. This
percentage increased slightly when considered at the time of the survey. A roughly
equal percentage of firms benefited from investments though business angels (70A
at start-up; 9% at the time of the survey). These figures are in line with those
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provided by Moore (1994), who reported that 10% of the high-tech firms in his
sample benefited from venture capital. Given that Mason and Harrison (1994)
estimate the that business angel sector in the UK is of at least equal size than the
official venture capital sector, the percentage of firms with business angel
investment is also within the expected range. Note that the percentage of firms
receiving funds from a business angel increased to a greater extent over time than
the percentage of VC investee firms.
Table 13
External Finance
% of firms at start-up 	 % of firms today
# of Weighted	 Unweighted	 # of	 Weighted Unweighted
obs.	 obs.
Venture Capital 35 7.44 9.67 39 8.78 10.77
Business Angels 29 7.10 8.01 40 8.92 11.05
Public Grants 50 12.27 13.81 62 12.93 17.12
The figures for government support requires some comments. The previous two
questions on venture capital and business angels enabled respondents to clearly
state their involvement at start-up and the time of the survey. One does expect an
increasing involvement over time as a disinvestment is unlikely at such an early
stage of the companies' life. The section on public grants, however, is less
straightforward as many grants and awards represent one-off payments instead of
ongoing equity participation's. The answer to "support today" therefore
underestimates the amount of firms that have ever benefited from such schemes.
Accordingly, when just looking at the results as indicated by the respondents, the
share of firms that received some sort of government grant over time is constant.
We therefore also calculated the share of firms that did receive a grant at the time
of start-up but indicated "no support" at the time of the survey. Accordingly, the
weighted share of firms that have received some government support or
participated in some government financed scheme since inception increases to
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20.7%. Note, however, that this figure is likely to include refundable loans.
According to the comments provided on the questionnaire by many entrepreneurs,
this percentage does not only cover non-refundable grants and innovation,
technology or design awards, but also the participation in the Small Business Loan
Guarantee Scheme which underwrites refundable loans administered by retail
banks. 27 of the firms (7.5% of the sample, 5.9% of the estimated population)
benefited from an export assistance grant or participated in a government
programme designed to assist them in their international expansion. 23 of these
firms indicated that they have international sales at the time of the survey. Three
of the firms that received export assistance did not sell into foreign markets during
their last financial year but had international sales at some stage in the past. In
only one case, there were no international sales recorded despite the provision of
export assistance.
We also asked respondents to indicate the amount of funds provided through these
external financiers, expressed as percentage of total equity. Note that this does not
mean that the venture capitalists or the business angels hold the same amount of
the shares or voting rights. Note also that this is of course less applicable to
government grants which are in the majority of cases accounted for as
extraordinary revenues and therefore appear in the profit and loss report, but not
the balance sheet. Still, it gives a rough indication of the amount of finance made
available to the entrepreneurs through these sources of finance and a comparison
is quite informative. On average, venture capitalists provided an investment which
represented a share of 39% of the firms' equity. When looking at the firms today,
the average share amounted to 36%. It was somewhat surprising to find out that
the mean share of business angels' investment was higher than the venture
capitalists'. Among those firms that benefited from investments from business
angels, we found a start-up investment of 52% and 41% today respectively. Note
also a certain decrease in the relative importance of the amount of these
investments over time. A possible explanation for this relative decrease is that
both venture capitalists' and business angels' investments are likely to represent a
larger share of the total equity at company start-up compared to later stage
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investments. Finally, public grants were less important as sources of finance than
these two sources of equity finance. We found that the value of the grants
amounted to 37% at start-up and 32% at the time of the survey respectively.
Further analysis revealed some industry-specific differences. Life sciences firms
had a higher share of venture capital investments both at start-up and today
whereas engineering were more likely to benefit from business angel investments
than the remaining firms. On should, however, bear in mind that such a break-
down conveys the danger of making inferences about a larger population based on
very small numbers. The breakdown of the presence of business angels by
industry resulted in sub-groups consisting of 5 to 11 cases. Any interpretation
therefore has to be made with extreme care.
5.2.4. Founders
When looking at the characteristics of the founders (table 14), we observed that
the majority of firms, 70% of the population, were set up by teams of at least two
founders. This figure applies across all different industries and size classes. 79%
of the founders had joint working experience prior to starting their firm. We then
looked at the international experience of the founders. We asked respondents to
state whether they had previous work experience abroad, work experience in the
UK for an internationally operating company or whether they have been educated
abroad. The results show that 51% had work experience in a foreign country and
46% worked in the UK for an internationally operating firm respectively.
Combining these two indicators, 67% of founders that had some sort of
international business exposure. International education was less common with
only 13% of the founders stating that they spent time abroad as part of their
education. Only one founder stated that he was educated abroad but had no foreign
exposure in a professional setting. No important differences were found when
looking at the different size classes with the exception of smallest firms having a
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lower percentage of international exposure. On the scores indicating international
business experience, firms operating in life sciences and engineering had the
highest percentages of founders with international exposure.
nM
Table 14
Founder Characteristics
Mean
Weighted
Median SD
Unweighted
Mean	 Median SD
Number of Founders 2.13 2.00 1.21 2.16 2.00 1.27
Joint work experience* (in %) 78.53 41.14 81.60 38.82
Work experience abroad (in %) 51.43 50.05 52.21 50.02
Work experience in UK for
international firm (in %)
46.08 49.92 48.90 50.06
Education abroad (in %) 13.06 33.75 12.71 33.35
* for firms with at least 2 founders
Management Skills
We asked respondents to indicate whether they experienced shortages of particular
skills when they started their firm and at the time of the survey. In table 15, we
show the percentage of those firms that said they faced a substantial shortage of
skills at start-up and at the time of the survey respectively. We operationalised
"substantial" as those firms that ticked a score of 4 or 5 on the five point Likert
scale. As one can see from the table, the largest learning effects over time were in
managerial areas such as marketing, sales and financial management. The
situation in technical areas such as production and research and development
stayed relatively stable over time. There were neither industry-specific differences
nor differences with regard to the size classes.
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Table 15
Shortage of Management Skills*
At start-up
% of firms with "substantial"
shortages of skills
Today
% of firms with "substantial"
shortages of skills
Marketing 31.68 18.14
Sales / Distribution 30.41 23.15
Financial Management 22.72 9.73
General Management. 12.49 10.76
Production, Manufacturing 17.63 12.63
Research & Development 20.23 19.17
* Weighted Results
nI•
5.2.5. Research and Development Activities
Given that our survey targeted technology-based start-ups, we included a number
of questions in order to determine to what extent the responding firms were
involved in research and development (R&D) activities. In accordance with
widespread practice (see also section 4.2.), we chose several indicators. We first
asked firms about the regularity of their R&D activities. As additional indicators,
we used R&D intensity (measured as R&D expenditures as percentage of total
sales), the share of R&D employees (measured as employees devoting at least 50%
of their time to the development of future or existing products as percentage of
total employees) and the number of employees with technical training in the
company. The results are as follows.
We asked respondents to state how regularly they engaged in research and
development activities. 36 (11%) firms stated that they did not perform any
research or development. 106 (33%) firms indicated that they were involved in
R&D activities on an occasional basis. The remaining 220 (56%) firms stated that
they regularly undertook research and development activities. Looking at the
industry breakdown of this indicator revealed that the firms grouped under "other"
had a substantially lower share of firms with regular research and development
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activities (36%). This indicator was highest for the IT/Communication hardware
and life sciences firms, with 72% and 69% respectively. An analysis by size class
revealed that larger firms had a higher tendency to engage in research and
development on a regular basis. The percentages for permanent R&D activities are
45% (3-5 employees), 60% (6-9 employees), 60% (10-19 employees) and 75%
(more than 20 employees) respectively. Table 16 shows the R&D intensity of the
firms in our sample.
Table 16
R&D Indicators: R&D Intensity
Weighted	 Unweighted
% of	 Mean R&D Median	 % of	 Mean R&D Median
firms
	
Intensity	 firms	 Intensity
No R&D Activities 10.51 0 0 9.94 0 0
Occasional R&D 33.20 7.64 2.00 29.28 8.25 2.00
Regular R&D 56.29 22.61 15.00 60.77 20.26 12.00
Total 100.00 15.26 7.00 100.00 14.72 8.00
Firms that regularly engaged in research and development activities reported an
average R&D intensity of nearly 23% (median 15%) with values ranging from 0%
to 200%. The distribution is skewed to the right with 80% of firms showing an
R&D intensity of 30% or less. 13 firms with regular R&D activities reported R&D
intensity of 0%. However, they did provide an estimation of R&D employees (see
below). These firms do probably not a have a separate R&D budget and their
managing directors felt unable to provide a detailed account of the expenses for
the questionnaire. As one would expect, the firms that performed development
activities only on an occasional basis reported lower R&D intensities (mean 7.6%,
median 2%). A breakdown by firm size (in terms of employees) revealed small
differences. The mean values per size class ranged from 14.9% for smallest firms
(1-5 employees) to 16.9% for the largest firms (more than 20 employees).
We then looked at a different indicator for the technology intensity of the firms. In
accordance with common practice in studies that are concerned with measuring
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the technology intensity or knowledge content of firms (see for example OECD
1997), we asked respondents to state how many employees devoted more than
50% of their time to research and development of current or future products. We
asked respondents to provide the information in full-time equivalents. The result
are displayed in table 17.
Table 17
R&D Indicators: R&D Employees*
% of
firms
Weighted
Mean R&D
Employees
Median % of
firms
Unweighted
Mean R&D
Employees
Median
No R&D Activities 10.51 0 0 9.94 0 0
Occasional R&D 33.20 35.04 28.57 29.28 30.33 21.98
Regular R&D 56.29 36.82 33.33 60.77 30.85 25.00
Total Firms 100.00 31.77 25.00 100.00 27.67 22.22
* in full-time equivalents
According to the respondents, roughly a third of the workforce of the start-ups is
involved in research or product development. However, as opposed to the highly
skewed distribution of the R&D intensity, the values of the share of R&D
employees approximately follow a normal distribution. It is also quite noticeable
that the "occasional" R&D performers reported equal levels of R&D employees. A
separate analysis looking at the size classes revealed that smaller firms had a
higher share of employees working on product development. The smallest size
group (1-5 employees) had a mean of 34% as opposed to 25% for the group of the
largest firms. This could reflect the phenomenon that task sharing is very common
in small structures and development staff are likely to be involved in other
activities. As a result, R&D employees may be overcounted in a survey addressed
to small firms.
As a final indicator, we looked at one human capital indicator that is frequently
associated with the knowledge intensity of a firm. We asked the respondents to
indicate how many employees had technical or scientific education at degree level.
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The results (table 18) show that the firms in the sample (both weighted and
unweighted) have a highly educated workforce. As expected, firms that regularly
perform R&D activities top the list with 46.5% of employees having technical or
scientific education at degree level.
Table 18
R&D Indicators: Employees with Technical Education
Weighted	 Unweighted
% of	 Mean Tec.	 Median	 % of - Mean Tee.	 Median
firms
	 Employees	 firms	 Employees
No R&D Activities 10.51 9.08 0 9.94 8.44 0
Occasional R&D 33.20 27.19 16.67 29.28 24.93 16.67
Regular R&D 56.29 46.52 42.85 60.77 40.59 36.60
Total Firms 100.00 36.17 28.57 100.00 32.80 25.00
We then looked at the industry breakdown of these figures (see figure 2). Some
industry-specific differences are remarkably consistent. Software firms achieve the
highest scores on the three indicators nearly doubling the values of the industry
group "other". On average, the software firms had an R&D intensity of 19.4%
(median 10%), an R&D employee share of 41.7% (median 34.5%), and nearly half
of their workforce (mean 48.4; median 50%) was educated at degree level. The
differences between the software firms and the other firms become quite
substantial when looking at the two employee indicators. Yet, the high scores of
software firms relative to firms from the remaining four industry groups are not
surprising given that software, a service industry, is characterised by a relatively
low capital intensity and the fact that its main expenses are usually labour costs. It
is also quite noticeable that the industry group "other", mainly electronic
components firms, is consistently found at the lower end of the spectrum. The
differences between the remaining three industries are less marked with life
sciences scoring slightly higher than IT/Communications hardware and
engineering when looking at the share of R&D employees.
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R&D Indicators by Industry
Figure 3
R&D Indicators by Firm Age
Age
In a further step, kernel density estimations were performed in order to explore the
distribution of R&D intensity in the different industries. Figure 4 and 5 show the
results. The estimations reveal that the research and development expenditures as
share of total turnover are distributed quite evenly across the five industries. In all
industries, the distribution is skewed to the right with the highest density being
lower than the mean. In all industries, one can observe a number of extreme firms
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that spend sums in excess of 50% of their total turnover on research and
development. Note, however, that the firms with the highest R&D intensities were
not necessarily the youngest firms. An analysis of the R&D indicators by different
age groups did not reveal age specific differences (Figure 3).
Figure 4
Kernel Density Estimation of R&D Intensity by Industry
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Kernel Density Estimation of R&D Employees (by Industry)
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The kernel density estimations for the share of R&D employees by industry
(figure 5) reveal that this indicator is approximately normally distributed for the
software, engineering and life sciences firms. The distributions of the indicator for
IT/Communications hardware firms and "other" firms is characterised by higher
degrees of skewness.
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To summarise, from looking at both the weighted and unweighted means, one can
conclude that the majority of firms that replied to the survey do actually fall
within the category of one could call "technology-based" or "knowledge-
intensive" according to those criteria commonly used in the relevant literature.
Compared to the figures given by Butchart (1987) for the different high-
technology industries, they are characterised by higher levels of research and
development expenditures, higher levels of research and development employees
and a workforce with a high degree of technical/scientific skills. It is worth
pointing our that the weighted results for all research and development indicators
show slightly higher values than the unweighted results. The results by industry
suggest, that the differences can be largely attributed to the fact that the weighting
corrects for the undersampling of software firms, the firms with the highest scores
on the majority of indicators. However, to a lesser extent, it also reflects the
phenomenon that smaller firms indicated slightly higher values for various
indicators.
5.2.6. Product Characteristics
Due to the main focus of the present research project, the analysis of the scope and
determinants of international activities of start-up firms, we also asked
respondents to provide us with information on the products they commercialise.
As we expected a sizeable proportion of firms to sell a range of different products,
we asked respondents to provide us with information on their best selling products
or product groups. We first asked them to indicate the share of turnover that their
best-selling product was contributing to their total turnover. On average, their
best-selling product contributed 61% to total turnover. For 58% of firms, their
best-selling product contributed more than 50% to total turnover. We will now
report the characteristics of the best-selling products. Table 19 gives a breakdown
of how the firms characterised their best-selling product.
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Product Category
We asked respondents to state whether their products are consumer goods, capital
goods, components or products ready for use by the end-user. Note that these
categories are not always mutually exclusive as products such as software
solutions can be at the same time be sold as an end product to a customer or be
incorporated as a component into other, more complex solutions. Note also that
there is a quite high percentage of products that are neither capital goods nor
consumer goods. These are frequently products sold to industrial buyers but do not
represent major investments. Not surprisingly, components were most prevalent
among firms of the industry group "other". 67% of firms in this group classified
their best-selling product as a component. This compares to a sample average of
20%. There were no differences across different firm size classes.
Table 19
Classification of best-selling Product
Product Category Weighted Unweighted
% of firms % of firms
Product ready to use for end-user 48.90 44.44
Component of other products 20.00 21.67
Both component and end-product 8.07 9.72
Neither component nor end-product 23.03 24.17
Total 100.00 100.00
Capital good 33.63 33.89
Consumer good 13.86 11.94
Both capital and consumer good 0.51 0.83
Neither capital nor consumer good 52.00 53.33
Total 100.00 100.00
Innovativeness or Newness of the Product
We then asked respondents to indicate how they would characterise their best-
selling product in terms of the newness or innovativeness. As mentioned above
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this output indicator was meant to add further information on the innovativeness
of their technology in addition to the R&D input indicators. Table 20 gives a
breakdown of this indicator.
One third of the respondents classified their products as "incorporating novel
technology developed specifically in-house." The results indicate that there is a
certain correlation between the R&D intensity of the firms and the innovativeness
of the technology. Accordingly, firms with more innovative products were
characterised by higher levels of R&D expenditures. Note, however, that firms
whose products incorporate "new combinations of existing technology" and
"novel technology developed elsewhere" are characterised by roughly equal levels
of R&D intensity. Figure 6 gives a breakdown of this indicator by industry group.
Table 20
Innovativeness of Technology
Degree of Innovativeness / Newness
Weighted
% of firms
Unweighted
% of firms
R&D
Intensity
(in %) *
Share R&D
Employees
(in %) *
Product incorporates tried and tested
combinations of existing technology
24.94 23.31 7.30 20.83
Product incorporates new combinations
of existing technology
26.40 27.81 14.53 31.65
Product incorporates novel technology
developed elsewhere
15.88 12.92 13.55 31.75
Product incorporates novel technology
developed specifically in-house
32.78 35.96 22.88 38.95
Total 100.00 100.00 15.26 27.67
* weighted results
Figure 6 reveals that the highest share of firms whose products incorporate novel
technology developed in-house can be found in the life sciences field (50%). This
is followed by engineering (45%) and IT/Communications hardware firms (40%).
The degree of technology differentiation among the software firms was evenly
balanced. Firms from the industry group "Other" had the highest share of firms
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that classified their technology as "tried and tested" (41%). This is in line with
expectations as this category largely consisted of manufacturers of electronic
components.
Figure 6:
Degree of Technology Differentiation by Industry
Commercialisation
To determine the extent to which their products require tasks to be performed
during their commercialisation, we asked the firms to rate the level of pre-sales
consultation, installation, maintenance/upgrade, training and system requirements
on a five point Likert scale. We are reporting here those firms that indicated that
their products require substantial commercialisation efforts. We operationalised
"substantial" as scoring of 4 or 5 on the 5 point Likert scale.
As one can see from figure 7, there are a number of industry-specific differences.
The products of software firms for instance require far more maintenance than the
products of the firms in other industries. More than half of the software firms
(51%) stated that their products require substantial maintenance. This is probably
due to the fact that a substantial share of these firms are actually small software
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programmers whose main activity consists of contract programming of tailor-
made solutions. Products of firms in the engineering and life sciences sectors
require more pre-sales consultation than other products (81% and 82%
respectively). This, however, does not appear to be caused by customisation
requirements as these products require on average fewer customisation efforts than
products of firms from other industries.
Figure 7
Commercialisation Requirements by Industry
Life sciences had the lowest share of firms whose products are characterised by
substantial client-specific customisation (30%). In this industry, however, we
could observe the highest share of firms that stated that their products require
substantial training (49%) and installation efforts (27%). We also asked
respondents to indicate their chosen sales in the UK. 12% of the firms indicated
that they exclusive sold through third parties such as distributors. 57% of the start-
ups stated that they exclusively sell directly to the final customers. A further 26%
of the firms used both sales channels. The remaining 5% used other sales
channels, such as licensing.
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5.2.7. Growth Rates
The final section of the chapter on general firm characteristics is concerned with
the growth rates of the firms in our sample. We calculated annual average growth
rates for employment and sales growth based on figures provided by the
entrepreneurs.22 It is not unproblematic to calculate growth rates for start-up firms.
The observation of the growth figures alone can lead to the conclusion that the
firms in the sample are exceptionally successful. Yet, an inflated growth rate can
have two reasons. First, it is caused by the fact that the majority of start-ups were
quite small when they were founded (median 2 employees). Starting with a small
base will inevitably result in a high growth rate as soon as the firm starts recruiting
additional employees.
Figure 8
Average Annual Growth Rates by Firm Age
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22 The formula to calculate the employment growth rate is as follows:
Employment Today  )11 AgeAverage Annual Employment Growth = 	 —1
Employment at Start — up
The sales growth rate is calculated in a similar way, except that "age" is replaced by the time
difference between the first financial and the last or current financial year respectively.
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Second, the firms in the sample are quite young. The younger the firms, the more
spectacular the growth rate (see figure 8). The difference between employment
growth and sales growth for firms that one year old can, in many cases, probably
be explained by the time lag to accomplish the development phase (during which
product and market developers have to be hired) and the generations of the first
sales. The following example will illustrate the point further. A firm that was set
up by one founder in 1993 which had 5 employees at the time of the survey will
have an average annual employment growth rate of 49% over a four year period.
Yet, one can hardly speak of it a "fast growing" company in the terms used by
policy makers and academics interested in the topic (see, for example, Storey
1996). In order to get a complete impression, we will therefore discuss the median
growth of these firms where appropriate.
The results are displayed in table 21 to table 23. The employment growth rate and
three different sales growth rates are shown. In addition to the sales during the
first financial year and the last completed financial year, we also asked the
entrepreneurs to indicate the year-end forecast for their current financial year.23
We therefore show the sales growth between start-up and the last financial year,
growth between the first year and the year-end forecast for the current year and the
last year compared to the year-end forecast for the current year.
When looking at the employment growth, both weighted and unweighted
calculations show an average annual rate of 51%. The median growth is reported
at 26%. As expected, the sales growth rate is very high with a calculated annual
average rate of 112%. The differences between the weighted and the unweighted
figures indicate that smaller firms have higher average growth rates. Note also that
the expected growth rate between the last financial year and the year-end forecast
for the current year is quite high at 53%. The average firm reported an expected
23 During the subsequent interview phase of the Anglo-German project, carried out between six
and nine months after the survey, 20 managing directors were interviewed. In all but one case, the
estimated turnover target was met by the firms. This suggests that the information given by the
respondents is actually quite accurate and reinforces the importance of this measure.
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sales growth of 28% which shows that the majority of start-ups in our sample are
quite optimistic about their future.
Table 21
Average Annual Growth Rates
Growth Rates (in %)
Mean
Weighted
Median SD Mean
Unweighted
Median SD
Annual Average Employment 51.50 25.99 119.97 51.25 29.13 109.72
Growth
Average Sales Growth (start-up 112.31 46.14 250.16 87.44 42.81 204.63
- last financial year)
Average Sales Growth (start-up 70.60 44.37 101.15 61.91 40.68 83.48
- current year end forecast)
Average Sales Growth (last year 53.04 28.57 127.78 45.62 25.00 108.09
- current year end forecast)
Tables 22 and 23 give average and median growth rates for the different
industries. The differences at the industry level are not straightforward. Compared
to the total sample, the software and life science firms reported the highest
employment growth but only relatively low median rates. This suggests that there
are a number of extreme firms that cause the distribution to be highly skewed to
the right.
Table 22
Average Annual Growth Rates by Industry*
Mean Growth Rates (in %) Sample Soft- IT/Corn Engin. Life Other
Mean ware Hardw. Science
Average Employment Growth 51.50 63.33 39.84 34.27 62.05 40.69
Average Sales Growth (start-up -
last financial year)
112.31 154.87 76.98 92.86 87.11 78.05
Average Sales Growth (start-up -
current year end forecast)
70.60 82.20 66.92 67.19 70.39 52.67
Average Sales Growth (last financial
year - current year end forecast)
53.04 68.02 48.33 45.83 42.23 31.98
* weighted results
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Table 23
Median Annual Growth Rates*
Median Growth Rates (in %) Sample Soft- IT/Corn Engin. Life Other
Median ware Hardw. Science
Annual Employment Growth 25.99 25.74 31.95 28.47 23.86 25.89
Annual Sales Growth (start-up — last
financial year)
44.37 47.87 51.17 44.22 33.51 38.95
Annual Sales Growth (start-up -
current year end forecast)
46.14 47.56 52.42 46.14 39.50 37.97
Annual Sales Growth (last financial
year - current year end forecast)
28.57 34.62 22.30 25.00 27.90 18.42
* weighted results
M.
In order to obtain a more realistic picture of the growth pattern of the firms in our
sample, we decided to plot the median and mean growth rates for the different age
groups. Figure 9 shows the results. The x-axis on the chart has be to interpreted as
follows. Firm age group "1" contains all firms. In age group "2" only firms that
were at least two years old at the time of the survey were included, an so on.
Group "10" contains only the oldest firms in the sample. Along the x-axis, the
number of observations thus gradually decreases from 362 firms to 39 firms.
Given the cross-sectional rather than longitudinal nature of the sample, this can
only be an imperfect approximation of the growth pattern over time. Nonetheless,
it does convey an important message: The older the firms in our sample, the more
the values between mean and median converge. Separate kernel density
estimations of the growth rates for the different age groups show that, for older
firms, the growth rate distribution increasingly converges to a normal distribution
(results not shown). Taking this convergence as an indicator, the results suggest
that the growth rates decrease as the firm grows older to a level of about 25%
annual growth for employment and about 30% for sales growth. These figures are
probably a more realistic estimate of the growth potential of these firms than the
calculated average growth rates for the whole sample.
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It was not possible to identify studies that reported similar growth rates. The
majority of empirical studies on the growth of entrepreneurial firms surveyed by
the author were not comparable as they focus on firms from different industries or
provide growth rates at a certain given year rather than average annual growth
rates. As these figures are highly sensitive to the chosen age range, comparisons
with studies that use different age cut-offs cannot be made. A study looking at
average annual growth rates since inception for a sample of firms covering ten
years of their life could no be identified in the literature. 24 Note, however, that
these figures are roughly in line with recent data provided by Keeble et al (1998).
They reported that their sample of new, technology-based firms in the Oxford and
24 Note that the average annual growth rates among the start-up firms in the German sample is
roughly equal. This lends some support to the accuracy of the growth rates reported here.
150
Cambridge region experienced an employment growth of 99% and a sales growth
of 233% over a three year period. This corresponds to an annual average of 26%
and 49%. As these figures are based on older firms, they approximate the
converged longer term mean and median values that one can observe among the
older firms in our sample (see figure 9).
5.2.8. Summary of the Descriptive Analysis of Firm Characteristics
To summarise, we have a sample of firms that are on average five and a half years
old and that employ 15 people. The majority of these firms are actively involved
in research and development activities. Furthermore, all R&D indicators used in
this study indicate that they devote substantial resources to the development of
current and future products.
When looking at the impact of the weighting, it becomes evident that for the
majority of variables, the stratification did not result in substantial differences
between the (unweighted) sample mean and the estimated (weighted) population
mean. In a univariate context, the main differences are found when looking at
those indicators that measure or incorporate some notion of size. As mentioned
earlier, this is a direct consequence of the sampling strategy and the differences
between the weighted and unweighted results can be attributed to the
undersampling of service firms and smaller firms. It lends further support to the
argument that a weighting should not necessarily be introduced into the
multivariate analysis (see also section 4.4.2.), as this would lead to an over-
emphasis of certain multivariate pattern, despite the evidence in the descriptive
statistics that there are hardly any differences when looking at the univariate
distribution of the variables discussed above.
151
5.3.	 Descriptive Data Analysis: International Activities
5.3.1. Prevalence of the Phenomenon
One of the key objectives of the present research is an estimation of the extent to
which British start-up firms in high-technology industries have engaged in
international activities. In section 3.2.1., we discussed the use of different
definitions or threshold in order to separate internationalisers and non-
internationalisers. Accordingly, we will use a first operationalisation that classifies
firms as "international" as soon as they have entered one foreign market or
generated one percent of their total revenue through international sales during
their last financial year. In addition, we will use two additional cut-off criteria and
consider only those firms as internationalisers that have entered at least three
markets or generate at least 10% of their total revenues from international sales.
The sample also contains 30 firms that had international activities at some stage
but did not generate any revenues from international sales during their last
financial year. All but six of these firms were classified as domestic start-ups.'
The group of domestic start-ups therefore also contains 24 "de-internationalisers."
The following tables will report the results for the three indicators and report the
time lag between formation and international sales.
Table 24 gives an overview of the international activities of the start-ups in our
sample. 246 out of 362 of the firms in the sample (68%) did engage in
international operations. Due to the weighting, the estimated share of
internationalisers among the population of British start-ups decreases slightly to
60%. If one counts the 24 "de-internationalisers" among the international start-
25 In three of those cases, the firms were set up in 1996. They have entered foreign markets in
1997. As their financial year 1997/98 was not completed at the time of the survey, they correctly
answered in the questionnaire that - despite competing internationally - they did not generate
revenues through international sales in their last financial year. In the remaining three cases, the
founders stated in the questionnaire that their firm was actively competing in several foreign
markets. However, they did - exceptionally -not generate any revenues through foreign sales
during their last financial year. These three cases are there kept within the sample of
internationalisers.
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% of firms with international sales
Time lag between start-up and
international sales
Time lag between first domestic sales and
international sales
% of firms with international sales into
least three countries
% of firms that generating at least 10% of
revenues through international sales
% of firms that generating at least 50% of
revenues through international sales
ups, the percentages change further. It thus follows that 66% of the estimated
population of British start-ups have at some stage of their lives been involved in
international activities (75% of the sample). When adopting a stricter definition of
"international activities" using the additional indicators introduced above, the
percentages decrease. 45% of firms had activities in at least three foreign countries
and 47% of the firms generated more than 10% of their annual turnover through
non-domestic revenues. When we adopt Oviatt and McDougall's (1997) most
recent definition of an international new venture, which includes only firms
younger than six years, we can still find that 51% of the firms (unweighted: 62%)
have initiated international sales. These results provide clear evidence that
international activities are much more prevalent among British high-tech start-ups
than previously assumed. The finding actually suggests that the majority of British
high-tech start-ups compete internationally rather than limiting themselves to their
domestic home market.
Table 24
International Activities Of Sample Firms
# of obs
Weighted
Mean
Unweighted
Mean
246 59.30 67.96
244 2.22 2.16
244 1.54 1.41
184 44.86 50.83
193 47.30 53.31
97 23.55 26.80
The table also shows that, on average, international start-ups initiated their cross-
border sales during the third year of their life. Only 2.2 years (median 2) elapsed
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between start-up an the first international sales. Given that a sizeable proportion of
start-ups have no sales in their early years because they are still engaged in
development activities, we also calculated the time lag between the first sales and
the first international sales. The resulting lag of 1.5 years (median 1) shows that
the average firm with international sales decided to venture abroad shortly after
product launch. These results strongly suggest that, at least in the UK,
international activities among start-ups are much more prevalent than expected.
Tables 25 and 26 compares these indicators at the industry level and by different
size classes respectively.
Table 25
International Activities Of Sample Firms by Industry *
Mean Total Software IT/Corn Engin. Life Other
Sample Hardware Sciences
-
% of firms with
international sales
59.30 47.72 68.73 79.21 84.91 55.10
% of firms with international
sales into least three countries
44.86 35.31 55.21 67.32 69.42 33.82
% of firms generating at least 47.30 37.57 51.30 69.00 76.86 41.29
10% of revenues through
international sales
* weighted results
The industry breakdown reveals that software firms and firms grouped under
"other" had the lowest propensity to engage in international sales. This could be
explained by the presence of a large number of contract programmers and
developers among the software firms. Similarly, the industry group "other" is to a
large extent made up of manufacturers of electronic components. Arguably, both
groups are more likely to subcontract for domestic clients than for international
ones. The life sciences firms had the highest scores on all indicators for
internationalisation. When looking at the time lag between start-up (or first sales)
and first international sales, the life sciences firms were also the quickest to enter
foreign markets (after 0.9 years). No further industry level differences were
observable for the timing of internationalisation. The analysis by size class (table
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Mean
% of firms with
international sales
% of firms with international
sales into least three countries
% of firms that generating at
least 10% of revenues through
international sales
26) shows that smaller firms obtain lower scores on all operationalisations of
international activities. This provides some evidence that internationalisation
requires a certain critical mass of resources. Nonetheless, the fact that 51% of the
firms of the smallest size class engaged in cross-border activities suggests that
resource-related barriers to internationalisation can be overcome.
Table 26
International Activities Of Sample Firms by Size Class*
Total
Sample
3-5
employees
6-9
employees
10-19
employees
20 +
employees
59.30 51.19 50.44 64.26 75.47
43.46 34.27 39.56 44.88 57.94
46.57 38.40 40.97 49.46 60.50
-
* weighted results
Before looking at the degree of internationalisation, a word of caution is warranted
since we sampled a cross-section of firms. The reported share of internationalisers
is probably a realistic approximation of the share of internationalisers 5.7 years
(the average sample age) after formation. However, the share of internationalisers
among the older firms is higher than among the younger firms. This reflects the
fact that for the majority of the youngest firms in the sample, the observed time
period of the survey instrument is therefore too short to give them a realistic
chance to internationalise. Given their survival, the percentage of firms that will
have a longer term propensity to internationalise will be larger.
In an attempt to establish the impact of this bias, we used additional information
given by the entrepreneurs. We asked them whether they planned international
activities in the future. Thus, we can divide the sample up into four groups of
firms. First, we have those start-ups that had international activities during their
year of formation. We then have a group of internationalisers that have initiated
155
"Born international" (International
activities within year of formation)
International start-ups (international
activities in second year or later)
No international activities, but future
involvement anticipated
No international activities and no future
involvement anticipated
cross-border activities in the second year since formation or later. There is a third
group of firms which are currently not engaged in international activities but plans
to do so in the future. Finally, there are those start-ups that have no international
activities and do not plan any future involvement. These figures are presented in
table 27.
Table 27
Timing and Expected Involvement in International Activities*
Timing 1 Timing 2
# of firms %* # of firms %*
69 16.06 112 25.79
177 43.24 134 33.51
63 21.08 63 21.08
53 19.62 53 19.62
* weighted results
I Base year: year of formation
2 Base year: first financial year
The table shows that 16% (unweighted: 19%) of the firms in our sample had
international activities within their year of formation. Taking their first financial
year as base year - remember that some firms will spend their first years
developing their products without generating any sales - the percentage or "born
international" firms increases to 26% (unweighted: 31%). More importantly,
however, there are only about 20% of the firms (unweighted: 15%) that do not
envisage any international activities in the future. In the absence of non-response
bias, this shows that 80% of the British high-technology start-ups have already
started international activities or plan to do so in the foreseeable future. 26 This
26 Note, however, that some firms may at that stage fall outside the internationally accepted
definitions of new ventures.
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figure is somewhat lower, but in line with the share of firms with international
activities in the sample that are 8 years and older (74% weighted, 77%
unweighted). Overall, these descriptive analyses have provided compelling
evidence that international activities are of foremost concern for British start-ups
firms in high-technology sectors.
5.3.2. The Degree of Internationalisation
After having established that a majority of start-ups in our sample engaged in
international activities, we were of course interested in the extent to which they
engaged in international activities. There is considerable debate about the
appropriate definition of the degree of internationalisation of a firm (Sullivan
1994; Ramaswami, Kroeck and Renforth 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997). We
agree that internationalisation is a multidimensional construct that probably cannot
be captured using a single measure such as share of non-domestic revenue.
However, we also agree with those authors that are concerned with the loss of
information through the construction of an index that combines several measures
(Ramaswami, Kroeck and Renforth 1996). In the next sections, we will therefore
consider several indicators of the degree of internationalisation. We chose the
share of non-domestic sales, number of markets entered and percentage of firms
that generate more than 50% of their turnover form foreign sales. A sub-sample of
246 high-tech start-ups engaged in international activities. Table 28 provides a
summary of some indicators of interest for this sub-sample.
There are little differences between the weighted and the unweighted results. On
average, these firms generated 38% of their total turnover form international sales
(median 31%). The values observed range from 0 to 100%. On average, these
firms sell into 10 foreign countries (median 6) with the maximum observed
number of foreign market entries being 90. As reported in the previous section,
firms with international activities on average started selling abroad two years after
their formation. 27% of all internationalisers had international revenues within
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=% of non-domestic revenues
Number of foreign markets
entered
% of firms generating at
least 50% of revenues
through international sales
their first year of formation. These firms now generate on average 47% of their
revenues from foreign sales. Today, 38% of the international start-ups generate
more than 50% of their revenues through non-domestic sales.
Table 28
The Degree of Internationalisation - Descriptive Statistics *
Weighted	 Unweighted
Mean	 Median	 SD	 Mean	 Median	 SD
38.50
9.51
38.26
32.0
6
31.18
11.07
48.70
38.44
9.99
38.93
30.0
6
in
31.66
11.86
48.86
* international start-ups only
These figures are slightly lower but in line with the data provided by recent
studies. Keeble et al. (1998) surveyed of British technology-based firms in the
Oxford and Cambridge region and reported that the average share of non-domestic
revenue amounted to 44%• 27 In a study of Canadian NTBFs, Preece, Miles and
Baetz (1999) reported an average of 53% of non-domestic revenues. Table 29
gives a breakdown of these figures by industry. A breakdown by industry reveals
that firms from the industry group medical engineering / life sciences were the
most "international" firms in the sample. On all indicators, this group obtains the
highest scores. Software, the only service group in the sample, has the lowest
share of firms with international activities. Once these firms have initiated
international activities, however, the chosen indicators suggest that their
internationalisation performance is not substantially different form the sample
average.
21 Note that firms in Keeble's sample were older SMEs rather than start-ups.
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% of non-domestic revenues
Number of foreign markets
entered
% of firms generating at
least 50% of revenues
through international sales
Table 29
Degree of International Activities by Industry*
Total Software IT/Corn
Hardware
Engin. Life
Science
Other
38.47 35.48 33.61 44.64 50.28 37.25
9.42 9.23 10.43 6.18 13.63 7.92
38.26 32.54 33.39 49.35 52.26 36.19
* weighted results
Figure 10 shows the results of a kernel density estimation for the share of non-
domestic revenue. The dotted line shows the distribution of the share of non
domestic revenue (or share of international sales) which is overlaid with a normal
distribution around the mean. As one can see from the estimation for the total
population, the distribution is skewed to the right with the high percentage of
firms (41%) having a share of non-domestic revenue of less than 20%. From then
on, however, the distribution is fairly flat with a stable density of firms having
international sales of up to 90%.
There are also a number of industry-specific differences in the distribution of the
share of non-domestic revenue. The international sales distribution of firms in the
software, IT/Communications hardware and "other" industries is very similar to
the total sample. The distribution of the engineering and life sciences firms,
however, is markedly different. The graph suggests that there are two distinct
groups of engineering firms with international activities. The share of international
sales of the first group oscillates around 15% whereas the second group has a
mean of 75%. The distribution of the share of non-domestic revenues for the life
sciences firms is quite flat with a stable number of firms reporting international
sales between the 20% and 90% level.
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Figure 10
Kernel Density Estimation of the Share of Non-Domestic Revenue by
Industry (Compared to Normal Distribution)
5.3.3. Entry Modes
As one of our chosen areas of analysis is the market entry decision, we asked
respondents to provide us with information on their three most important foreign
markets defined by their contribution to the sales of the firm's best-selling
product. We chose the operationalisations of Root (1987) and Klein, Frazier and
Roth (1991) to define different entry modes. The differences between agents and
distributors were explained in the questionnaire. Accordingly, an agent sells ad
hoc on a commission basis whereas a distributor sells on a regular basis.
This resulted in a dataset of 547 market entry decisions. 10 cases had to be
excluded from the analysis, because respondents could either not provide country
level sales or indicated that they used entry modes that were difficult to classify.
Respondents did, for example, report sales modes such as the formation of export
co-operatives and global distribution deals with multinationals. In the latter case,
the sales transaction has been carried out between the UK subsidiary of the
multinational and the start-up, whose international activities mainly consisted of
setting up technical support offices abroad. Due to their heterogeneity, these entry
modes were excluded from further analysis. The results are displayed in table 30.
Out of the 547 market entry decisions in our sample, the preferred current entry
mode used by the firms was distributors (42%) followed by direct exporting
(36%) and the use of sales agents (11%). Market entry modes that required some
form of foreign direct investment were not extensively used by the firms in our
sample. 27 entries (5%) were carried out through joint ventures and 15 entries
(3%) via wholly owned subsidiaries. The generation of international sales
revenues through licensing also had a marginal role (9; 2%). On average, an
individual market entry accounted for 8.3% of the total turnover of the start-up
with mean values ranging from 5.9% for joint ventures to 14% for entry modes
that involved building up a subsidiary.
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Table 30
First and Current Entry Modes
Entry Mode First Entry % Current Entry OA
Exporting 241 44 199 36
Agents 68 12 60 11
Distributors 198 36 227 42
Sales joint venture 12 2 27 5
Wholly-owned sales subsidiary 7 1 15 3
Licensing 11 2 9 2
Missing / other 10 2 10 2
Total 547 100 547 100
	•
Note: The table shows the first and current entry modes used in the most important foreign
markets for the company's best selling product.
In comparison with the first entry modes used by these firms, it appears that
aggregate changes of entry modes over time reflect a tendency to use
arrangements that represent a higher commitment to international sales. These
descriptive findings provide further evidence of the validity of our decision to
compare direct exporting and exporting via distributors as the main strategic
options for high-tech start-ups.
After analysing the changes of individual market entry decision, a similar picture
emerges. Table 31 maps out first entry mode, intermediate mode and anticipated
future changes. Out of the 515 entry decisions surveyed, 345 (67%) have never
been subject to operating mode changes and the respondents did not anticipate any
changes in the future. Arguably, these firms may be too young and their
international experience too short to have experienced changes in entry modes
(average age 6 years, see above). Respondents reported 187 actual and anticipated
changes. The large majority represents in increase in commitment (151 cases) and
only a relatively small number of market entries (21) represent a decrease of
commitment.
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Table 31
Evolution of Market Entry Modes
change	 change	 Missing /
representing	 representing	 change in
increasing	 decreasing	 commitment not
commitment	 commitment	 classifiable
No changes 345
Different first entry mode 101 88 11 2
Different intermediate entry mode 10 7 2 1
Expected different future mode 76 56 8 12
187 151 21 15
5.3.4. Pattern of Market Selection
Tables 32 and 33 give an overview of the geographical spread of the international
firms in our sample. The most important markets for British high-tech start-ups
are found in Western European countries followed by North America and East
Asia. In terms of the first market entered - which may not be the firms' largest
market - a similar picture emerges. While the majority of firms (138; 57%) had
their first international sales in Western Europe, the most popular country of first
entry was the US (52; 21%).
Table 32
Geographical Focus of International Activities (by Target Region)
Unit of Analysis Entries Firms
Entry Mode CurrentEntries
% First Country
Entered %
EU/EFTA 307 56 138 57
US & Canada 106 19 56 22
East Asia (Japan, HK, Sing., Korea, Taiwan) 37 7 14 6
Australia & New Zealand 25 5 6 2
Emerging Markets, Europe 12 2 2 1
South America 3 1 3 1
Middle East 22 4 11 5
Emerging Markets, Asia 13 2 4 2
Other 22 4 10 4
Total 547 100 244 100
163
It is noteworthy that 43% of first entries were made to countries that do not belong
to the EU/EFTA. When looking at the second, third, fourth and fifth market
entries, a similar pattern emerges (results not shown).
Table 33
Geographical Focus of International Activities
(10 Most Frequently Named Target Countries)
Unit of Analysis
Entry Mode Rank
Current
Entries
# of obs.
Unit of Analysis
Entry Mode Rank
Firms
# of obs. %
USA 1 96 18 USA 1 52 21
France 2 68 12 France 2 29 12
Germany 3 64 12 Germany 3 24 10
Ireland 4 28 5 Ireland 4 18 7
Netherlands 5 24 4 Sweden 5 15 6
Belgium 6 20 4 Netherlands 6 14 6
Australia 7 18 3 Belgium 7 8 3
Spain 7 18 3 South Africa 8 7 3
Sweden 7 18 3 Australia 10 6 2
Japan 10 16 3 Norway 10 6 2
Other countries 177 32 Other countries 65 27
Total 547 100 Total 100 244 100
Looking at individual countries, however, (table 33) the most frequently entered
export market is the US with 96 entries, followed by France (68) and Germany
(64). A similar pattern is evident from the choice of the initial market entry. These
results corroborate the findings of Lindqvist (1991) and Bell (1995). A breakdown
of market entries at a regional level shows that a majority of firms chose
geographically close countries for their first international sales. An analysis at the
country level, however, reveals that the size of the target market rather than its
closeness to the home market coincides with the entry frequency. Note also that an
important minority of firms entered spatially distant markets in South East Asia,
South America and the Middle East first.
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5.3.5. International Production
207 firms (85%) were not involved in any foreign production. Of the remaining 36
firms, eight (3%) said that their manufacturing is exclusively carried out abroad.
Six firms were using local subcontractors, one firm engaged in a production joint
venture and one firm had both a production joint venture and a manufacturing
subsidiary in one country. Among the 28 firms (12%) that stated that their
products are produced both in the UK and abroad, 18 firms used the services of a
local sub-contractor, eight firms set up their own production facility and one firm
chose to set up a manufacturing joint venture in one country and to produce via
sub-contractors in another. These figures indicate that the main focus of
international activities of the start-up firms in our sample is on commercialisation,
not production. Only 11 out of 243 firms (3%) were involved in equity
investments into foreign production operations.
5.3.6. Growth and International Sales
This section will explore some issues related to firm growth and
internationalisation. Unfortunately, we do not dispose of data on firm size in the
year prior to the first international sales. We are thus merely comparing overall
firm growth of those start-ups that have initiated international sales at some stage
of their lives with those that only compete domestically. As already mentioned in
section 5.2.7., it is not unproblematic to calculate growth rates for start-up firms.
Given that some firms started very small, a consideration of the average growth
rates could result in a misleading picture. Median and Mean growth rates are
therefore presented together in tables 34 and 35.
We were surprised to find that on all growth indicators, firms without international
activities scored higher than those with international activities. Firms without
international activities experienced higher employment and sales growth between
start-up and the time of the survey. Furthermore, they had a more optimistic
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outlook on their current financial year. This became apparent from comparing
both mean and median values for the third item reported in the tables. The average
domestic start-up expects a growth of 33% whereas the average international start-
up expects a growth of 25%. As expected, the differences were more spectacular
when looking at the mean values than at the median values.
Table 34
Mean Annual Growth Rates of the Sample Firms -
Comparison of International Start-ups and Domestic Start-ups
Mean Growth	 Weighted
	
Unweighted
Total	 Intern.	 Domestic	 Total	 Intern.	 Domestic
Sample	 Firms	 Sample	 Firms
Annual Employment Growth
	
51.50	 50.84	 52.46	 51.24
	
43.48
	
68.23
(start-up to present day in %)
Annual Sales Growth (start-up
	 70.60	 60.31	 84.99	 61.91	 60.50	 65.12
to current year end in %)
Annual Sales Growth (last	 53.04	 51.46	 55.67	 45.62	 44.60	 48.12
year to current year end in %)
Table 35
Median Annual Growth Rates of the Sample Firms -
Comparison of International Start-ups and Domestic Start-ups
Median Growth	 Weighted
	
Unweighted
Total	 Intern.	 Domestic	 Total	 Intern. Domestic
Sample	 Firms
	 Sample	 Firms
Annual Employment Growth
	
25.99	 25.74	 30.66	 29.13	 28.12
	 31.95
(start-up to present day in %)
Annual Sales Growth (start-up 	 44.37	 42.87	 50.00	 40.68	 39.91	 43.49
to current year end in %)
Annual Sales Growth (last 	 28.57	 25.00	 33.33	 25.00	 25.00	 27.95
year to current year end in %)
Due to the lack of data on firm size in the time period prior to internationalisation,
the following analytical dilemma arises. One explanation for the lower growth
rates of international start-ups could be related to their domestic setting. It may
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well be the case that internationalisers have been "pushed" to venture abroad
because structural or strategic factors inhibited them from growing in their home
market. While the internationalisation efforts may be quite successful, they will
report a lower overall growth rate for their consolidated operation. The second
possible explanation could be that internationalisers were relatively successful
firms in their domestic market. Given the conventional view that competing
internationally is more resource-intensive than competing in a domestic setting, it
could well be that their overall growth rate decreases as a result of initiating cross-
border activities.
In order to shed further light on these issues and get a better understanding of the
growth rate differentials, we used a tool similar to the one used during the
discussion of growth rates in general (section 5.2.7.). Since the results from table
26 suggest that smaller and younger firms are less likely to have engaged in
international sales — yet, they are the firms with the highest calculated growth rates
- we plotted median growth rates for the firms for different age groups and
compared internationalisers to non-internationalisers. The results are displayed in
figure 11. The x-axis on the chart is to be interpreted as follows. Firm age group
"1" contains all firms. In firm age group "2" only firm that were at least two years
old at the time of the survey were included, an so on. Group "10" contains only the
oldest firms in the sample. Along the x-axis, the number of observations thus
gradually decreases from 362 firms to 39 firms. Like in the section on firm growth
in general, the same disclaimer about the cross-sectional nature of the dataset
applies here.
The plots show that, when looking at annual sales growth, the higher sales growth
rates can be attributed to the presence of the youngest firms in the analysis sample.
When only considering firms that are at least three years old, international start-
ups have median growth rates that are consistently higher than those of domestic
start-ups. These differences are not as clear cut when looking at the plot for the
median employment growth rate. As with sales growth, one can attribute the fact
that that non-internationalisers have higher aggregate employment growth rates
167
.35	 -
Median
Annual	 3
Employment
Growth	 25
International Start-ups
.2
.15
3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	
9,
10
Firm Age Groups
.45 -
.35 -
Median
Annual Sales 3 -
Growth
.25 -
.15	 -
4 1	 51 61	71	 8	 9	 10
International Start-ups
Domestic Start-ups
almost exclusively to the inclusion of very young firms in the analysis. When only
considering those firms that are at least three years old, the growth rates between
internationalisers and domestic start-ups are quite similar.
Figure 11
Median Employment Growth Rates by Age Groups
.45 -
Domestic Start-ups
Firm Age Groups
These findings therefore strongly suggest that the differences are a statistical
artefact stemming from the composition of the sample rather that reflect
performance problems of international firms. The higher reported growth rates
among domestic firms therefore seem to stem from the fact that domestic firms are
on average smaller and younger at the time of the survey. Their inclusion leads to
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an inflation of annual growth rates. We can therefore not support the proposition
that internationalisers have lower growth rates per se.
Note, however, that we cannot make any statements concerning the degree of
causation between growth and internationalisation. A statistical relationship
between growth and internationalisation cannot be established with this cross-
sectional sample but requires a longitudinal dataset. Nonetheless, exploratory
analysis of our data allows us identify the youngest firms as being responsible for
observed growth differentials. This result should be informative for further
research looking at the internationalisation-performance relationship of start-up
firms.
5.3.7. Motives, Triggers, Costs and Constraints
The questionnaire also included several questions where entrepreneurs were asked
to assess their international activities. Respondents were asked to rank their
motives for starting international sales, the constraints encountered and the cost
incurred during internationalisation (questions 34, 35 and 36 of the questionnaire).
Unfortunately, despite the pre-testing during four pilot case studies, the questions
that required a ranking rather than checking a Likert scale (questions 34 and 36)
were not always answered in the way intended by the researchers. For example,
respondents did not rank all items or provided identical ranks for different items.
Nonetheless, part of the information obtained can be used. Rather than use the
rankings, we will count the cases where a particular item been classified as the
"most important" motive or constraint. As a result, the aggregate of this variable
should still indicate the relative importance of the different motives for and
constraints as perceived by the firms' managers. The question on costs
encountered during the internationalisation process used a Likert scale. In this
case, no such problems were evident from the response behaviour. Table 36 shows
provides an overview over the responses.
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Table 36
Motives for Initiating International Sales
Motives	 # of counts as most
important motive
Potential of foreign markets for generating long term 	 165
company growth
Insufficient sales potential in domestic market 	 49
Amortisation of research and development costs 	 11
Learning from internationally leading customers, 	 11
suppliers and competitors
Reputation benefits of being viewed as internationally 	 20
competitive company
The overwhelming majority of the entrepreneurs stated that securing long term
company growth was the main motivator for international sales. Admittedly, the
first and second item are difficult to untangle. However, the fact that the item
"potential of foreign markets for generating long term company growth" was rated
as most important motive more than three times more often than "insufficient sales
potential in the domestic market" suggests that British entrepreneurs see
international expansion as growth opportunity rather than as reactive move to
counter limited demand in their home market. Amortisation of research and
development costs and learning effects represented motives of minor importance.
The results should be interpreted in light of the following limitation. For this
question, the entrepreneurs were asked to rate different items among a given set
alternatives. A more open-ended approach to this question could have revealed
additional reasons for selling abroad. Note also that this question makes the
entrepreneurs evaluate their motives long after the decision has been taken. The
real motives at the time of the first international sales may have been different.
Nonetheless, the results suggest that British high-tech entrepreneurs have a quite
proactive attitude to international activities. The results displayed in table 37 lend
further support to this argument.
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Table 37
Preparation and Existing Relationships Prior to the First International Sales
Preparation / existing relationships prior to the first
international sales
% of firms
(internationalisers only)
Weighted	 Unweighted
Product developed with the intention to sell it
internationally
77.54 76.33
Commitment to international sales in the business plan 70.29 69.51
Country-specific market research undertaken 23.18 25.20
R&D collaboration with foreign partners 9.13 8.94
Sales to UK subsidiary of foreign customer 24.18 23.58
Table 37 reports how the firms prepared for their internationalisation and whether
they had any existing relationships with foreign partners prior to international
sales. The proactive attitude identified through the questions on motives for
selling internationally also became apparent when looking at the first item of table
37. 78% of the international start-ups intended already at the development stage to
sell their product into foreign markets. However, the results also suggest that this
international orientation was unrelated to existing R&D cooperations with foreign
partners. Altogether, only 9% of the international start-ups engaged in
collaborative research and development with foreign partners. Existing
commercial relationships with UK subsidiaries of foreign firms, on the other hand,
were more important triggers for international sales. Nearly a quarter of the firms
already sold to UK subsidiaries of their foreign customers before starting to sell
abroad. 70% of the international start-ups did have a commitment to international
sales, but only 23% undertook specific market research prior to entering their first
foreign market.
This apparent contradiction can be explained when looking at the immediate
triggers for foreign sales. Firms were asked to describe what led to their first
international sales. We coded the answers into ten different categories. Table 38
gives an overview of the most important triggers. The most important triggers for
international sales were proactive actions such as deliberate contacting of potential
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foreign customers (24), international marketing actions (23) and visits to trade
shows (18). Arguably, many of these can be carried out without undertaking
detailed country-specific market research.
Table 38
Triggers for First International Sales
Trigger # of firms %* % le*
Deliberate strategy to contact
potential foreign customers
24 9.92 10.96
Proactive
Strategy Order after PR, direct marketing
or advertising action
22 9.45 10.05
Contact during visit of trade fair 18 7.31 8.22
Personal Contacts
and Relationships
Personal contact from previous
employment
46 20.31 21.00
International reputation of
founder
9 3.00 4.11
Third Party
Contact via UK subsidiary of
foreign customer
23 10.01 10.50
Referrals Recommendation / contact via
third party
16 7.02 7.31
Unsolicited Unsolicited order 30 14.50 13.70
Contact through internet 6 4.04 2.74
Internet
advertising
Other 25 14.44 11.42
Total 219
* weighted
	
** unweighted
The table also reveals that international sales frequently originated from the
founders' personal networks of contacts and relationships. These include contacts
from previous employment (46 mentions) and reputation effects (9 mentions). The
latter are particularly pertinent in science-based industries where communities of
researchers frequently interact across national borders. Referrals from third parties
(16 mentions) and UK subsidiaries of foreign customers (24 mentions) triggered
the international sales of the firms in the sample.
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Unsolicited orders lead to the first international sales in 30 cases. Note however,
that the distinction between unsolicited orders and third party referrals is only
made on the basis of the respondents' answers. In reality, these two groups of
triggers are likely to overlap. Internet advertising, despite offering a low-cost way
of achieving international visibility, did not play an important role in triggering
international sales. Only 6 firms reported that their first international sales resulted
from a foreign customers visiting their website. The small differences between the
weighted and unweighted results indicate that proactive action was a slightly less
common among smaller firms and software firms. A further question asked
respondents to rate the additional costs of international sales that were not client-
specific.
Table 39
Costs of International Sales
Costs Mean Score * # of counts as most
significant cost driver
Cost of accessing information on foreign markets 2.86 23
Costs identifying and forming commercial
relationships
3.49 47
Costs of market entry and setting up foreign sales
channels
3.52 55
Cost of product launch in foreign market
(marketing costs)
3.34 52
Operating costs of the chosen sales channel 2.89 26
Costs of monitoring foreign activities 2.89 21
* weighted
The results in table 39 show that relationship building with foreign partners,
market entry / set up of the sales channel and product launch in foreign markets
were rated as most important cost drivers of international expansion. Accessing
information, monitoring foreign distribution partners and operating cost of the
chosen sales channel were named less frequently as important cost drivers.
Additional costs mentioned by entrepreneurs in the questionnaire were mainly
related to the recent appreciation of the British pound which reduced demand and
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margins in export markets. Finally, we asked respondents to rate factors that
constrain them in their ability to internationalise further. The results are displayed
in table 40. Here, the results indicate that scarcity of management time and
additional costs of internationalisation were seen as the biggest current constraints.
Only a minority of firms regarded increased exposure to risk and lack of
experience with international activities as important constraints to
internationalisation.
Table 40
Barriers to International Sales
Constraints
# of counts as most important constraint
Total	 International	 Domestic
Firms	 Firms
Scarcity of management time 129 95 34
Limited managerial experience in international
activities
41 26 15
Additional costs of foreign sales 61 41 20
Increased exposure to risk 44 39 5
5.3.8. Summary of the Descriptive Analysis of Internationalisation
Our results provide compelling evidence that British high-technology start-ups are
involved in international activities to a much greater extent than one would expect
from these young firms. Not only have the majority of firms in our sample (67%)
started to sell abroad, but they entered on average 10 foreign markets (median 6)
in the relatively short time period between inception and the time of the survey.
Today, the internationalisers generate on average 38% of their revenues through
foreign sales. A quarter of the firms in the sample generate at least 50% of their
sales from international activities. The fact that we identified two recent studies
that reported similar figures do support the representativeness of our findings
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(Keeble et al 1998; Preece, Grant and Baetz 1999). The international activities of
our firms were oriented towards the commercialisation of their products rather
than production. When we looked at growth rates, it appeared at first glance that
firms without international activities had higher growth rates than
internationalisers. Our analysis showed, however, that this effect can be attributed
to the fact that the youngest firms (with the highest calculated growth rates since
they start from a low base) have a higher share of non-internationalisers. When
looking at the older firms, the relationship was inverse and internationalisers had
higher growth rates than domestic firms. This is, of course, only a crude analysis,
as our dataset does not allow us to establish the extent to which the growth is
determined by international or domestic sales. Any interpretation has to be made
with extreme care and should bear this important limitation in mind. In any case,
it does highlight the need for gathering longitudinal data to look into the
internationalisation — performance relationship.
The above descriptive results suggest that there is some support for the theoretical
claims of process models when looking at the aggregate sample. The majority of
firms were involved in low commitment entry modes and few firms engaged in
activities that required foreign direct investment. The firms' entry mode changes
over time reflect an increase of commitment to foreign markets. Finally, a
majority of firms first sells into relatively close markets. However, there are
important numbers of individual firms that that deviate from this pattern. The fact
that the single most important target country, both in terms of first entry and
absolute numbers of market entries, is the US suggests that entry mode choices are
also driven by more compelling strategic reasons than psychic distance alone. The
economic size of the target market or the recognition of significant, country-
specific opportunities may be more persuasive factors. We will now present the
results of our multivariate analyses and investigate the determinants of the
decision to internationalise, the degree of internationalisation, the timing of
foreign market entry and the choice of entry mode.
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6.	 Multivariate Data Analysis
6.1.	 Operationalisation of Independent Variables
In our hypotheses, we stated that the various dimensions of internationalisation are
expected to be a function of firm size, international experience of the founders,
external finance, technology intensity, innovativeness, the extent to which
products are customised and the costs of commercialisation. Accordingly, we have
to measure these influence factors. Firm size was operationalised in several ways.
In the questionnaire, we asked respondents to state employees and sales both at
start-up and at the time of the survey. The descriptive analysis revealed that the
distributions are highly skewed to the right. Such a distribution is to be expected
in a sample of start-up firms. Consequently, the direct operationalisations of size,
i.e. the inclusion of the absolute sales volume or number of employees risk
producing statistically insignificant parameter coefficients. Highly skewed
distributions can be normalised using logarithmic transformations. We therefore
first calculated log values of our various size measures. Second, for the regression
models shown here, we constructed an index of the log values for firm size
measured by number of employees and firm size by sales. The levels of the alpha
coefficient (0.72 at start-up; 0.88 today) are above the recommended thresholds
(Nunally and Bernstein 1994), therefore indicating construct validity. Since the
actual firm size at the time of the survey could at the same time represent the
cause and effect of international activities, we primarily used size at start-up in our
regressions. We thus avoid possible effects of endogeneity in the models.
Nonetheless, in most cases we also report parameter coefficients when size today
is entered into the regression equation in order to explore whether the results are
consistent.
International work experience was operationalised by asking the respondents in
the questionnaire whether they had previous living experience abroad, whether
they had work experience for an internationally operating firm or whether they
were educated abroad. These measures are consistent with those used by Roth
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(1995), Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1996) and Reuber and Fischer (1997).
The exact wording of these questions can be found in the questionnaire in
appendix 1. The respondent's answers have then been included as dummy
variables in the models. Dummy variables have also been coded to indicate
industry affiliation and the involvement of venture capitalists and business angels.
In accordance with standard practice (Butchart 1987; Koberg, Rosse and Bergh
1994; OECD 1997), we chose two indicators to measure technology intensity
(questions 8 and 9 in the questionnaire, see appendix 1). We asked respondents to
state technology intensity measuring R&D expenditure as percentage of total
turnover and R&D employees as share of total employed (see also section 4.3.). In
all regressions, we compare the impact of their inclusion on the model results. The
irmovativeness of the technology employed was measured using a four-item scale
(question 17 in the questionnaire, see appendix 1). We developed this scale after a
review of the relevant literature (Roberts 1991; OECD 1997) and refined it
through discussions with our pilot-case study respondents. Respondents were
asked whether their products are best classified as incorporating tried and tested
combinations of existing technology, new combinations of existing technology,
novel technology developed externally or novel technology developed specifically
for this product by the company.
The extent to which a product requires client-specific customisation and the
transaction costs incurred during the sales process were each measured using a 5
point Likert scale (question 18 in the questionnaire, see appendix 1). The four
items measuring transaction costs (pre-sales consulting intensity, installation
intensity, maintenance intensity, training intensity) were then combined into a
single item (alpha 0.73). Finally, country GDP and risk data were obtained from
the IMF's World Investment Report and the publication Institutional Investor.
A summary table (table 41) of the independent variables is presented below. Table
42 displays the first order correlations of the dependent and independent variables.
We will now present the results of the various regression models on the
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differences between international and domestic firms, their degree of
internationalisation and the timing of their initial market entry. Since we
hypothesised an identical variable vector for these three distinct dimensions of
internationalisation, I will first report the results of the model estimations. After
that, I will discuss the impact of the independent variables in a joint section. A
summary of the expected relationships is displayed in table 43.
Table 41
Summary of Independent Variables -
Variable	 Explanation	 Measurement
Int. Act.
Degree of int.
Speed
Size
Age
Exp. abroad
Exp. mult
Exp. edu .
R&D Expend.
R&D Emp.
VC
Angel
Inno_l
Inno_2
Inno_3
Inno-4
Custom
Cost
Software
IT/COM
Engin.
Life Sc.
Other
International activities
Degree of internationalisation
Speed of foreign market entry
Firm size
Firm age
Work experience abroad
Work experience for internationally
operating firm in the UK
International education
R&D expenditure
R&D employees
Venture capital investment at start-up
Business angel investment at start-up
Technology newness: new
combinations of existing technology
Technology newness: tried and tested
technology
Technology newness: incorporates
novel technology developed
externally
Technology newness: incorporates
novel technology developed
internally
Customisation requirements
Cost of commercialisation
Industry: Software
Industry: IT/Com hardware
Industry: Engineering
Industry: Life Sciences
Industry: "Other"
Dummy variable (1==yes)
Share of non-domestic revenue in %
year of first foreign sales — year of
formation, recoded so that highest
values represent highest speed
Index of log values for sales and
employees at start-up
Base year 1997
Dummy variable (1—yes)
Dummy variable (1=--yes)
Dummy variable (1=--yes)
Ratio R&D expenditure to sales
Ratio R&D employees to total
employees
Dummy variable (1=--yes)
Dummy variable (1==yes)
Dummy variable (1=--yes)
Dummy variable (1------yes)
Dummy variable (1-----yes)
Dummy variable (1--yes)
5 point Likert scale
Index of consultation installation,
training and maintenance requirements
Dummy variable (1,--yes)
Dummy variable (1=--yes)
Dummy variable (1.---yes)
Dummy variable (1---yes)
Dummy variable (1-,--yes)
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Table 42 (previous page)
Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables
Table 43
Summary of Expected Relationships
Hypothesis Decision to
Internationalise
Degree of
Intern.
Timing of
Entry
Entry Mode
(Distributor)
Firm Size Hla: + Hlb: + HIc: + H9: +
International Experience (Founder) H2a: + H2b: + H2c: + H10: +
International Experience (Firm) H11: +
Domestic Sales Mode (Distributor) H12: +
External Equity H3a: + H3b: + H3c: +
Technology Intensity H4a: H4b: H4c:
curvilinear curvilinear curvilinear
Technological Differentiation H5a: + H5b: + H5c: + H13: -
Customisation H6a: - H6b: - H6c: - H14: -
Cost of Commercialisation H7a: - H7b: - H7c: - H15: +
H8 hypothesised that the variable vector that discriminated between internationalisers
and non-internationalisers accounts for differences in the degree of internationalisation
6.2.	 Differences Between International Start-ups and Domestic start-ups,
Degree of Internationalisation and Timing of Foreign Market Entry
6.2.1. Differences between Internationalisers and Domestic Start-ups
6.2.1.1. Model Estimation
We model the decision to internationalise using a binary choice model. In our
case, we specified a series of Probit models in order to determine the key
influence factors that differentiate between internationalisers and non-
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internationalisers.28
 The Probit models estimate international sales (1=yes, 0=no)
as dependent variable. In table 44 to 47, we report the results of our models. All
models estimate the probability to internationalise as a function of start-up size,
age, international experience of the founders, technology intensity, the presence of
external finance, innovativeness of the technology, customisation requirements,
commercialisation costs and industry dummy variables. In model I, we chose to
operationalise technology intensity by using research and development
expenditures as percentage of total turnover (R&D expenditure). Furthermore, we
use firm size at start-up. In model II, technology intensity is operationalised using
the percentage of employees that work for at least 50% of their time on the
development of current or future products (R&D employees). Firm size at start-up
is used. Model III is identical to model II with one exception. We entered size
today in the regression equation. In model IV, we assess the impact of the
weighting on the multivariate result for the decision to internationalise. In model
V and VI, more conservative thresholds are used to operationalise the notion of an
international start-up. Using a polar approach, the firms had to sell into either
three foreign markets or generate at least 10% of their total revenues through
foreign sales. Firms with international activities that stayed below these thresholds
were removed from the analysis.
' The Probit and the Logit model are the most widely used binary choice models. Whereas the
Logit model is based on the cumulative logistic distribution, the Probit model is based on the
cumulative normal distribution. They produce similar results although the parameter coefficients
are not directly comparable (Amemiya 1981; Greene 1997). The choice of one over the other is
usually based on convenience or the availability of calculation routines in computer packages.
180
Table 44
Probit Models to Test the Propensity to Internationalise
Variable
Model I
Coefficients
Model II
Coefficients
•
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.0861 *** 0.0980 ***
Age 0.0375 ** * * 0.0371 ****
/
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.1504 *** 0.1424 ***
International Work Experience 0.1069 * 0.1035 *
International Education 0.0852 0.0916
R&D Intensity (% of turnover) 0.7744 **
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2 -0.4697 ±
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 1.1532 * * **
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -1.1596 ***
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0170 0.0276
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.0738 0.0976
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1454 ** 0.1364 * *
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.1741 * * 0.1693 **
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.0927 0.0829
Customisation Requirement -0.0567 **** -0.0516 ***
Commercialisation Cost 0.0217 0.0178
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.2277 * ** * 0.2265 ****
Industry: Engineering 0.2482 **** 0.2548 ** **
Industry: Life Sciences 0.1933 ** 0.2036 * *
Industry: Other 0.1724 ** 0.1863 ***
No. of Observations 354 354
Log Likelihood -168.15 -165.97
Chi-square (di): 105.58 (18) **** 109.93 (18) ****
Pseudo-R2: 0.2389 0.2488
Correct classifications (in %): 77.40 77.12
Maximum Chance Criterion (in %): 67.96 67.96
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows marginal parameter estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 45
Probit Models to Test the Propensity to Internationalise
Variable
Model II
Coefficients
Model III
Coefficients
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.0980 ***
Firm Size (index of log values today) 010703 **
Age 0.0371 **** 0.0244 **
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.1424 *** 0.1421 ***
International Work Experience 0.1035 0.0931 ***
International Education 0.0916 0.0962
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 1.1532 **** 1.1097 ****
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -1.1596 *** -1.1304 ***
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0276 0.0374
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.0976 0.0765
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1364 ** 0.1241
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.1693 ** 0.1611 **
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.0829 0.0661
Customisation Requirement -0.0516 *** -0.0531 ***
Commercialisation Cost 0.0178 0.0131
Industry: IT/Com Hardware 0.2265 ** ** 0.2222 ****
Industry: Engineering 0.2548 **** 0.2536 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 0.2036 ** 0.2087 ***
Industry: Other 0.1863 *** 0.1872 ***
No. of Observations 354 355
Log Likelihood -165.97 -168.41
Chi-square (dl): 109.93 (18) **** 105.82 (18) ****
Pseudo-R2: 0.2488 0.2391
Correct classifications (in %): 77.12 76.62
Maximum Chance Criterion (in %): 67.96 67.96
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows marginal parameter estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 46
Probit Models to Test the Propensity to Internationalise
Variable
Model II
Coefficients
Model IV
Coefficients
(weighted)
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.0980 *** 0.1226 ***
Age 0.0371 **** 0.0431 ****
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.1424 *** 0.1914 ***
International Work Experience 0.1035 0.1340 **
International Education 0.0916 0.1172
R&D Intensity (% of turnover)
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 	 1.1532	 ****	 0.6205	 **
(R&D Intensity % employees)2	 -1.1596	 ***	 -0.4166
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0276 0.0462
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.0976 0.0818
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1364 ** 0.2492 ****
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.1693 * * 0.2589 ***
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.0829 0.2465 ***
Customisation Requirement -0.0516 *** -0.0606 ***
Commercialisation Cost 0.0178 0.0523
Industry: IT/Com Hardware 0.2265 ** ** 0.2800 ****
Industry: Engineering 0.2548 **** 0.3091 ** **
Industry: Life Sciences 0.2036 ** 0.2873 ***
Industry: Other 0.1863 *** 0.2419 ***
No. of Observations 354 354
Log Likelihood -165.97 -171.48
Chi-square (dl): 109.93 (18) **** -134.84 (18) ****
Pseudo-R2: 0.2488 0.2822
Correct classifications (in %): 77.12 75.71
Maximum Chance Criterion (in %): 67.96 59.30
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows marginal parameter estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 47
Probit Models to Test the Propensity to Internationalise
Variable
Model V
Coefficients
(at least 3
countries)
Model VI
Coefficients
(at least 10%
foreign sales)
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.1380 **** 0.1256 * * * *
Age 0.0458 **** 0.0421 ****
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.1771 *** 0.1872 ***
International Work Experience 0.1393 * 0.0994 ±
International Education 0.1216 0.1178
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 1.6076 **** 1.5510 ****
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -1.4340 *** -1.3785 ***
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0488 0.0130
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.0847 0.1207
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1399 ± 0.1529 *
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.2054 * 0.2342 * *
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.0916 ** 0.0929
Customisation Requirement -0.0686 *** -0.0550 * * *
Commercialisation Cost 0.0211 0.0237
Industry: IT/Com Hardware 0.3483 **** 0.3167 ****
Industry: Engineering 0.3670 **** 0.3512 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 0.2897 *** 0.2905 ***
Industry: Other 0.2716 *** 0.2934 ****
No. of Observations 289 300
Log Likelihood -129.35 -137.05
Chi-square (df): 127.19 (18) **** 122.32 (18) * * * *
Pseudo-R2: 0.3296 0.3086
Correct classifications (in %): 80.97 80.28
Maximum Chance Criterion (in %): 61.25 62.67
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows marginal parameter estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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For all models, the likelihood ratio chi-square test indicates significant overall
solutions compared to a constant-only model. The pseudo R 2 ranges from 0.24 in
model I to 0.34 in model V. However, there are problems of interpretation
associated with these test statistics. The pseudo-R 2 does not allow for an intuitive
interpretation of goodness of fit other that stating that one model is "better" than
another based on identical functional model specification and numbers
observations. This test statistic is not comparable to the traditional R 2 of
regression analysis as is does not represent the amount of variance explained. In
addition, the likelihood ratio tests only examine the null-hypothesis of obtaining
the stated parameter estimates from our sample while the true population
parameters are in fact zero. We therefore also calculated a "hit-rate" of correctly
classified cases. In the models using the basic definition of "international
activities", the classification ratio ranges from 77% to 78%. Using the more
conservative thresholds for internationalisation, the models resulted in
classification ratios of up to 81%. In all cases, these ratios compare favourably to
the maximum chance score of correct classifications that one would obtain by
assuming that all firms in the sample have international activities.
6.2.1.2. Model Results
Based on a comparison of these models, we reach the following conclusions with
regard to our hypotheses. Hla could be supported. Our measure of size at start-up
is positively related to the observation of international activities. The results of all
the models show that, compared to domestic start-ups, the likelihood of
international sales increases with larger log values of size measured at start-up.
Despite possible problems of endogeneity, we used "size today" in model III to
explore the stability of our effects. As is evident from the table, model II and III
lead to identical size effects. Furthermore, all other independent variables
remained unchanged in terms of direction and statistical significance. Given that
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we entered the log values of firm size into the regression models, the results
indicate that the effect of absolute firm size decreases, the larger firms are.
Overall, it suggests, that a certain size threshold or critical mass in terms of
manpower and resources is required in order to internationalise. Once a certain
scale of operations has been reached, the marginal effects of absolute values size
becomes insignificant. Nonetheless, Hla receives support as we find significant
positive effects of the log values of size on the propensity to internationalise. The
impact on the different methods to operationalise size will be discussed further in
section 6.2.4.
H2a was supported. In all models, both the measures of living experience abroad
and work experience in an internationally operating company had a positive,
significant impact on the probability to internationalise. It is interesting to note
that, in all models, the marginal effects of work experience for an internationally
operating company were stronger than the effects of direct work experience in a
foreign country. International education also had a positive impact on
internationalisation. Its effect, however, is statistically insignificant when the other
two measures are entered in the regression as well. Taken individually, the effect
of international education is statistically significant. We will discuss the effect of
the different measures of international experience in more detail in section 6.2.4.
H3a was not supported. Neither the involvement of venture capitalists nor
business angels had a significant impact on the decision to internationalise. H4a
hypothesised a curvilinear effect of technological intensity on the probability to
internationalise. As already stated above, model I used R&D expenditures as
percentage of total sales whereas model II used the percentage of R&D
employees. For a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped effect to be present, three
conditions must be met. First, the parameter of technology intensity must be
positive and significant. Second, the parameter for squared technology intensity
must be negative and significant. Third, the turning point of the curve must lie
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within the observed range of values for technology intensity. 29 In all models
except model IV, we can observe a significant positive effect for the variable and a
significant negative effect for the squared term, regardless of whether R&D
intensity is measured as percentage of turnover or as share of development
employees. The turning points are within the range of observed values (82% for
R&D intensity as share of turnover, 50% for employees) thus leading us to accept
the presence of a curvilinear effect. Only in the weighted model does the squared
term lose its significance. This difference can be explained if one recalls the fact
that the weights put a greater emphasis on smaller firms and software firms.
Among each of the strata, the software firms and the smallest firms have the
highest level of employees working on product development.' Software firms and
firms belonging to the smallest size class report and R&D intensity (employees) of
35% which compares to 21% for the remaining firms. Since the likelihood of
international sales is lower for these firms, the correlation of R&D intensity and
international sales is less significant. One would therefore expect other factors to
account to a greater extent for the variation in the data. Since the squared terms
actually measures the decreasing element in the curve - the "penalty" of high R&D
levels on the propensity to internationalise - it does not come as a surprise that the
weighting increases the standard error of the estimate. For the weighted data, there
seems to be a more linear relationship between R&D intensity and international
sales. On the unweighted data, however, a curvilinear effect will become apparent.
H4a therefore receives partial support.
H5a looked at the innovativeness of the products sold abroad. Compared to the
base case of "tried and tested" technology, firms that sell more innovative
products have a higher probability to engage in international activities. However,
no significant effect was found for the most innovative product category.
Nonetheless, hypothesis 5a can be supported. A Wald test was performed in order
to test the hypothesis of a joint impact. Compared to the base case of "tried and
29 We obtain the latter through equalising the first derivative of the R&D intensity function with 0.
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tested" technology, all three dummy variables that operationalised more
innovative product technology were jointly related to international activities
(p<0.01). The hypothesis of a joint positive impact was supported irrespective of
the chosen specification. More innovative technology is thus positively related to
internationalisation in our models.
H6a is supported as the degree of customisation is negatively related to
internationalisation in all models. H7a looked at the transaction costs associated
with commercialising a product. The hypothesis that high transaction costs
represented a stronger barrier for non-internationalisers than for internationalisers
could not be supported in any of the models. As expected, all models predict that
internationalisers are older than domestic start-ups. This is to be expected given an
average time lag of two years between firm formation and initial
internationalisation reported in the section on descriptive statistics. Compared to
the base case of software, firms from all other industries had a higher propensity
to internationalise. While there is a literature on the problems of service firms with
regard to internationalisation (see Erramilli and Rao 1993) this finding came as a
surprise as more than 90% of service firms were software companies. A priori,
they were expected to face relatively few barriers to internationalisation other
than, in particular cases, the need to translate their applications. Probably this is
explained by the fact that the majority of software firms are small firms involved
in contract programming. Rather than venturing abroad, they are more likely to
offer and deliver their services locally. On the other hand, since there are software
firms that have very high levels of foreign sales, it appears that barriers to
internationalisation can be overcome through offering highly standardised
packages.
As a next step, we were interested in identifying the effects of the weighting on
our regression model. Above all, compared to the maximum chance criterion of
" See also section 5.2.5. on the overcounting of R&D employees among small firms.
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59.3%, the classification ratio of the weighted regression of 75.9% represents a
substantial improvement of predictive ability. The results of the weighted model
differ in two aspects from the unweighted models. First, the curvilinear effect of
research and development intensity becomes insignificant (see also above).
Second, the weighted model is the only model where higher costs of
commercialisation do actually lead to a higher probability to sell internationally.
As the weighting changes the emphasis of the multivariate pattern of small and
service firms, we ran a number of regressions on various_ sub-samples. These
regressions (results not shown) clearly identify the overemphasis of software firms
as being responsible for the change of the cost of commercialisation coefficient.
Software firms experience on average higher costs of commercialisation than
firms from the other industry groups. The fact that there are still 56% of software
firms with international activities causes this coefficient to become positive in a
weighted model. The reduction of the level of significance of technology intensity
can be explained by the lower probability of the smallest firms to engage in
international sales. Yet, among these firms, one can also observe very high levels
of technology intensity as measured by R&D employees. Note also that due to the
lower probability of smaller firms and software firms to internationalise, the
weighted regression models produce better performance statistics. In order to
examine the validity of our explanation, we performed several regressions on the
subsample of software firms. The results are displayed in appendix 6. We provide
a summary discussion of the effects of the weighting in section 6.2.4. Altogether,
the weighting does not fundamentally change the results of our modelling of the
probability of international sales.
Models V and VI use more conservative thresholds to operationalise international
activities. As stated above, firms are counted as internationalisers if they have
entered at least three different foreign markets (model V) or if they generate at
least 10% of their total revenues through foreign sales (model VI). Comparing the
parameter estimates of these models with the other models, one realises that the
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effects are stable. Finally, we estimated these models using robust standard errors
in order to account for possible effects of heteroscedasticity not accounted for by
the log transformations of firm size (results not shown here). None of the robust
models changed the sign or level of significance of the coefficients reported here.
To summarise, we conclude that, with the exception of the variable
commercialisation cost affected by the weighting, the reported effects are stable
regardless of the chosen model specification and the chosen threshold for
international activities.
6.2.2. The Degree of Internationalisation
6.2.2.1. Methodological Considerations
In this section, we will estimate the degree of internationalisation of the firms in
our sample. Our dependent variable, the share of non-domestic revenues, is the
most frequently used measure of the degree of internationalisation of a firm. It is
closely related to the binary dependent variable estimated in the previous section.
In this section, we are actually testing whether the variable vector that accounts for
the decision to internationalise can also account for different internationalisation
"intensities".
There are a number of approaches that could be used to estimate this variable. One
approach, used by numerous studies (see Sullivan 1994, for a review), consists of
estimating the chosen indicator of the degree of internationalisation through a
standard OLS (ordinary least squares) regression. This approach can be performed
on the subsample of internationalisers or on the total sample. If only the
international start-ups are retained for this analysis, the results can, of course, only
apply to this sub-sample. From a theoretical and managerial point of view, an
important issue now arises. Suppose the regression on the sub-population of
internationalisers leads to the (rather unexpected) finding that a high degree of
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international sales is explained by products characterised by high customisation
requirements. In the previous section, however, we found that customisation had a
significant impact on the decision not to compete internationally. What
recommendations can be given if the characteristics of those firms with a high
degree of internationalisation are relatively similar to those that do not compete
internationally at all? Stated in other words, an analytical focus on the subset of
internationalisers risks producing findings that may be inconsistent with the
determinants of observing international activities in the first place. To avoid the
above problem, we can, as an alternative approach, set the value of the dependent
value (share of non-domestic revenue) to "0" for the non-internationalisers and
perform a standard OLS regression. This approach uses the information on non-
internationalisers as well and has been employed, for example, by Reuber and
Fischer (1997) and Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza (1997).
Yet, at this stage, an additional issue arises. In our case, we have information on
the independent variables of both firms with and without international activities.
Yet, only for firms with international activities, the dependent variable, the share
of non-domestic revenues, is observable. We therefore have what is called a
censored sample. Censoring is one instance where the values of variables are
limited in their range thus producing biased OLS estimators (Greene 1997). In our
case, this is mainly caused by the cross-sectional research design. Given that we
sampled firms founded between 1987 and 1997, we ended up with a number of
firms whose recorded life span (one or two years) is too short to observe them
when they engage in international activities. Setting the value of the non-domestic
revenue artificially to "0" will produce biased estimators since the values of this
dependent variable for non-internationalisers are — strictly speaking - not
observable. In the econometric literature, this problem is known as sample
selection. Sample selection occurs when the observation of a dependent variable is
not independent from the probability of its occurrence.
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A number of different methods have been developed to estimate the determinants
of a dependent variable for the entire population of firms based on a censored
sample. These models usually estimate a selection equation to determine the
probability of observing the dependent variable and a main equation on the
dependent variable. Two widely used estimation methods are the Tobit model and
the two step Heckman selection model. The Tobit model is actually a special case
of sample selection. Here, the selection equation is the same as the main equation
being estimated. This would be the appropriate method if internationalisation was
a linear phenomenon, i.e. the same factors that discriminate between
internationalisers and non-internationalisers are also responsible for a high score
of the degree of internationalisation. As we hypothesised that the same variable
vector determines the propensity to internationalise and the degree of
internationalisation of a firm, the results of the Tobit model should be consistent
with the OLS regression.' Accordingly, comparing the results of the Tobit and a
standard OLS regression could inform our understanding of the validity and
stability of the observed effects and state whether sample selection is a problem in
the present case.
6.2.2.2. Model Estimation
To shed further light on the determinants of the degree of internationalisation, we
will now discuss the results of our estimations in order to identify which factors
account for the variation in the share of non-domestic revenue. We will compare
the results and discuss to what extent the differences can be attributed to the
different estimation methods.
31 Of course, the magnitude of the coefficients will be different. Still, Greene (1980) found that the
coefficients of the OLS model, when divided by the degree of censoring, approximate to the
coefficients of the Tobit model.
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Table 48
Estimation of the Share of Non-Domestic Revenue
- OLS Regression on International Firms -
Variable
Model I
Coefficients
Model II
Coefficients
Model III
Coefficients
weighted
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.0274 -0.0067 0.0258
International Experience of the Firm (in years) 0.2565 **** 0.3056 **** 0.2391 ****
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.0646 0.0706 0.0710
International Work Experience 0.0447 0.0713 0.0487
International Education 0.0463 0.0071 0.0481
R&D Intensity (% of turnover) 0.3589 **
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2 -0.0573
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 0.6204 **** 0.5681 ***
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -0.3151 -0.3135 ±
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0502 0.0672 0.0481
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.0871 0.0827 0.1003 ±
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1531 * 0.1756 0.1956 **
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.0957 0.1181 0.1548
Novel Technology Developed Internally -0.0149 0.0469 0.0369
Customisation Requirement -0.0715 -0.0656 -0.0735
Commercialisation Cost 0.0781 0.0555 0.0634
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.1430 * 0.0912 0.1111
Industry: Engineering 0.1892 ** 0.1328 ± 0.1426 *
Industry: Life Sciences 0.2044 *** 0.1501 ** 0.1812 **
Industry: Other 0.2458 *** 0.1581 * 0.2275 **
No. of Observations 231 231 231
F-Statistic 3.86 **** 3.75 **** 2.93 ****
df 18; 212 18; 212 18; 212
R2 0.2470 0.2416 0.1993
Adjusted R2 0.1831 0.1772 0.1313
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows beta coefficients.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 49
Estimation of the Share of Non-Domestic Revenue
- OLS Regression on all Firms -
Variable
Model IV
Coefficients
Model V
Coefficients
Model VI
Coefficients
weighted
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.1280 *** 0.0975	 ** 0.1411 ***
Age 0.1599 **** 0.1694 - **** 0.1745 ****
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.1270 ** ***0.1393 0.1537 ***
International Work Experience 0.0709 0.0871	 * 0.0615
International Education 0.0646 0.0546 0.0635
R&D Intensity (% of turnover) ****0.3726
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2 *
-0.1745
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 0.6892 **** 0.4593 ***
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -0.4533 ****
-0.2534 *
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0308 0.0291 0.0392
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.0639 0.0612 0.0739
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1107 * **0.1343 0.1280 **
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.1155 ** **0.1255 0.1571 ***
Novel Technology Developed Internally -0.0026 0.0377 0.0523
Customisation Requirement -0.1123 ** **
-0.1309 -0.1159 **
Commercialisation Cost 0.0436 0.0483 0.0729
Industry: IT/Com Hardware 0.1870 **** ****0.1592 0.1696 ***
Industry: Engineering 0.2388 **** ****0.2044 0.2074 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 0.2024 **** ****0.1735 0.2031 ****
Industry: Other 0.2140 **** 0.1524	 ** 0.2048 ****
No. of Observations 352 352 352
F-Statistic 7.54 **** ****6.64 7.82 ****
df 18; 333 18; 333 18; 333
R2 0.2871 0.2640 0.2971
Adjusted R2 0.2485 0.2243 0.2592
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows beta coefficients.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 50
Estimation of the Share of Non-Domestic Revenue
- Tobit Regression -
Variable
Model VII
Coefficients
Model VIII
Coefficients
Model IX
Coefficients
weighted
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 7.8795 **** 6.5952 *** 10.0559 ****
Age 3.4506 **** 3.6712 - **** 4.2444 ****
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 13.5384 **** 14.6213 **** 17.9507 ****
International Work Experience 7.5071 ** 9.1635 ** 8.2268 *
International Education 9.1450 7.8975 6.7146
R&D Intensity (% of turnover) 70.2167 ***
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2
-24.5733 ±
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 136.2137 **** 89.1006 ***
(R&D Intensity % employees)2
-111.4290 **** -54.9145 *
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 4.6199 4.8184 6.7062
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 12.0750 11.6734 ± 14.0679 *
New Combinations of Existing Technology 16.7416 *** 19.2948 *** 24.6549 ***
Novel Technology Developed Externally 21.4477 *** 23.9287 *** 32.5872 ***
Novel Technology Developed Internally 6.6827 10.7940 * 17.4824 **
Customisation Requirement
-3.9317 *** -4.4213 **** -4.3216 ***
Commercialisation Cost 1.4131 1.4834 2.9929
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 24.5434 **** 21.9252 **** 29.7948 ****
Industry: Engineering 33.2199 **** 29.7669 **** 36.6633 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 32.8766 **** 29.0679 *** 40.9037 ****
Industry: Other 27.2351 **** 21.1645 **** 34.4005 ****
No. of Observations 352 352 352
Log Likelihood -1231.30 -1236.91 -1078.44
Chi-square (dl): -144.56 **** -133.34 **** 164.86 ****
(18) (18) (18)
Pseudo R2 0.0554 0.0511 0.0710
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows coefficient estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 48 shows the results of the OLS regressions on the sub-sample of firms with
international activities (models Ito III). In these models, we decided not to use age
as a control variable. Instead, we used the number of years a firm has already sold
internationally as a predictor. We do so for the following reason: First, this
variable can be understood as "age since first international sales" or company
experience with international sales. It is highly correlated with firm age (r=--0.64),
but likely to be a better predictor of the degree of internationalisation since it takes
into account that firms enter foreign markets at different age levels. Second, from
a theoretical point of view, firm experience plays a central role in the process
theories of internationalisation reviewed in chapter 2. Accordingly, the extent to
which firms engage in international sales is argued to be a function of the past
experience with foreign activities. Since we perform these OLS regressions on the
sub-sample of internationalisers, we have information on this variable. This is not
the case when looking at the entire sample, since the variable can not be
established for non-internationalisers. Table 49 shows the results of the OLS
regressions performed on the total sample with the share of non-domestic revenue
set to "0" for non-internationalisers (models IV to VI). Finally, in table 50 we
contrast these OLS regressions with three Tobit models in order to examine the
validity of our results and to account for the effects of the censoring (models VII
to IX). The models are also estimated using the weights in order to assess the
impact of the sampling strategy (models III, VI and IX). In all cases, the models
resulted in statistical significant solutions. In the OLS models, the R 2
 and adjusted
R2 ranged from 0.19 to 0.30 and 0.13 to 0.26 respectively. The pseudo R 2 in the
Tobit models ranged from 0.05 to 0.07.
6.2.2.3. Model Results
In model I to III which examine the sub-sample of internationalisers, there are few
significant factors that impact on the degree of internationalisation. The number of
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years since their first international sales, or, stated differently, their direct
international experience, is strongly related to the degree of internationalisation.
The beta coefficients reveal that this is one of the strongest predictors of the
degree of internationalisation. This result lends support to process theories which
argue that the extent of international activities at a given time is a function of past
experience with international activities. When looking at technology intensity, it
became apparent that the linear component of the R&D vector is positive and
significant in all three models and is the most influential variable according to the
beta coefficients. Differences between the models became apparent as the squared
component of this vector is significant only when using the share of R&D
employees as a measure. However, the turning point of the function is only
reached at about 100% R&D intensity by employees, the limit observation of the
sample. The hypothesis of a curvilinear effect can therefore not be supported in
the sub-sample models.
When looking at the innovativeness of the product, we found that only the
products that incorporate "new combinations of existing technology" have a
significant positive impact on the share of non-domestic revenue compared to the
base case of "tried and tested technology". A Wald test on a joint influence of the
technology variables was insignificant. All remaining product related variables
turned out to be insignificant as well. Among the industry variables, life sciences
firms were the only firms with a consistent positive effect in the models. The
dummy variables for engineering and "other firms" were positive in model I,
where we operationalised technology intensity as share of R&D employees.
Variables that discriminated between internationalisers and non-internationalisers,
such as size, international experience and customisation have lost their
explanatory effect with regard to the share of non-domestic revenue, with only
work experience for an internationally operating firm being marginally significant
in model II.
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Overall, we conclude that the models on the subsample of internationalisers
perform quite poorly as none of the hypothesised relationships could be supported.
These results suggests that, when looking just at the subsample of
internationalisers, the factors that caused them to venture abroad are of limited
value for explaining their degree of internationalisation. It also suggests that, at
least as far as the chosen variable vector in our models is concerned,
internationalisers are a quite homogeneous type of firm. For example, the Probit
regressions in section 6.2.1. showed that the products of international start-ups
require less client-specific customisation. Once that these firms sell their products
into foreign markets, their marginal customisation requirements lose their power
as predictors of subsequent performance. Differences in their strategic orientation
and particular events or experiences rather than the more structural characteristics
measured here are likely to explain the differences in their degree of
internationalisation.' This is also evident from the strong effect of experience with
cross-border sales on the subsequent degree of internationalisation. The latter
lends support to the arguments of internationalisation process models which see
organisational outcomes as functions of past experience. We therefore conclude
from model I to III that the variable vector that discriminated quite well between
internationalisers and non-internationalisers in the previous section loses its power
when applied to the question how well the subsample of internationalisers
performs in terms of degree of internationalisation. Nonetheless, the findings of
the subsample regression are not contradictory to the results on the decision to
internationalise, because its significant factors were not negatively related to the
decision to internationalise in the first place.
As a next step, we looked at the entire sample of firms. A picture consistent with
the earlier findings emerges here, since both the OLS regression and the Tobit
model produce results which are in direction and significance almost identical to
' Lindqvist (1991) encountered somewhat a similar situation. She came to a similar conclusion
after finding out that few variables of her dataset contributed to explaining differences in the share
of non-domestic revenue among her sample of firms with international activities.
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the Probit model on the differences between international start-ups and domestic
start-ups. We base our discussion mainly on the results of Tobit model as we
believe that its results are more accurate given the degree of censoring in our
sample.
In all models that were estimated on the entire sample, firm size was significantly
positively related to the share of non-domestic revenue. The same results were
obtained when using the summary scale constructed of the log values for size at
start-up and at the time of the survey (results of the latter not shown here, but see
table 55). H1 b can therefore be supported. ' 3 Since we used the summary scale
constructed of the log values for employee and sales, the results suggests that a the
effect is decreasing with increasing absolute size. Stated differently, firms that
generate a high share of non-domestic revenues are found to have minimum size.
Work experience for an internationally operating firm was found to have a
significant positive impact on the share of non-domestic revenues in all models.
The effects for direct international work experience were positive and significant
with the exception of model IV and VI. In these specifications, this variable
slipped above the chosen significance thresholds. We believe that this is an effect
of the censoring that is not accounted for by the OLS regressions and are therefore
inclined to accept the positive impact of that variable when looking at the entire
sample. International education was not found to be significant in any of the
' Since the share of non-domestic revenue is not independent from the level of sales, we then also
added the absolute value for "sales today" into the equations. This control variable was not found
to be significant in any of the models that were based on size at start-up. However, it was
significant and positively related to the degree of internationalisation when entering size at the
time of the survey. Since we have already pointed out in section 6.2.1. that the level of total sales
at the time of the survey could be at the same time the cause and effect of a high degree of
international sales, we cannot make any causal inference here. In any case, the simultaneous use of
the summary scale for size and sales today impacted on the level of significance for the firm size
index scale. This was to be expected given the high degree of multicollinearity among these
variables (correlation r=0.75). The remaining variables were not affected in terms of direction and
significance. The variable sales today is therefore omitted from the displayed specifications in
order to improve the comparability between the models that estimate the different dimensions of
internationalisation. A more detailed discussion of the effect of firm size in our models can be
found in section 6.2.4.
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models when entered simultaneously with the other two variables measuring
management's international experience. When we omitted the latter two and
entered only international education in the regression equations, this variable
turned out to be significant. We will discuss this effect in more detail in section
6.2.4. Overall, we find support for H2b.
The presence of venture capital was not significantly related to the degree of
internationalisation in any of the models. Marginally significant effects were
achieved for business angel investment in the case of the weighted OLS and Tobit
models and the unweighted Tobit model that used R&D employees as measure of
technology intensity. H3b therefore receives partial support.
In the OLS and Tobit models that used the share of R&D employees as measure of
technology intensity (models IV, VI, VII and IX), we found a curvilinear effect of
technology intensity on the share of non-domestic revenue. The turning points of
the function lay between 61% and 90%. In models V and VIII that used R&D
expenditures as a percentage of turnover, we could also identify a curvilinear
effect. Yet, only four firms had expenditure levels that were beyond the turning
point of this vector. Despite lying within the observed range, the curvilinearity is
therefore of limited relevance for practical or predictive purposes. H4b therefore
receives only partial support.
Similar effects were observed when looking at the innovativeness of the
technology embodied in the products. Compared to the base case of tried and
tested technology, more advanced / newer technology was positively related to the
degree of internationalisation. While the most advanced technology was not
positively related to the base case, the joint impact of the three technology
dummies was positive and significant (p<0.03). Hypothesis 5b therefore receives
support. Like in the Probit models on the differences between internationalisers
and domestic firms, the extent of required product customisation was in all models
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(III to IX) negatively related to a the share of non-domestic revenues. The level of
pre- and after sales service requirements, the costs of commercialisation, were not
related to the degree of international sales in a significant way. This leads us to
accept hypothesis 6b and reject hypothesis 7b.
Finally, the effects of the control variables for age and industry were consistent
across the different specifications and corroborated the findings of the Probit
model. Accordingly, as expected, older firms are more likely Jo have higher shares
of non-domestic revenues. Furthermore, compared to the base case of software, all
remaining firms had higher levels of non-domestic revenues. We then tried to
assess the differences between the weighted and unweighted regressions. In all
eight models, the weighting produced similar effects and there are hardly any
differences in the level of significance of the individual variables. The main
difference was found when looking at business angels. This result can be
explained because the weighting overemphasises the multivariate pattern of
smaller firms that had a much lower likelihood of attracting business angel
finance. As the amount of variation explained by that variable increases through
the weighting, we identify marginally significant effects in the regressions.
To conclude, the differences between the sub-sample OLS regressions and the
models performed on the entire sample were striking. In the latter case, the
differences in the degree of internationalisation can, to a large extent, be attributed
to the discriminating factors between internationalisers and non-internationalisers.
Taking the entire sample as a base for analysis, we could therefore support H8.
Yet, we have to be aware that an acceptance or a rejection of this hypothesis is a
direct consequence of the method rather than the characteristics of international
start-ups. When looking exclusively at the latter as a base for analysis, H8 would
clearly have to be rejected. None of the factors that significantly influenced
internationalisation had substantial power to explain the subsequent share of non-
domestic revenues among the internationalisers.
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6.2.3. The Timing of Market Entry
6.2.3.1. Methodological Considerations
In order to test the hypotheses regarding the timing of foreign market entry, we
estimated several Cox proportional hazard and Weibull regression models. These
models are part of a family of approaches models known as event history analysis
(EHA). Event history analysis has two distinct features that recommend its use for
the analysis of decision making in a more dynamic context. First, event history
analysis allows for a more dynamic consideration of the decision to
internationalise as it allows for the incorporation of firm characteristics measured
at several time periods preceding foreign market entry. Unfortunately, we do not
have such information for the sample firms.
Second, and more important in our case, event history analysis is a superior
approach to investigate the probability of an event occurring when the data is
censored. In principle, a model specification without data from different time
periods is related to a binary choice model, such as a Logit or Probit model. As
already mentioned in the previous section, our cross-sectional sample is "cut off'
or censored because there are a number of young firms that have currently not
internationalised but are likely to do so in the future.' Previous research has
shown that Logit or Probit models to analyse organisational outcomes can lead to
biased estimators when the sample is censored (Hannan and Freeman 1984;
Yamaguchi 1991). If, on the other hand, the Cox regression leads to the same
results as the Probit model on the decision to internationalise, we can conclude
that the results are quite stable and that the censoring is not a problem in the case
of our sample.
' A further reason for censoring would be the death of an organisation. As these case are not
observable at the time of the survey, we have no data on these.
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Event history analysis tries to identify the factors that impact on the occurrence of
a particular event ("exits" or "failures" in the terminology of EHA), given different
duration times ("times-at-risk" or "spell lengths") between starting time and
occurrence. The rate at which an event occurs during the specified period at risk is
referred to as hazard rate. The hazard rate usually varies over time and among
different groups. Cox proportional hazard models have in the past been applied to
modelling foreign market entry decisions of firms (Tan and Vertinsky 1996). It is
a non-parametric method estimated using the method of partial likelihood. As
opposed to parametric methods such as an exponential regression or a Weibull
regression, Cox's method assumes a time dependence of the variates without
requiring the researcher to specify its form. Since parametric methods such as the
Weibull regression are very sensitive to the specification of time dependence and
interaction, Cox's method is, in many cases, more likely to produce robust results
(Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991). On the other hand, a Weibull regression allows
for an interaction with time and the incorporation of an increasing or decreasing
hazard rate over time. 35 Graphical inspection of the hazard rate over time usually
reveals whether the observed phenomenon is subject to increasing or decreasing
hazard over time. For these reasons, we will estimate several Cox and Weibull
models. A more formal discussion of the likelihood functions and properties of
these models can be found in Yamaguchi (1991) and Greene (1997).
6.2.3.2. Model Estimation
In event history analysis, the factors that impact on the occurrence of an event are
estimated. Using the jargon of EHA, a firm is "at risk" of "failing" since inception.
In the present context, a failure or exit refers to the first foreign market entry. By
35 The classical example of the application of the Weibull regression is the question of how quickly
a bearing wears out. Given constant use, the risk of failure of a bearing usually increases over
time, that is a bearing that has been in use for one year will have a lower risk of failure than a
bearing that has been in use for five years. The hazard rate approximating the risk of failure is thus
increasing over time instead of being constant.
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the end of the observed time period, a firm will have either failed, that is
internationalised, or be treated as censored observation. An important caveat has
to be noted. Event history analysis normally requires data that was recorded before
observations were at risk or that are not subject to changes over time. While the
assumption that categoric variables such as industry and innovativeness of the
technology are not subject to changes over time is quite reasonable, a problem
appears when looking at technology intensity. On the one hand, one expects high-
technology start-ups to devote most of their resources in relative terms on product
development when they are young. However, the same argument can be made in
the other direction. Early commercial success allows the start-up's management to
channel additional resources to research and development activities in order to
concentrate on future generation products. Note also that a breakdown of
technology intensities in section 5.2.5. revealed that the level of R&D
expenditures stayed relatively stable irrespective of the age of the start-up. Thus, if
there are changes over time, we do not expect these changes to bias our modelling
of the timing of market entry in a consistent way. This property should therefore
not impact substantially on the results but could increase the noise in the data. In
the worst case, this leads marginal t-statistics to slip outside the accepted
significance levels.
Model I and model II (table 51) are identical with one exception. Like in the
previous models, we report the results for two different measures of technology
intensity. In both models, the starting year for a firm to be "at risk" of international
market entry is its year of formation. In model III, we chose a different starting
period. Here, a firm starts being at risk after its first sales. We chose this model
specification in order to account for those firms that focus exclusively on product
development during their first years. By definition, these will enter foreign
markets only after product development is finished. In the following table (table
52), we compare model I to a weighted model (model IV) and to a model that uses
a different definition of exit (model V). In the latter case, we consider a firm as
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international when it has entered its first three foreign markets. Finally, in table
53, we report the results of three Weibull regressions in order to identify whether a
decreasing or increasing hazard rate invalidates or supports the results of the Cox
model.
6.2.3.3. Results
All eight models result in statistically significant solutions. The parameter
coefficients should be interpreted as follows: A positive sign indicates that a
variable is positively related to early internationalisation. Conversely, a negative
coefficient indicates that the variable in question is negatively related to the speed
of market entry. When looking at the models, we found that the effects were very
consistent irrespective of the model specification. The Weibull and Cox models
produce almost identical results. Small differences were only found when we
changed the model specification and added the weights. In the Weibull
regressions, the p-values of around 1.7 indicate an increasing hazard rate over time
(bottom table 53). The value of 1.7 should be interpreted as follows: five years
after inception, a firm's chances of engaging in international activities are nearly
twice as high compared to two years after inception (or, to be precise (5/2)1.7-1
=1.90).
In all models, we found that our measure of firm size had a significant positive
effect on early foreign market entry. 1-11 c is therefore supported. Like in the
previous models on the propensity and degree of internationalisation, we entered
the log values of size into the regression equation. The results therefore indicate
that the effect of size decreases with increasing absolute values of firm size thus
suggesting that a minimum critical mass is required for the initiation of
international activities.
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Table 51
Cox Regression to Estimate the Time to Internationalise
Model I	 Model II	 Model III
Variable	 Coefficients	 Coefficients	 Coefficients
base year: year	 base year: year	 base year:
of formation	 of formation	 first sales
a
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.3182 **** 0.2835 **** 0.3688 ****
Age -0.0240 -0.0246 -0.0712 * *
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.3598 * * * 0.3824 * * * 0.5256 * * * *
International Work Experience 0.2137 ± 0.2395 ± 0.3155 *
International Education 0.1490 0.1427 0.1954
R&D Intensity (% of turnover) 1.6311 *
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2 -1.3784 *
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 2.9529 * 1.8505 * *
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -3.0325 * * * -1.5726
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up -0.1501 -0.0894 -0.1700
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.2571 0.2541 0.2456
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.2293 0.2717 0.5203 * *
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.3651 0.4845 0.7163 * * *
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.1277 0.1724 0.4326
Customisation Requirement -0.0888 * * -0.1024 * * -0.1219 *1*
Commercialisation Cost -0.0042 -0.0098 0.0435
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.5538 * * * 0.5472 * * * 0.7364 * * * *
Industry: Engineering 0.7321 * 0.6832 * * * * 0.7961 * * * *
Industry: Life Sciences 0.6543 * * * 0.5819 * * 0.7992 * * *
Industry: Other 0.3587 ± 0.2732 0.5067 * *
No. of Observations 354 354 354
No. of Failures 242 242 242
Log Likelihood -1161.54 -1164.55 -967.77
Chi-square (df): 84.98 (18) * * * * 78.95 (18) * * * * 108.63 (18) * * * *
Pseudo R2 0.0353 0.0328 0.0531
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows parameter estimates instead of hazard ratios.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.1 5 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 52
Cox Regression to Estimate the Time to Internationalise
Model I
	
Model IV	 Model V
Variable	 Coefficients	 Coefficients	 Coefficients
base year: year	 weighted	 failure: entry into
of formation	 countries
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.3182 **** 0.3337 **** 0.2765 ****
Age -0.0240 -0.0724 * -0.0078
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.3598 *** 0.3835 *** 0.2127
International Work Experience 0.2137 ± 0.2245 ± 0.3921 **
International Education 0.1490 0.2699 0.2258
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 2.9529 ** ** 3.1851 **** 3.2249 ***
(R&D Intensity % employees) 2 -3.0325 *** -3.2940 **** -3.1323 ***
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up -0.1501 -0.1323 0.0735
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.2571 0.2361 0.3423
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.2293 0.2660 0.1179
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.3651 ± 0.4602 * 0.0953
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.1277 0.1067
-0.0598
Customisation Requirement
-0.0888 **
-0.1199 *** -0.1084 **
Commercialisation Cost
-0.0042 -0.0032 0.0416
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.5538 *** 0.7393 **** 0.7807 ****
Industry: Engineering 0.7321 **** 0.7683 **** 0.8891 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 0.6543 *** 0.7321 *** 0.6792 **
Industry: Other 0.3587 ± 0.4297 * 0.4524 *
No. of Observations 354 354 354
No. of Failures 242 242 184
Log Likelihood -1161.54 -1107.58 -928.33
Chi-square (df): 84.98 (18) **** 110.69 (18) **** 74.01(18) ****
Pseudo R2 0.0353 0.0476 0.0383
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows parameter estimates instead of hazard ratios.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 53
Weibull Regression to Estimate the Time to Internationalise
Variable
Model VI
Coefficients
Weibull
Model VII
Coefficients
Weibull
Model VIII
Coefficients
weighted Weibull
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.3343 * * * * 0.2984 **** 0.3740 ****
Age 0.0406 0.0411 0.0419
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.4121 * * * 0.4353 *** 0.5349 * * *
International Work Experience 0.2403 * 0.2676 * 0.3124 *
International Education 0.1543 0.1419 0.0862
R&D Intensity (% of turnover) 1.8402 * *
(R&D Intensity % turnover)2 -1.5836 * *
R&D Intensity (% of employees) 3.1943 * * * * 1.9671
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 -3.3220 * * * -1.5912
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up -0.1362 -0.0640 -0.1451
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.2314 0.2359 0.2272
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.2123 0.2608 0.5246 * *
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.3524 ± 0.4938 0.7053 * *
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.1159 0.1579 0.5053 * *
Customisation Requirement -0.0903 * * -0.1054 ** -0.0992 * *
Commercialisation Cost -0.0090 -0.0177 -	 0.0304
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.5624 *** 0.5663 *** 0.5757 ***
Industry: Engineering 0.7889 **** 0.7385 **** 0.8486 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 0.7204 * * * 0.6450 ** 0.8043 ***
Industry: Other
_
0.3454 ± 0.2581 0.4678 *
-
No. of Observations 354 354 354
No. of Failures 242 242 242
Log Likelihood -169.71 (18) 173.04 -166.57
Chi-square (dl): 125.49 * * * * 118.03 (18) **** 116.13 (18) * * * *
p 1.73 1.69 1.72
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows parameter estimates instead of hazard ratios.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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International experience was also positively related to early foreign market entry
in all models. The results are significant for work experience in an internationally
operating firm and work experience abroad. After taking these two factors into
account, international education turned out to be insignificant. When we added
only the latter in the regression equation, we found positive, significant
coefficients in all models for international education (results not shown here). We
therefore can support hypothesis 2c.
Hypothesis 3c stated that firms with external sources of equity finance were
expected to engage in international sales more rapidly than other firms. None of
the models revealed significant positive effects of business angel or venture
capitalist investment on the timing of foreign market entry. Note that venture
capital was even negatively associated with rapid entry, albeit at an insignificant
level. Hypothesis 3c therefore has to be rejected. H4c hypothesised a curvilinear
effect of technology intensity on the timing of international sales. This hypothesis
can be accepted since we observe a significant curvilinear effect with the turning
points of the function well within the observed range of values for this variable.
This effect was identified in all models irrespective of the measure and
specification.
To our surprise, the innovativeness of a product did have a weaker impact on the
timing than on the other dimensions of internationalisation. Compared to the base
case, only one category, "product incorporating novel technology developed
externally", had was positively related to the timing of market entry. Furthermore,
the hypothesis of a joint positive impact of more innovative technology could not
be supported (p<0.48). We therefore do not find any support for hypothesis 5c in
the unweighted models. Note, however, that these variables become significant in
the weighted models (models VI and IX).
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Like in the models on the probability of engaging in international sales (section
6.2.1.) the extent of required client-specific customisation was negatively related
to early foreign market entry. The extent to which a product requires pre- and
after-sales services during commercialisation, however, does not impact on the
timing of first entry. We therefore accept H6c but have to reject H7c. Among the
control variables, there are industry effects consistent with the other models. In
essence, compared to the base case of software, firms from all other industries
entered foreign markets quicker. As one would expect from these models, firm age
per se is not significantly related to the timing of foreign market entry as the effect
is usually accounted for by the interaction with time.
As a next step, we compared these results with the results from two slightly
different specifications. In the first case, we chose a different base year as "entry"
year for firms becoming at risk of internationalising. Instead of being "at risk" at
the time of formation, we chose their first financial year as entry time. This
specification is supposed to account for effects from those firms that do not
generate any sales during their early years and exclusively focus on product
development. In the second case, we chose a more conservative threshold to
designate the "exit" of "failure" event. Here, we considered the time span to enter
three different foreign markets. Both specifications resulted in almost identical
estimators thus supporting the stability of the observed effects.
Finally, we assessed the impact that our sampling strategy had on the results by
comparing the weighted and unweighted results. Here, in both the Cox and the
Weibull models (model III and model VIII), the weighting had a consistent
impact. In essence, the observed difference are the increase of statistical
significance for innovativeness and external finance from business angels. The
internationalisers among both software and the smallest firms, characterised their
products as more innovative than their domestic counterparts, or, stated
differently, the differences were more pronounced compared to the remaining
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firms from other industries and size classes. It does require a reconsideration of
our judgement on hypothesis 5c, since the test of the significant positive joint
effect of the three "innovativeness" dummy variables could not be supported in the
unweighted models. Hypothesis 5c can therefore only be supported in the
weighted models.
To conclude, the estimations of the factors influencing the timing of
internationalisation produce very similar results to the Probit models on the
differences between domestic and international start-ups. The main exception is
the innovativeness of the products sold abroad. Since our chosen specifications of
the Cox and Weibull regressions are somewhat similar to a binary choice model
while having the advantage of accommodating censoring, the results paint a quite
clear picture of the factors influencing the different dimensions of
internationalisation. The next section will provide a summary discussion of the
results of the various models to explain the first three dimensions - probability,
degree and timing - of internationalisation.
6.2.4. Discussion:
Differences Between International Start-ups and Domestic Start-ups,
Degree of Internationalisation and Timing of Foreign Market Entry
Our findings indicate that the key variables that play a role in the
internationalisation of start-ups in high-technology industries are international
experience of the founders, technology intensity, the extent to which a product
requires client-specific customisation and the degree of technological
differentiation of the technology incorporated in a product. With the exception of
the role of external equity finance and the commercialisation requirements of the
exported products, all variables had, by and large, the expected effect on the
observed outcomes. The analysis of the first three dimensions of
211
internationalisation revealed a quite clear and consistent picture. This is quite
remarkable because we used different econometric approaches to model these
dimensions. The only area where the results depended substantially on the chosen
method, or to be precise, on the analysis sample, was the estimation of the degree
of internationalisation. The analysis revealed that none of the hypotheses could be
supported when estimating the regression models on the sub-sample of
international firms. Table 54 gives a summary overview of the hypothesised and
identified relationships.
Table 54
Summary of Expected and Identified Relationships
Hypothesis	 Expected	 Propensity to	 Degree of	 Timing of Entry
Relation	 Internationalise	 Internationalisation
International	 Total
Start-ups only Sample
Firm Size	 +	 +	 not sig.	 +	 +
International Exp.	 +	 +	 not sig.	 +	 +
External Equity	 +	 not sig.	 not sig.	 not sig. / + unweighted: not sig.
weighted: +
Technology Intensity curvilinear unweighted: curv.	 + linear curvilinear / 	 curvilinear
weighted: +, lin.	 linear
Newness of	 +	 +	 not sig.	 +	 unweighted: not sig.
Technology	 weighted: +
Customisation	 not sig.
Cost of	 unweighted: not sig. not sig. 	 not sig.	 not sig.
Commercialisation	 weighted: +
The fact that we used a stratified random sampling approach rather than a random
sampling approach to generate our data did not appear to invalidate our findings.
The use of the weights lead to different results in only four instances (see table
54). In the majority of cases, these effects can be attributed to the software firms.
Since their characteristics could not be picked up entirely by the industry dummy
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variables, their over-representation in the weighted models is responsible for the
observed differences. In order to check the validity of our reasoning, we therefore
performed several regressions on the software firms to model the decision to
internationalise, the degree of internationalisation and the timing of
internationalisation.' The results are displayed in appendix 6. They show that the
significant positive effect of the cost of commercialisation on the decision to
internationalise can be found among the software firms. Furthermore, the positive
effect of the innovativeness of the technology on the timing is also to a large
extent a result of the software firms. The remaining difference between weighted
and unweighted model (positive effect of business angels on timing) can be
attributed to the smaller firms.' Nevertheless, we cannot identify major
differences between the weighted and unweighted models that would invalidate
our conclusions.
Among the industry control variables, we found clear evidence that firms from the
manufacturing sector are more likely to internationalise than their software
counterparts. A further control variable, age, also had a strong effect on the
' An alternative approach would have been to model an interaction term between software and
those variables where differences between the weighted and unweighted model appear. As this
requires knowledge of the differences, it is — in the absence of well-founded hypotheses - not a
suitable approach for hypothesis testing.
37 Note also that R&D intensity becomes insignificant in each of the subsample regressions in
appendix 6. This suggests that R&D intensity does not discriminate between the different
dimensions of internationalisation among the software firms. We therefore performed a Probit
model on the subsample of all manufacturing firms and compared the test statistics with the Probit
model on the total sample. Here, the inclusion of the software actually lead to an improvement of
the test statistics such as the classification ratio (from 74% to 77% in the case of the decision to
internationalise), which is the opposite of what one would expect if the model loses power on the
software firms. A more plausible explanation is therefore, that the software firms are a too
heterogeneous group. This is caused by the fact the industrial classification systems used by
OECD countries do not allow for a more accurate classifications other than "computer-related
services". A sizeable, yet unknown proportion of these firms seems to behave more like the
relatively homogeneous manufacturing firms. These may well be the firms that sell standardised
software packages. The remaining firms, such as contract programmers and software consultants
could be responsible for the variation in the model results. Unfortunately, we can only speculate
on these groups, as our dataset does not allow us to explore these differences further. Additional
research on software firms should therefore develop criteria to divide this heterogeneous group of
firms into more homogeneous sub-groups.
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probability of international sales and the degree of non-domestic revenues. This
does actually lend support to the propositions of the internationalisation process
theory (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 1990) which argues that the degree of
internationalisation of a firms is actually increasing over time irrespective of
whether strategic decisions in that direction are made.
Table 55
Effect of Different Measures of Firm Size on Dependent Variables
Measurement of Differences between Degree of Timing of
Size Domestic and Internationalisation Internationalisation
International Firms (OLS / Tobit, all firms)
Start-up
Employees (absolute) positive positive * positive
Employees (log) positive positive positive
Sales (absolute) not significant, pos. not significant, pos. positive
Sales (log) positive positive positive
Index of abs. values positive * positive * positive
Index of log values positive positive positive
Today
Employees (absolute) not significant, pos. positive * not significant, pos.
Employees (log) not significant, pos. positive * not significant, pos.
Sales (absolute) not significant, pos. positive positive
Sales (log) positive positive positive
Index of abs. values positive positive positive *
Index of log values positive positive positive
* marginally significant at p<0.15
The impact of several variables on the internationalisation of high-technology
start-ups requires further consideration. In order to explore the role of firm size,
we ran a series of regressions that used different measures of firm size. Table 55
summarised the role of size in the different models. The table shows that in all
regression models, the various measures of firm size had a positive impact on the
dependent variables. However, not all measures of size, especially when using
absolute values, were related to the various dependent variables at a statistically
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significant level. Note also that one cannot make inferences about a causal
relationship when considering the effect of size measured at the time of the
survey. Nonetheless, the results are displayed here because they paint a consistent
picture, irrespective of whether start-up size or size today is used. Furthermore, in
each of the regression model, the use of different measures for size does not
impact on the stability of the effects of the other variables.
As already mentioned, for the models presented in the previous sections, we
constructed an index out of the logarithms of employment (in full-time
equivalents) and annual sales. We chose to do so because in all regression models
using the index constructed out of the log values, we obtain significant results and
consistently better test statistics. We therefore concluded that the log
transformations resulted in a better fit of our models to the data. 38 The effect of
firm size should be interpreted as follows. For the smallest firms, a marginal
increase in size leads to significantly higher propensity to engage in international
sales, to a higher share of non-domestic revenue and to an earlier entry into
foreign markets. However, the positive effect of firm size decreases the larger the
firms gets. These results therefore suggest that international activities require a
certain minimal scale. Beyond that threshold, additional size differentials do not
contribute to explaining the phenomenon of internationalisation. Having said that,
plots of the effects of firm size on the three dimensions of internationalisation
suggest that this minimal scale is quite low and is actually overcome by the
average firm in our sample. For example, based on the log values for size today,
the Probit models on the decision to internationalise predict an incremental
positive internationalisation probability from 9.4 employees onwards. Note that
this value is below the sample median of 12 employees. These findings
corroborate the results of Calof (1995) who found that — while being statistically
significant — size did not explain a lot of the variation in international activities.
' An alternative approach would be to divide the firms up into different size classes and generate
dummy variables. When choosing that approach, we produced consistent results.
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While this is not a direct contradiction of internationalisation process theory, it
does indicate that scale-related barriers to international sales can be overcome
quite easily.
The explanation why small size is not an important barrier to internationalisation
for some start-ups could be related to their particular resource endowment.
Resource-based approaches argue that organisational outcomes are determined by
their resource endowment and accumulated skills. Accordingly, scholars have
argued that the international experience of the founders should be given attention
when analysing the phenomenon of international entrepreneurship (McDougall,
Shane and Oviatt 1994; Oviatt and McDougall 1994). The models presented here
confirm the results from studies on international new ventures that identified the
international experience of the entrepreneur as key variable (Jolly, Alahuhta and
Jeannet1991; McDougall, Shane & Oviatt 1994; Murray 1994; Bloodgood,
Almeida and Sapienza 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997). All three measures of
international experience, work experience abroad, work experience in the UK for
an internationally operating firm and international education, were positively
related to the dimensions of internationalisation at a significant leve1.39 Due to the
level of collinearity between these variables, their joint inclusion in the models
causes international education to become insignificant in all cases. All variables
are significantly correlated between each other at p<0.01. However, they cannot
be transformed into a single scale to measure "international experience" as, despite
their correlation, they represent quite different aspects of this construct.
Accordingly, the alpha score of 0.48 for the hypothetical summary scale is too low
to recommend the creation of a single item. Taken individually, though, all three
measures are significant. Our results therefore show that international experience
does not necessarily have to come from living or working abroad. Work
experience in the UK for an internationally operating country turned out to be the
strongest predictor among the three operationalisations. The exposure to foreign
' The exception is the sub-sample OLS model to determine the share of non-domestic revenue.
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operations during previous employment is thus likely to lower the psychic barriers
to international expansion. Probably, this variable does, in many cases, also
comprise the managerial experience of the founder.
An additional variable grounded in resource-based approaches is the degree of
technological differentiation of the products. We argued earlier that the degree of
differentiation is likely to increase with the newness of the technology
incorporated in the products. Our results lend support to the assertion that
international new ventures exploit leading edge technology (Jolly, Alahuhta and
Jeannet 1991; Boter and Holmquist 1996; Murray 1996). The newness of the
technology incorporated in the products turned out to be a significant predictor of
international activities. While there is no difference in the timing of market entry,
firms whose products incorporate newer technology will have a higher chance of
eventually entering foreign markets. Subsequently, they are also likely to achieve
higher levels of foreign sales than firms that export products incorporating less
advanced technology. An important qualifying remark is warranted here. The
analysis of the individual variables revealed that the dummy variable for the most
advanced technology category was insignificant in the majority of models. This
could indicate a problem related to international technology transfer, such as user
acceptance of a new solution. This is a considerable obstacle in domestic
transactions (Roberts 1991), but could be amplified in the cross-border setting for
two reasons. First, from a buyer's point of view, the firm in question is an
unknown start-up without a proven track-record. Second, the manufacturer of the
product is a foreign firm, which from a buyer's point of view, raises questions of
reliability and product support. The mechanisms of how start-ups overcome these
barriers in an international setting should therefore become an area for future
research in international entrepreneurship. The analysis of the chosen entry modes
in the next section should also shed further light into this apparent dilemma.
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Our third proxy variable to operationalise resource-based approaches, the presence
of business angel and venture capital finance, did not have a significant effect in
most of the models. This result came as a surprise since both variables do not only
capture the influx of financial resources but also the value-added through strategic
advice and access to complimentary business contacts. There is an obvious a priori
explanation for the lack of explanatory power of these variables. Some high-
technology start-ups with external equity exclusively focus on product
development for a number of years. These firms receiyed external funds to
perform resource intensive development activities with uncertain outcomes and do
not, in the absence of a commercial product, devote substantial management time
and resources to international expansion during their early years. Yet, we expected
this effect to be picked up by the curvilinear modelling of technology intensity. To
our surprise, this was not the case. Still, while the curvilinear modelling did not
impact on the significance level of external equity finance, it has the potential to
explain why previous findings on the relationship between technology intensity
and international activities have been inconclusive (for example Cooper and
Kleinschmidt 1985; Lindqvist 1991; Fujita 1995a). In essence, our results show
that up to a certain point, technology intensity is positively related to the three
dimensions of technology intensity. 40 However, beyond that level, technology
intensity will start to impact negatively on internationalisation as it draws on too
many critical resources. This effect is apparent from the majority of models
irrespective of the measure. Not surprisingly, however, the curvilinear effect
becomes most clear when we chose the share of R&D employees as
operationalisation of technology intensity.
The importance of customisation as a barrier to internationalisation echoes
findings of studies that examined product characteristics of international start-ups
(Murray 1996; Lindell & Karagozoglu 1997; Roberts & Senturia 1997). From a
' In our models, the observed turning points lie between 50% (probability to internationalise,
model I) and 100% (degree of internationalisation, models V and VI).
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theoretical point of view, the role of customisation is more difficult to untangle.
On the one hand, one can argue from a transaction cost point of view and identify
high customisation requirements as a condition that gives rise to transaction costs
during commercialisation. Conversely, one can adopt a resource-based perspective
and argue that the capability to offer standardised products is a precondition for
growth and expansion (Roberts 1991). We are inclined to follow Roberts who
persuasively argues that substantial R&D investments are required to turn a
bespoke concept into "shrink-wrap" standardised products. This reasoning
receives some support by looking at the significant, negative correlation between
our variables that capture technology intensity and customisation (r=-0.1247 for
R&D expenditures, r=-0.1494 for R&D employees; both are significant at
p<0.05). Whatever line of argument one adopts, client-specific customisation is
clearly negatively related to the probability of engaging in international sales, the
degree of non-domestic revenues and the timing of foreign market entry.
Our final set of hypotheses concerned the role of the cost of commercialisation.
Here, we could not support the notion that the cost of commercialisation represent
important barriers to cross-border relationships. It could be explained if one recalls
that the preferred entry mode of the firms in our sample is the use of foreign
distributors (42%). This is in contrast with studies which report that the preferred
entry mode of smaller firms is direct exporting (Bamberger and Evers 1994), thus
indicating that start-ups in high-tech industry adopt different distribution channels
compared to more traditional small firms. Furthermore, these findings do lend
support to recent theorising on the use of collaborative market entry modes in
knowledge-intensive industries when the motivations of the entrant are influenced
by gaining access to complementary capabilities and skills in the target country
(Madhok 1997). Given the relative unimportance of size and transaction cost
characteristics other than customisation as explanators of international activities,
we would argue that even the smallest firm and youngest firms are capable of
selling their products abroad if their decision is matched with the appropriate entry
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mode. Our final area of analysis will therefore examine the determinants of the
entry mode choice.
6.3. The Choice of Market Entry Mode
6.3.1. Model Estimation
We will now proceed to analyse the determinants of our fourth dimension of
internationalisation, the choice of entry mode. To test our hypotheses, we
estimated six Probit models with the entry mode (1 —distributor, 0 —direct export)
as dependent variable. These two entry modes capture 78% of the observed entry
modes in our sample (see also section 5.3.3.). We report the marginal parameter
coefficients of the models in order to compare the magnitude of the effects of the
different variables. We estimated our principal model using firm size at start-up
(model I). In model II, we use firm size at the time of the survey as a measure.
Model III is identical to model I but is calculated using the weights. In model IV
to VI, we explore the stability of our results with different model specifications.
Model IV excludes the variable "domestic sales mode" in order to avoid possible
endogeneity problems. In model V, only those entry modes enter the analysis that
account for at least 10% of total sales of the start-up. Finally, in model VI, we
exclude those entry decisions that have been subject to changes over time in order
account for the influence of firm-specific learning effects that cannot be captured
with available data. Models I to III are displayed in table 56, models IV to VI in
table 57.
6.3.2. Results
All model solutions are statistically significant at p<0.0001. Among the 396 entry
mode choices for which all variables were completed, 217 (55%) firms chose
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distributors, 179 (45%) firms chose to export directly. The classification ratios
suggests that the predictive ability of the estimated models represents a substantial
improvement over the maximum chance criterion. The results of the models are
very similar. In all models (except model V, see below), the measure of size is
positively related to the use of distributors and the effects are highly significant in
the statistical sense. This effect was observable irrespective of whether size at
start-up or today (model II) was entered in the regression equation. However,
when looking at the marginal effects, the real impact of size,on the choice of entry
mode is quite small. Nonetheless, H9 can be accepted. The direct international
experience of the firm at the time of the market entry is not significantly related to
the choice of a particular sales mode in any of the models. H10 therefore cannot
be accepted. We then looked at the founders' international experience as a
surrogate of direct international experience of the firm. As opposed to the
hypothesised positive effect, the parameter coefficients turned out to be negative,
albeit not always significant. Hypothesis 11 therefore has to be rejected.
Hypothesis 12 was supported. Firms that used distributors domestically also had a
higher propensity to use intermediaries for their international sales in all models.
A comparison of the marginal effects also shows that this variable had one of the
strongest effect among all dummy variables included in the models. H13,
following the organisational capability perspective, stated that the products of
firms that export directly incorporated newer technologies than those, which
entered foreign markets via intermediaries. This hypothesis has to be rejected.
Compared to the base case of a product incorporating tried and tested
combinations of existing technology, more advanced technology tends to be sold
via intermediaries. This effect could be found in all models. H13 therefore has to
be rejected.
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Table 56
Probit Model of the Entry Mode Decision
- Direct Exporting vs. Distributors -
I=Distributor, 0 = Exporting
Variable
Model I
Coefficients
start-up size
Model II
Coefficients
size today
Model III
Coefficients
weighted
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.0842 ** 0.1146 ***
Firm Size (index of log values today) 0.001 ***
Company Experience with Int. Activities 0.0000 -0.0074 0.0063
Work Experience in UK for Multinational -0.0440 -0.0315 -0.0046
International Work Experience -0.0669 -0.1018 ± -0.0437
International Education 0.0146 0.0181 -0.0438
Domestic Sales Mode: Distributor 0.3844 **** 0.3703 **** 0.2942 ****
R&D Intensity (% of expenditures) -0.2693 * -0.2746 * -0.0646
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1223 ± 0.1490 * 0.0865
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.3287 *** 0.3182 *** 0.3547 ****
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.2109 ** 0.1997 ** 0.2720 ***
Customisation Requirement -0.0600 *** -0.0682 **** -0.0891 ****
Commercialisation Cost -0.0006 -0.0123 -0.0148
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.1504 * 0.1340 ± 0.1629 **
Industry: Engineering 0.2069 ** 0.1882 * 0.2286 ****
Industry: Life Sciences 0.4546 **** 0.4554 **** 0.5078 ****
Industry: Other 0.0647 0.0545 0.1993 **
Country GDP (in absolute terms) -0.0050 *** -0.0048 *** -0.0053 ***
Country Risk 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0002
No. of Observations 396 398 396
Log Likelihood -219.09 -219.28 -216.12
Chi-square (df): 107.14(18) 109.93 (18) 114.46 (18)
Pseudo-R2: 0.1965 0.2004 0.2094
Correct classifications (in %): 73.99 71.36 71.97
Maximum Chance Criterion (in %): 54.80 54.52 54.80
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows marginal parameter estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 57
Probit Model of the Entry Mode Decision
- Direct Exporting vs. Distributors -
1=Distributor, 0 = Exporting
Variable
-
Model IV	 Model V	 Model VI
Coefficients	 Coefficients	 Coefficients
without domestic entries contributing	 entry modes that
sales mode	 at least 10% of sales 	 have not changed
Firm Size (index of log values at start-up) 0.0609
-
0.0447 0.1396 ****
Company Experience with Int. Activities 0.0003
,
-0.0215 0.0117
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.0091 -0.1116 ± -0.0521
International Work Experience -0.0940 ± -0.0774 -0.0606
International Education -0.0047 0.0899 -0.0175
Domestic Sales Mode: Distributor 0.3573 ** ** 0.4868 ****
R&D Intensity (% of expenditures) -0.2621 * -0.3110 ± -0.1728
New Combinations of Existing Technology 0.1438 * 0.0830 0.0695
Novel Technology Developed Externally 0.2370 ** 0.2539 ** 0.3745 * * **
Novel Technology Developed Internally 0.1384 ± 0.1812 * 0.1998 **
Customisation Requirement -0.0832 ** * * -0.0532 ** -0.0426 *
Commercialisation Cost 0.0374 0.0367 -0.0071
Industry: IT/Corn Hardware 0.1925 * * 0.0802 0.1243
Industry: Engineering 0.1994 * * 0.1495 0.2188 **
Industry: Life Sciences 0.4408 **** 0.4383 * * ** 0.4770 ****
Industry: Other 0.1872 * -0.0273 0.0283
Country GDP (in absolute terms) -0.0042 ** -0.0051 *** -0.0034
Country Risk -0.0005 0.0015 0.0016
No. of Observations 397 295 337
Log Likelihood -237.18 -168A8 -184.29
Chi-square (dl): 72.54 **** 72.44 (18) **** 98.57 (18)
Pseudo-R2: 0.1326 0.1772 0.2110
Correct classifications (in %): 69.52 70.71 70.45
Maximum Chance Criterion (in %): 54.66 50.84 50.45
Note: The reference category is a software firm selling products that incorporate "tried and tested"
technology. The table shows marginal parameter estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
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The models support H14. Products that require extensive customisation are less
likely to be sold internationally through intermediaries. H15 cannot be accepted.
The measures used to operationalise the costs of commercialisation did not have
statistically significant impact on the decision to involve intermediaries in the
sales process.
The strength of the industry control variables depended on the model
specification. The strongest and most consistent effect was found among the life
sciences firms. All other things being equal, life sciences firms rely much more on
intermediaries to sell their products abroad when compared to the base case of
software. The effects for IT/Com hardware and engineering supported in most
models the notion that these firms are more likely to sell via distributors. The
entry modes of firms classified as "other" did not differ from software firms in
most of the models. Technology intensity was used as a control variable and
resulted in a significant negative effect in four of the six models. Accordingly,
firms that have higher R&D expenditures have a lower propensity to sell via
distributors. However, as the size of the marginal effect in table 56 indicates, firm
differences of at least one order of magnitude need to be present in order to have a
substantial impact. Finally, among the country variables, only the absolute market
size appears to have a significant impact on the entry mode decision. The size of a
national market thus seems to be positively related with the propensity to use
distributors. The estimates for country risk did not have a statistically significant
effect within the model.4'
In order to examine the validity of our findings, we tested three additional models.
A possible danger of the specifications chosen for the models I to III is that they
include the domestic sales mode of the start-ups. While we argue that this variable
captures at the same time the notions of domestic learning and path dependency
41 As the two control variables country risk and GPD per capita where highly correlated (r=0.93),
we included only country risk in the regression equations.
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advocated by the organisational capability perspective, we accept the criticism that
it could be endogenous to the regression model, i.e. it could be determined to a
large extent by the other variables in the regression equation. In order to assess the
impact of endogeneity on our parameter estimates, we therefore specified a Probit
model excluding the domestic sales mode. Model IV reveals that the exclusion of
this variable does not invalidate the results of model I. Note, however, that the
levels of significance decrease slightly in model IV.
We make a further modification in model V. In this model, we include only those
entry modes that represent at least 10% of the total turnover of the firm. Our initial
results could be biased due to the inclusion of reactive, unsolicited foreign sales
that are not a result of firm-specific factors or managerial action. Choosing a
relatively high threshold of 10% should lead to the exclusion of the majority of
these cases. Model V produces similar results than the other models, with the
exception of the industry dummy variables (except life sciences) and firm size
losing their significance. This result indicates that smaller firms are more likely to
have unsolicited ad-hoc foreign sales which are carried out mainly through
exporting. When these cases are removed from the analysis, firm size ceases to be
a predictor for the use of more complex sales arrangements.
A related modification has been made in model VI. Some of the market entries
included in models I to V have been subject to changes over time. Accordingly,
the current entry mode could be a result of learning effects over time rather than
reflecting actual differences in firm or product characteristics. Model VI therefore
only includes those entry modes that have not been subject to changes over time.
Despite this change, the effects are similar to those reported in model I.
Finally, we estimated a weighted model in order to assess the effect of the
sampling strategy. The comparison between model I and III revealed that the main
differences concern the control variables. Industry effects became stronger, thus
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indicating that software firms had a stronger preference for exporting as foreign
sales mode. Furthermore, the R&D intensity control became insignificant. Table
58 gives an overview of the hypothesised and identified relationships.
Table 58
Summary of Hypothesised and Identified Relationships between Independent
Variables and the Choice of Foreign Distributors
Hypothesis Hypothesis Expected Relation Entry Mode
Firm Size H9 + +
Firm International Experience H10 + not significant
Founders' International Experience H11 + not significant
Domestic Sales Mode H12 + +
Newness of Technology H13 +
Customisation H14
Cost of Commercialisation H15 + not significant
6.3.3. Discussion
Looking at the sample average, firms did engage in entry modes that were not
very resource intensive. But among these low-resource entry modes, the use of
intermediaries was more prevalent than direct exporting. Arguably, selling via
distributors represents a more complex and advanced managerial arrangement due
to the requirement to find, train, incentivise and monitor a third party. We
therefore expected, all other things being equal, the use of foreign intermediaries
to be more prevalent among more experienced and larger firms. As hypothesised,
we found a positive effect of firm size on the propensity to sell via intermediaries.
However, an analysis of the marginal effect reveals that - similarly to the
statistically significant but weak effect of R&D intensity - the real impact of that
variable is quite small. All other things being equal, firm differences of at least
one order of magnitude need to be present in order to have a substantial impact on
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the choice of entry mode. Furthermore, when we chose a more conservative
threshold for the inclusion of an entry mode in order to account for unsolicited
sales (model V), size ceased to have a explanatory power in the regression model.
These results undermine the role of firm size for determining entry mode choices
of international start-ups.
The results with regard to experience turned out to be contrary to our hypotheses.
Direct firm experience did not have a significant impact on the commitment of the
chosen entry mode. As extensive experience with foreign operations cannot
automatically be expected among young firms initiating their first foreign sales,
we also tested for international experience, a substitute for direct company
experience. This variable did have a significant impact on the choice of entry
mode, albeit not in the hypothesised direction. This suggests that managers that
have lived abroad are actually more likely to sell internationally without the
assistance of intermediaries. A possible interpretation of this finding is that
internationally experienced managers do not need to rely on the local market
knowledge of a distributor in order to commercialise their products abroad. We
conclude from these findings that, as far as the high-tech start-ups of our sample
are concerned, experiential knowledge, the key variable in the internationalisation
process theory (Andersen 1997), is of limited value to explain the entry mode
choices of the firms in our sample. This echoes the findings of other researchers
(see for example Bell 1995). However, our findings could also provide further
evidence for those researchers who claimed that these two different entry modes
do not represent distinct levels of commitment determined by past experience but
rather result from product- and firm-specific considerations (Andersen 1993;
Leonidou and Katsikeas 1996).
In the case of start-ups, the choice of foreign entry modes may therefore represent
a compromise between the resources of the start-up and the support requirements
of their products and customers. As hypothesised, our results indicate that a high
227
degree of required customisation led to the exclusion of intermediaries during the
sales process. Products that require client-specific changes are more likely to be
sold directly by the manufacturer. We argue that this is the case because the
expertise, skills and tacit knowledge required to adapt a product according to
customers' specifications are more likely to reside within the manufacturer and not
the intermediary. We further hypothesised that start-ups whose products require
extensive pre- and after sales support will be more likely to sell via distributors.
However, this hypothesis could not be supported as the level of required support
did not affect the choice of entry mode significantly. We would like to offer the
following interpretation for this result. The effects of the variables 'customisation'
(H14) and 'after-sales support' (H15) are somewhat related which is also manifest
in the significant positive correlation between the two. From the distributor's point
of view, they both incorporate the notion of having to acquire certain skills in
order to guarantee the effective commercialisation of a manufacturer's product. All
other things being equal, they should both act as a barrier to the involvement of
intermediaries during the sales process. From the point of view of a manufacturer
who wants to serve foreign markets, however, the use of a local distributor may be
the only practicable way of providing the necessary infrastructure for installation,
maintenance, upgrading and/or training of end-users. We tried to decompose this
dilemma and argued that highly customised products are more likely to be sold by
manufacturers directly because of their familiarity with their core technology. For
a distributor, the costs of acquiring those specialised technological skills may be
prohibitive and economically irrational. In contrast, the costs of learning how to
perform the more standardised tasks of installation, end-user training and
maintenance are likely to be much lower because of scale and scope effects,
particularly when the distributor has already has a portfolio of related products in
place. Therefore, selling a product whose commercialisation requires high levels
of support through intermediaries might be less of a barrier. The fact that the two
variables have different effects in the regression, though not as clear-cut as
expected, on the use of intermediaries (significant negative in the case of
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customisation vs. insignificant positive for sales support) is therefore an
interesting result in itself which goes a certain way to support our reasoning. It
suggests that customisation represents a barrier to the involvement of
intermediaries whereas the pre- and after sales requirements can be sub-contracted
by the start-ups and may even become a source of profit for their distributors.
The newness of the technology incorporated did have a significant impact on the
choice of the entry mode, albeit in the opposite direction than we hypothesised.
Compared to the base case of mature and tested technologies, transactions
involving products that incorporated more innovative technology (and hence a
higher degree of tacit knowledge according to the organisational capability
theorists) had a higher chance of being dealt with through collaborative
arrangements rather than being exported. While this indicates the international
market entry forms are actually influenced by product specific factors, the effects
derived from our sample of high-tech start-ups directly contradict the theoretical
prescriptions and findings on technology transfer modes of larger firms (Davidson
and McFetridge 1985). However, they do corroborate the recent findings of
Robertson and Gatignon (1998) which report that firms that experienced higher
technology uncertainties were more likely to engage in alliances. This result
merits further consideration. First, newer technology may not always be more
difficult to comprehend, especially if the distributor already has related products in
his portfolio. Second, in the absence of resources to build up a wholly owned
subsidiary, a distributor may be the only vehicle to a get a product into a local
market. Firms may perceive the performance penalty of sharing the margin worth
paying if the target market is too distant for the effective provision of back-up
services and if there are few growth opportunities in their domestic market. Third,
it points out towards a dilemma that especially young firms without an established
track record face. The much quoted concept of "liability of newness" posits that
young firms face disadvantages as stable relations with clients are not yet
established (Stinchcombe 1965; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Brilderl and
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Schtissler 1990). In cross-border business, relationships this may well result into
what we call the "liability of alienness". Buying from an unknown foreign supplier
is a risk, especially in such critical areas such as medical technology. Despite the
fact that distributors are considered as sub-optimal choices according to the OC
and TCE reasoning, it may well be that an established distributor is seen as a
mechanism to overcome this liability of alienness and to gain legitimacy in cross-
border business relationships.
Our strongest predictor of the respective foreign entry modes was the domestic
sales mode. The effect of this variable can be explained in two ways. First, it is a
proxy for different strategic and structural influence factors that impact on sales
channel choice irrespective of the setting. This variable therefore partly accounts
for unobservable effects whose determination was not among the objectives of the
study. Second, the explanatory effect of this variable is arguably due to the
presence of embedded routines and experiences with the domestic sales mode.
This finding does therefore corroborate theoretical propositions that stress the
importance of firm-specific routines and the path dependence of organisational
outcomes (Madhok 1997). However, further research should use a more refined
measure in order to determine to which extent foreign entry decisions are a result
of path dependency or company marketing strategy.
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7.	 Conclusions
We started this research by pointing out that there is a dearth of empirical
evidence on the extent of international activities among technology-based start-
ups. We then reviewed empirical knowledge in the area of international
entrepreneurship and examined different theoretical frameworks that could explain
the international activities of start-up firms. Unlike other authors (McDougall,
Shane and Oviatt 1994; Knight and Cavusgil 1996), we argued that their
widespread international operations per se are not inconsistent with the literature
of in the field of international business. In the theoretical part of the literature
review, we showed that the various aspects of cross-border expansions of
entrepreneurial firms can be accommodated quite well within the existing
frameworks. We argued further that the question whether existing theories are
applicable to the phenomenon could only be answered after a systematic survey of
the international activities of start-ups within a clearly defined setting. This
allowed us to respond to three major weaknesses in international entrepreneurship
research. First, with a few exceptions, the propositions of the exploratory, case-
based research have not been subject to empirical testing. Secondly, the
quantitative studies paid comparatively little attention to studying the core
dimensions of internationalisation, such as degree of internationalisation, timing
of market entry and choice of market entry mode. Thirdly, and most importantly,
the majority of empirical studies studying the phenomenon did not include a
control group of non-internationalisers. This is understandable as most of these
studies were exploratory in focus. Yet, for the field of international
entrepreneurship to move on, rigorous testing of the claims of previous
contributions is required. The present research therefore comes at a timely
moment for an empirical test and to suggest avenues for further research. We will
now assess our findings and the applicability of different frameworks.
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7.1.	 Implications for the Field of International Entrepreneurship
The project has provided evidence that international activities are much more
prevalent among British start-ups than previously thought. Our population
estimates suggest that 60% of British high-tech start-ups (67% of the sample)
were selling across borders. On average, they entered foreign markets two years
after inception. Today they operate in 10 different markets and generate nearly
40% of their revenues from foreign sales. To our knowledge, this is the first study
that systematically attempts to assess the prevalence of international activities
among high-technology start-ups in a particular country. We believe that our data
is quite representative of the British situation since our descriptive results with
regard to basic firm characteristics and international activities are similar to the
results of a recent exploratory British study that looked at the international
activities of high-technology start-ups in the Oxford and Cambridge region
(Keeble et a!. 1998). To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive survey
undertaken so far in the field of international entrepreneurship and the first attempt
to systematically establish the prevalence of this phenomenon in a particular
country.
When we looked at our data, we could confirm several propositions derived from
a review of the empirical, case-based literature in international entrepreneurship
and the theoretical literature. Above all, we confirmed that firm size is of limited
power to explain the four dimensions of internationalisation (Lindqvist 1991;
McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994; Calof 1994). While the findings regarding
firm size were statistically significant, they indicate that if there are scale-related
barriers to internationalisation, they can be overcome quite easily. In fact, the
average firm in our sample is well above the required threshold size suggested by
our models. One mechanism to overcome scale-related disadvantages could be
related to the skills and capabilities of the entrepreneurial team. Here, we found
that international experience of the management team of the start-up had a
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consistent positive impact on the propensity to internationalise, the timing of
internationalisation and the share of non-domestic revenues. However, it was not
related to the choice of market entry mode. We thus corroborated earlier results
(Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1991; McDougall, Shane and Oviatt 1994;
Bloodgood, Almeida and Sapienza 1996; Murray 1996; Reuber and Fischer 1997)
but also showed that international experience does not necessarily have to come
from direct living, work or education experience. International exposure while
working in the UK turned out the best predictor among the different variables
measuring international experience. Our results also support the work of
researchers who showed that the international start-ups in their sample produced
highly innovative products (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1991; Boter and
Holmquist 1996; Murray 1996). Accordingly, internationalisation is positively
affected by the degree of technological differentiation of a product. While this
variable did not lead to an earlier market entry, it eventually lead to a higher
probability of starting international sales over time. Furthermore, our results
support the notion that client-specific customisation affects international activities
in a negative way (Jolly, Alahuhta and Jeannet 1991; Murray 1996; Roberts and
Senturia 1996). This is to be expected in high-technology industries as
customisation frequently requires skills and capabilities close to the technological
core of the product (Roberts 1991). These skills are less likely to be resident
within the workforce of intermediaries such as distributors. This is not to say that
firms that sell highly specialised, customised cannot or should not attempt to
internationalise. However, customisation represents a considerable barrier for
building up extensive international activities. In summary, firms were more likely
to engage in international activities and achieve a higher share of non-domestic
revenues if they offer innovative, standardised products.
In addition, we identified strong industry effects which suggest that industry-
specific factors such as competition intensity and geographical location of lead
markets also play a substantial role in the internationalisation process (Boter and
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Holmquist 1996; Murray 1996). The life sciences firms in particular scored very
high on all dimensions of internationalisation which probably reflects the
importance of the US as global lead market in health care. However, a further
industry group merits consideration. Our multivariate results reveal that there are
quite distinct differences between software firms and the remaining firms. Yet, the
extent to which software firms are a homogeneous industry group is questionable,
as the firms may range from small contract programmers to larger firms selling
standardised packages. The strategy and structure profiles of these firms are
probably quite different and it seems obvious that these should result in different
internationalisation pattern. Unfortunately, in the absence of a better classification
scheme of these firms, we can only speculate about the nature of these differences.
Overall, the research project therefore does lend support to previous empirical
work in the field of international entrepreneurship. Furthermore, it improves the
validity of previous findings since our results are stable in the presence of a
control group of non-internationalisers.
7.2.	 Theoretical Implications
The question that now arises is how these results can inform internationalisation
theory. On an aggregate level, we do find some support for the
internationalisation process perspective. When considering a regional breakdown,
we realised that the majority of start-ups with international activities entered
Western European markets first. When looking at individual countries, however,
we found that the United States were the most important target market. In any
case, the notion that firms have a preference for entering psychologically close
countries can therefore be supported. Nonetheless, the importance of the US as
target country suggests that market size rather than psychic distance is the key
factor determining the geographical pattern of market entries. When looking at
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structural aspects of market entry, we found that, on average, start-ups engage in
low commitment entry modes. Furthermore, changes of entry modes reflect
increasing commitment over time instead of decreasing commitment. However, a
sizeable proportion of start-ups entered distant foreign markets first or chose
resource-intensive entry modes for their initial international expansion. This
finding sits uneasily within the expectations of the process model. In addition, we
find only partial support for the role of international experience at an
organisational level in explaining internationalisation. Organisational experience
had a positive impact on explaining the share of non-domestic revenue but did not
influence the choice of entry mode. Note, however, that this is not a proper test of
process theory since we do not dispose of a longitudinal dataset and the in-depth
information on the extent to which decision making in the internationalisation
process is influenced by past experience. Still, our results are at odds with the
assertion of process models that see experience as key variable. Furthermore,
internationalisation process theory claims an accelerated outward expansion
process will be observable among larger firms. While we do find evidence for the
significant influence of size on the dimensions of internationalisation, the
modelling reveals that the actual impact of firm size is quite limited. Scale related
barriers, if at all present, appear to be at such a low level that they can easily be
overcome, even by a small start-up. Our results therefore only partially support the
implications of internationalisation process theory.
We come to a similar assessment when looking at transaction cost approaches.
While they have in the past been applied successfully to the analysis of entry
modes of large firms, their implications in the present setting are inconclusive. In
our case, the firms that avoid collaborative arrangements - presumably to avoid
the associated governance costs — are slightly smaller and sell less innovative,
more customised products. It is reasonable to argue that, due to the customisation
requirements, these firms face higher governance costs and sales related
transaction costs. But should the ability to offer innovative, standardised, off-the-
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shelf products be seen as a transaction cost minimising device or as an
organisational capability to generate rents? Depending on the theoretical stance
that one chooses, one can argue both.
In order to avoid these ambiguities, we followed those researchers that
recommended the direct measurement of transaction costs (Klein, Frazier and
Roth 1990). We decided to ask our respondents to appraise a series of direct
measures of transaction costs occurring during the commercialisation process.
Here, we found that in none of the models, our measure of costs had a significant
impact on any of the dimensions of internationalisation. A possible explanation is
that, since they feel they cannot avoid direct transaction costs, some start-ups
accept a performance penalty rather than change their action. Yet, a test of this
proposition would require data on firm performance which we do not have. The
only way to find some support for the TCE logic is to argue that customisation is
related to substantially higher transaction costs compared to installation,
maintenance and training since it probably requires investment in skills closer to
the technological core of the product. Accordingly, customisation turned out to be
a substantial barrier to international sales whereas the direct costs of
commercialisation didn't. Yet, one doesn't need the theoretical apparatus of
transaction costs and its behavioural assumptions to come to that conclusion.
To conclude, we find only limited support for the propositions of transaction cost-
based approaches. Firms effectively did not internalise all cross-border
transactions of innovative products in spite of the traditional internalisation and
transaction cost arguments. Furthermore, a direct operationalisation of transaction
costs did not have the expected impact on internationalisation. Finally, the result
that standardisation is positively related to internationalisation can be explained
through the arguably less restrictive resource- and capability based approaches.
This is not to say that firms should act in a way that is inconsistent with TCE. Yet,
we would like to echo the opinions of other researchers who argued that there are
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superior approaches that do not require the analytical framework of TCE and its
behavioural assumptions to reach identical conclusions (Goshal and Moran 1996;
Madhok 1997).
We found the most consistent effects when we considered the operationalisations
of those frameworks that emphasise the role of firm-specific resources and
capabilities in explaining organisational outcomes. With the exception of external
equity, all hypotheses that emphasised the role of impe,rfectly imitable, firm-
specific factors received empirical support. The role of international experience of
the founders as a substitute for organisational experience has been confirmed with
regard to its positive impact on timing, degree and probability of international
sales. We are also inclined to see low client-specific customisation requirements
as an ability that facilitates the growth and internationalisation process rather than
as a transaction cost minimising device (Roberts 1991).
Our variable that measured the newness of technology requires further discussion.
Firms whose products incorporated more advanced technology had a higher
chance of engaging in international sales and a higher share of non-domestic
revenues in the models that looked at the entire sample. We argued that this was
because buyers are more likely to buy from foreign firms when the latter offer
innovative technology that indigenous competitors cannot supply. The
innovativeness of the technology did, however, not lead to the expected results
when looking at the determinants of entry modes. In essence, in accordance with
the OC perspective, we argued that the transfer of skills required for the effective
cross-border commercialisation is likely to be more difficult when the technology
is more innovative. This, in turn, should have a positive impact on the use of
direct export as entry mode. To our surprise, we realised that products
incorporating more advanced technology were more likely to be sold through local
intermediaries. We offered three different interpretations for this result. First, we
suggested that the transfer of tacit knowledge during the commercialisation may
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not be difficult if a specialised distributor has already products that incorporate
related technology in his portfolio. Second, distributors may be the only way to
provide ongoing support in distant markets. Start-ups may have little choice but to
accept lower margins in international sales if the demand in their home market is
constrained. Third, distributors may be a mechanism to overcome what we called
the "liability of alienness" of a foreign start-up. Since, according to the OC and
TCE reasoning, collaborative arrangements are considered as sub-optimal
operating modes for the cross-border commercialisation of innovative technology,
both theoretical approaches should benefit from modifications in order to apply to
the particular situation of new ventures. On second thought, it is therefore not
surprising that our hypothesis of the impact of technology on the choice of entry
mode could not be supported. Our interpretation is that transaction cost and OC
logic do not include organisational legitimacy in their reasoning, which is of
particular relevance to start-up companies.
7.3. Areas for Further Research
Our results suggests a number of avenues for further research. First, we pointed
out repeatedly that our data does not allow us to examine performance related
issues. Longitudinal data is required to analyse how differentials in international
activities, such as the choice of entry mode, impact on organisational performance.
Furthermore, when looking at the subsample of internationalisers, the variables
that discriminate between domestic and international start-ups fail to explain their
subsequent degree of internationalisation. Exploratory regressions showed that a
proxy variable measuring the proactiveness of the firm had some explanatory
power. As this is a very crude variable, future research should investigate more
closer the strategy-performance relationship of international new ventures.
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Second, further research into collaborative entry modes is warranted. In particular,
the mechanisms by which a start-up can incentivise and monitor a foreign partner
and collect the vital feedback from end-users merit further consideration. With the
exception of the theoretical contribution of Zacharakis (1997), this area is largely
unexplored within the context of international entrepreneurship. Further research
can build on the extensive work by marketing scholars on the domestic
manufacturer — supplier relationship (e.g. Heide and John 1994; Celly and Frazier
1996; Lassard and Kerr 1996). Besides the differences compared to the domestic
distributor relationship, the situation faced by small start-ups that venture abroad
is quite different compared to larger firm for reasons related to bargaining power
(Zacharakis 1997). For growth oriented firms, collaborative relationships may
well represent one avenue for successful mid-term expansion until sufficient
resources to build up wholly owned facilities are available. In addition, if there is a
liability of alienness, foreign partners could be the most effective mechanism to
gain legitimacy in cross-border business relationships. To conclude, well
functioning relationships with intermediaries could be a weaker form of what
Oviatt and McDougall (1994) call innovative, hybrid organisational arrangements
which they see as precondition for sustainable international entrepreneurship.
Third, our results suggests that the industry classification of software firms
comprises a set of quite heterogeneous firms. Our analysis of the Dun &
Bradstreet source data also showed that about 60% of the firms in Butchart
industries belong to one the software classification ("computer-related services").
As mentioned in the methodology section, this is partly due to the fact that the
standard industrial classification systems used in OECD countries fail to provide a
more accurate breakdown of these firms. The multivariate analysis revealed a
number of effects, partly uncovered after the weighting, that suggest that software
firms, or a subgroup of software firms, behave in a quite distinct way compared to
manufacturing firms. In the absence of a more accurate breakdown of these firms,
it is difficult to explain the exact nature of these effects. We have the feeling that
there are at least two distinct subgroups of software firms. On the one hand, there
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contract programmers and small developers which largely act as sub-contractors
and offer highly bespoke products. On the other, there are those software firms
that sell packaged solutions which the customer can individually tailor to his
needs. Further research into software firms should shed light on those issues and
attempt to develop additional classification criteria that can be easily
operationalised in surveys.
7.4.	 Managerial Implications
Our research has identified a number of practicable implications for the managers
of technology-based start-ups. We isolate several findings which we believe
professional managers need to understand. First, those firms which sell a highly
customised or bespoke product should be prepared to commit appropriate
resources to their pre-sales and after-sales service strategy given their greater
reliance on direct exports. In giving this advice, we are aware that our research
findings show that firms appear to choose a mode of foreign market entry
irrespective of the resource implications of the commercialisation process.
Similarly, our findings also showed that the size or resource endowment of firms
had a very weak, albeit statistically significant, effect on the choice of mode of
market entry. In short, it does not appear that resource constraints prevent firms
from choosing between the two discussed entry modes. Instead, managers should
be aware that the choice is likely to be influenced by the degree of customisation
of the product. Firms that seek to derive substantial revenues from international
activities should therefore consider whether a high customisation / standardisation
ratio impacts on their expansion plans.
Second, it appears that in getting a new, technologically advanced product into the
market, start-ups with a necessarily limited record of achievement should
collaborate in order to exploit the reputation of an established intermediary. The
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"liability of alienness" may result in situation where potential customers will not
deal with an unknown foreign start-up given the uncertainties of determining the
continued product support or even the very existence of the firm. The use of a
trusted distributor and its existing sales force may frequently be the only effective
way to sell products to professional customers, especially in sensitive areas such
as medical technology. Distributors may also be essential for supplying widely
dispersed customers in a large market like the USA. However, this issue is wider
than just medical technology. It is relevant for all young firms without established
track-records that initiate the commercialisation at international level of products
or services used in 'mission critical' applications with costly implications for
failure or non-performance.
Finally, if international expansion via distributors is perceived as an important
strategic goal for the start-up, its managers have to be aware already at the product
development stage that successful relationships with intermediaries frequently
depend on the ability to transfer the required skills for product support. The
potential of the products to generate future revenue streams for the distributor is
likely to be a further key issues to consider. Those young firms wishing to use
distributors in foreign markets can benefit from using collaborative relationships
in their domestic market first. Learning effects in managing relationships with
intermediaries may be more easily gained in the domestic market and at less cost.
In certain circumstances this learning may also be less risky given, for example,
easier communication and/or negligible psychic distance. Even for "born global"
firms, market based experimentation in the domestic market may still have these
advantages.
We would like to conclude this research project by getting back to the initial
question of why Europe has not been able emulate the US success in technology-
based entrepreneurship. Besides the familiar arguments that focus on the role of
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culture, finance and support infrastructures, we suggested an additional avenue of
investigation. We argued that, due to the limited potential of their home markets,
European high-tech start-ups that have the potential and determination to achieve
growth trajectories comparable to their successful US counterparts, have to
consider international expansion at inception. We also argued that this project can
become the starting point for a longer term research agenda on the performance
implications of internationalisation. International expansion, though arguably a
more challenging path to growth, can be an opportunity for those firms that
understand and are able to manage its resource implications. Our results provide
ample support that despite small size and a limited resource-base, the majority of
technology-based start-ups manages to initiate international sales. The present
research lay the foundations for gathering a longitudinal dataset to address
performance issues. Thus, we will hopefully be in a position to investigate
whether the increased managerial complexity of internationalisation represents a
barrier to long-term growth of European new, technology-based firms.
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Internationalisation of Young, Innovative Firms
A Study by Warwick Business School and the Zentrum far Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung
Company Profile
1. Please state the year of formation (first
legal incorporation) of your company:	 19
2. Was your company founded as:
O Independent new firm
O Management buy-out
O Management buy-in
O Subsidiary of another firm
O De-merger or spin-out from an existing firm
O Other (e.g. merger), please state:
Please note: Third parties will NOT be given access
to individual company data. Data will be analysed
anonymously and used for research purposes only.
If you have any queries about this survey, please
contact Dr Gordon Murray or Oliver Burge! at Warwick
Business School:
Phone:	 01203 523914
Fax:	 01203 524628
E-Mail:	 gordon.murray@warwick.ac.uk
o.burgel@warwick.ac.uk
Project Homepage: http://www.intsme.zew.de
3. Please indicate the TOTAL turnover of your company:
- in the FIRST year your company had sales
- in your LAST financial year 	
- the year end forecast for your CURRENT financial year 	
Year: 19
Year: 19
Year: 19
Does your company have any international sales?
O Yes	 Indicate the share of total turnover generated by foreign sales in your LAST financial year: 	 %
Please indicate the number of foreign countries to which you CURRENTLY sell: 	
Name the FIRST five countries in which you had any international safes and the YEAR of market entry.
O No	 Do you consider international sales as a probable option in the foreseeable future ? 0 Yes 0 No
5. How many persons were/are employed by your company (including owners)?
At the time of start-up:
	 	
Today: 	  (please state in full-time equivalents)
6. How many employees (including founders) have technical/scientific education at degree level?
Today: 	 	 0 None
7. Does your company carry out research and development activities?
0 Yes, regularly	 0 Yes, occasionally 	 0 No
8. How much did you spend on research and development in your last financial year? 	 % of total sa es
9. How many employees (including the founders) currently work exclusively or for at least 50% of their
time on the development of existing and new products?
	  (in full-time equivalents)
	 0 None
Founder(s) Profile
10. How many persons were founders of the start-up? 	
If more than 1, had any of the founders worked together for a period of at least 6 months prior to start-up?
0 Yes	 ONo
11. Please indicate whether or not you experienced a shortage of skills at the time of start-up or today:
Initially at start-up
Not at a I	 Strong y
Marketing 	
Sales /0 stribution 	
Financ-a Management 	
Genera Management! Organisation
	
Production Manufacturing Logist"cs ,,,,,,,,
Research and Development 	
Today
Not at a	 Strongly
	 pppp
0-0-0-0-0
To date:
0 yes: 	
0 yes:
0 yes:
Initially at start up:
D yes: 	
D yes: 	
D yes: 	
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12. Please indicate if any of your founders had international experience of the following kind BEFORE you made
your first international sales:
0	 Work experience abroad
O Previous work experience in the UK for an international company
O Education abroad
13. Please indicate whether your company received any of the following forms of external finance in addition
to your own funds:
(as a % of total EQUITY of the company)
Venture capital:
Business angels / informal investors:
Government / public grants:
Product Characteristics
Please give the following information about the best selling product line or product family in your LAST financial year.
We define a product line/family as a series of closely related products or services (including various upgrades) whose
core elements and technologies are identical. For example, a BMW 7 Series would be a particular product line, a BMW
3 Series would be another one, although there are different models (i.e. BMW 318, BMW 323) within the product line.
This product line/family is subsequently referred to in the following part of the questionnaire as "product or service".
14. Please indicate the share of total turnover of your best selling product in your last financial year and
describe the product or service:
Share of turnover:	 % of sales
Description of product: 	
15. Please indicate the year in which this product or service was first sold: 19
16. Please indicate whether your product or service is a:
O Capital good or service	 0	 Consumer good or service
O Component for other products 0	 Product ready to use by end-user	 (multiple answers possible)
17. How would you best describe the innovativeness of your product or service?
O It incorporates 'tried and tested' combinations of existing technology
O It incorporates new combinations of existing technology
O It incorporates novel technology that has been developed elsewhere
O It incorporates novel technology that had to be developed specifically for this product by your company
18. Please describe key characteristics of the product / service, particularly the extent to which it requires:
Technical consultation prior to sales 	
low	 substantial	 does not apply
0-0-0-0-0 	 0
Individual client customisation 	 0-0--0 0 0 	 0
Specific configuration / system requirements 	 0-0-0 0 0 	 0
Complex or time-consuming installation 	 0-0 0 0-0 	 0
Regular maintenance and/or upgrades 	 0-0-0-0--0 	 0
Specialised training required for front-line and sales personnel 	 0 0 0-0-0 	 0
Other key characteristics, please specify: .... 0-0-0-0	 0 	 0
19. Please indicate the estimated time for a competitor to launch a similar product with superior
performance or a product with similar performance at a lower price: 	 months
20. Please indicate whether your product or service has been:
a) developed primarily for the domestic market 	 0 yes	 O no
b) developed with the intention to sell abroad 	 0 yes	 0 no	 (please answer both questions)
21. How is your product or service primarily sold in your home country?
0 via distributors	 0 direct sales from headquarters 	 0 both	 0 other, please specify: 	
22. Please indicate the intensity of competition that you encounter in the UK market:
none	 very intense
Intensity of competition .	  0-0 0 0 0 	 Number of direct competitors: 	
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23. Do you produce your product or service in any foreign country?
O No, only domestic production 	 0 Yes, only foreign production	 0 Yes, foreign and domestic production
If yes ->	 Indicate the country(ies): 	
• via a wholly owned production subsidiary
El	 via a jointly owned production subsidiary with a local partner
O via a local subcontractor
24. Have you ever sold this product or service abroad?
O Yes
O No, but ANOTHER product or service is sold abroad 	 —) go to Question 33
O No international activities	 -n go to Question 35
International Activities / Market Entry
In the following section, we would like to ask you about your THREE MOST IMPORTANT foreign markets for the product
or service DESCRIBED ABOVE in your LAST financial year (if you have international sales in only one or two countries,
please fill in only for country 1 or country 1 and 2). If you did not generate any international sales with the product
described above, please do not fill out this section.
25. In how many countries did you sell this product last year? 	 countries
26. Please indicate how the sales for this product have been distributed during your LAST financial year in your
domestic and three most important foreign markets: 	 (in % of total sales for this product)
Domestic sales:	 Foreign country 1: 	 Foreign country 2:	 Foreign country 3:	 Rest of the world:
Ok	
= /00 %
Foreign Country 1 Foreign Country 2 Foreign Country 3
27. Please name the country
and year of market entry 19 19 19
28. Please indicate the degree of
adaptation necessary to sell
this product! service abroad:	 none	 substantial low	 substantial low	 substantial
Technical	 0-0 0 0-0 0-0-0 0 0 0 0 00-0..adaptation 	 ..... ...
Adaptation to regulatory requirements 	 0-0-0-0	 0 0-0-0-0-0 ..... 0-0 0 0-0.....
Packaging	 documentation 	 0	 0	 0	 0-0 and sales 0-0-0-0-0 ..... 0-0- 0 0-0.....
Other important	 0-0	 0	 0-0 0-0 0 0 0 0-0 0 0-0..product/service 	
changes required, please specify* 	
..	 ..... ...
29. Please indicate the intensity of 	 none	 very intense none	 very intense none	 very intense
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0in	 foreign	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0competition	 the	 country .. 	 ...	 ..... ...	 ..
Estimate the number of direct competitors
30. Please indicate the sequence of
entry / foreign sales modes:
(e.g. A - E, see codes below)
first entry	 current sales
mode	 mode
first entry	 current sales
mode	 mode
first entry	 current sales
mode	 mode
Codes for modes of sales:
A Direct exporting	 (to end-user) E Foreign Sales Subsidiary 	 (wholly owned)
B Foreign Agent (sells ad hoc on commission basis) F Licensing
C Foreign Distributor (sells on a regular basis) G Other sales mode, please specify:
D Foreign Sales Subsidiary (joint venture)
31. Between your CURRENT sales
mode and the sales mode used at
FIRST market entry, did you use
any intermediate stages?
32. Do you expect to use a different
sales mode in the foreseeable
future? (please use the above codes)
0 Yes, please specify: 0 Yes, please specify: 0 Yes, please specify:
0 No 0 No 0 No
0 Yes, please specify: 0 Yes, please specify: 0 Yes, please specify:
0 No 0 No 0 No
CONFIDENTIAL
Opportunities and Risks of International Activities
33. Did you receive any form of government assistance provided to assist your efforts to internationalise?
(e.g. export grants, use of British Embassy facilities abroad, etc.)
0 No	 0 yes –n please indicate the government scheme or service below:
34. How important were the following motives in influencing your decision to sell abroad?
Please RANK the different items in order of importance (1 = most important benefit, 5 = least important benefit)
Potential of foreign markets to generate long-term company growth
Insufficient sales potential in domestic market
Amortisation of product research and development costs
Learning from internationally leading customers, suppliers or competitors
Reputation benefits of being viewed as an internationally competitive company
35. Please indicate the level of importance of the following COSTS of engaging in international sales that you
have identified:
not present	 very significant	 does not apply
Costs of accessing information on foreign markets 	 0-0-0-0--0 	 0
Costs of identifying and forming commercial relationships 	 0-0 0 0-0 	 0
Costs of market-entry and setting up foreign sales channels
	 	
0-0-0-0----0 	 0
Costs of product launch in overseas markets (marketing costs) 	 	 0-0-0-0-0 	 0
Operating costs of the chosen sales mode/channel 	 0-0-0-0-0 	 0
Costs of monitoring foreign activities 	 0-0-0-0--0 	 0
Other important costs, please specify below*	 0-0-0-0-0 	 0
36. What constraints have you experienced during your internationalisation process OR, for firms
WITHOUT international sales, which prevent you from going abroad?
Please RANK the different items in order of importance (1= most important constraint, 5= least important constraint)
Scarcity of management time
Limited management experience in international activities
Additional costs of foreign sales caused by country-specific AND NOT customer-specific adaptations
Increased exposure to risk
Others, please specify: 	
37. PRIOR to your FIRST international sales, did you:
O have a commitment to international sales in your business plan or forecasts?
O undertake country-specific market research?
O collaborate on research and development with foreign partners?
O already sell to a UK subsidiary of your foreign customers / distributors?
38. What led to your first international sales?
(e.g. an unsolicited order, a contact at a trade fair, any particular event or trigger)
Thank you for your cooperation!
In order to thank responding companies for their assistance with this study, we will be sending out a summary report on
the findings of our research. If you would like to receive a copy of the report, please indicate your address:
Name:
Company Name:
Address:
Telephone:
	
Fax:	 E-Mail:
Please put the completed questionnaire in the pre-printed Business Reply envelope and send it to:
Dr Gordon Murray, Marketing and Strategic Management Group, Warwick Business School, Coventry CV4 7AL
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ZEW
Zentrum fin Europäische
Wirtschaltstorschung GmbH
.A/VARWIC
BUSINESS SCHOO
6th October 1997
Dear Mr X,
We would like to request your collaboration in an important new international
research programme from Warwick Business School, in cooperation with the
Zentrum ftir Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung in Mannheim, Germany, on the
internationalisation of young innovative firms.
The economic importance of young, high-tech firms in the UK and continental
Europe appears eventually to have become widely recognised. Recent reports from
the CBI, the Bank of England and the European Commission have each highlighted
the important contributions of these firms in the areas of innovation, new employment
creation, and export-led international competitiveness. Yet, detailed knowledge of
the opportunities and constraints facing these firms as they seek to grow remains
wholly inadequate. It is also unclear what role, if any, governments can and should
play in fostering the creation, growth and, particularly, the internationalisation of
these young innovative firms.
We particularly wish to understand a number of key issues about these firms'
internationalisation activities. Why do some firms internationalise, often very
rapidly, while other firms with similar resources remain domestic in focus? Is the UK
market large enough to sustain long-term growth for these companies? Does a high-
technology business need to have an international orientation from start-up? How can
these fledgling firms compete alongside established multinationals? What advice and
support is available?
These questions are at the heart of our research project, which has attracted
widespread support among both policy makers and practitioners. It is our intention to
compare the internationalisation experiences of entrepreneurs in two countries with
markedly different
continued ...
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business attitudes, practices and traditions. Importantly, we wish to feed back the
results of our study to both industrial participants and government policy makers. It
is our express intention to contribute to the debate on how Europe can best emulate
the framework of confidence and support which so characterises new technology
start-ups in the USA.
Accordingly, data are needed on both firms which have and do not have international
activities or foreign sales. We would therefore be most grateful if you, or the
appropriate senior manager, would give us 15 minutes to answer the enclosed
questionnaire and return it in the prepaid envelope. The deadline date for responses is
Friday 27th October. If you have any questions or comments on the questionnaire,
please feel happy to contact us.
Please note: The data will be aggregated and used anonymously. No third party
will be given access to any firm specific information which will remain completely
confidential.
We would be delighted to send you a summary of the findings of our research. Also
enclosed is a Hot Topics paper in order to illustrate one means by which we at
Warwick attempt to disseminate the results of our contemporary research studies to a
wider audience of practitioners and policy makers. If you are interested, further
background information about this study and the participating researchers can be
found on our project homepage at http://intsme.zew.de
Yours sincerely,
Dr. Gordon Murray	 Oliver Burgel
Strategic Management Group
	 Strategic Management Group
Warwick Business School
	 Warwick Business School
encs.
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ZEW
Zentrum tr Eurogaische
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH
„WARWICK
BUSINESS SCHOOL
4th November 1997
Dear Mr X,
Four weeks ago, we sent you a questionnaire and invited you to participate in an Anglo-
German academic research study. The purpose of this study is to investigate why some
young and innovative firms rapidly internationalise while other comparable firms remain
firmly domestic in their sales focus. We are particularly interested in barriers to
internationalisation faced by entrepreneurial young firms.
From our records, we know that you have not returned our questionnaire. Yet, we are
particularly interested in firms of the age and business activity of your company. While we
fully appreciate the time demands on small and medium sized businesses, we are writing to
you again to seek your personal co-operation with this university research project.
All completed and returned questionnaires are highly valuable for our analyses. This
applies especially if you have not undertaken international activities and do not intend
to do so in the near future. For these firms, completing the survey should only take
about 10 minutes.
We are confident that this research will have highly practical outcomes. Our findings, which
will be discussed with government departments, will give young firms an opportunity to
communicate their experiences to policy makers via both the survey and follow-up case
studies. However, we would like to stress that all information will be aggregated and used
anonymously to guarantee respondent confidentiality.
We enclose a further questionnaire and a Business Reply envelope. Our deadline for returned
forms is Friday, 19th December. We would be happy to respond to any queries or comments
about the questionnaire or the wider research programme. If they wish, all research
participants will receive a summary of key results on request.
We very much hope that you will support this important work.
Yours sincerely,
Dr. Gordon Murray
Strategic Management Group
Warwick Business School
Oliver Burgel
Strategic Management Group
Warwick Business School
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WARWICK
USINESS SCHOOL,
-	 ,
ZEW
Zentrum fiir EuropAische
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH
3 rd December 1997
Dear Mr X,
A couple of weeks ago, we sent you a questionnaire and a reminder and invited you to
participate in an Anglo-German academic research study. From our records, it appears that we
have not received your questionnaire.
Please excuse our persistence. To be successful researchers, we have to demonstrate
exactly the characteristics of commitment and determination as entrepreneurs. While we
fully appreciate the time demands on small and medium sized businesses, we are writing to
you again to seek your personal co-operation with this university research project.
The purpose of this study is to investigate why some young and innovative firms rapidly
internationalise while other comparable firms remain firmly domestic in their sales focus. We
are also investigating the various barriers to internationalisation faced by entrepreneurial
young firms.
Therefore, we are particularly interested in firms that have not undertaken
international activities and do not intend to do so in the near future. For these firms,
completing the survey should take less than 10 minutes.
We are confident that this research will have highly practical outcomes. Our research, which
will be discussed with government departments, gives young firms an opportunity to
communicate their experiences to policy makers and to voice their concerns. The results of
this initiative will therefore lead to a much better appreciation of the challenges that young
innovative firms face as they attempt to expand their sales.
We enclose a further questionnaire and a Business Reply envelope. We would be happy to
respond to any queries or comments about the questionnaire or the wider research
programme. All research participants will receive a summary of key results on request.
We very much hope that you will spare the little time that it takes support this important
work.
Yours sincerely,
Dr. Gordon Murray	 Oliver Burgel
Strategic Management Group	 Strategic Management Group
Warwick Business School 	 Warwick Business School
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WARWI C
- BUSINESS SCHOOL
ZEW
Zentrum fOr Europaische
Wirtschattstorschung GmbH
Dear Sir or Madam,
In the Autumn of 1997, we wrote to you asking for your assistance in a research programme
which we were undertaking. We wished to look at the behaviour of innovative start-ups in the
UK and, particularly, whether international expansion represents a viable strategy for these
young firms.
Since our original contact, we have received over 400 completed questionnaires. This makes
our survey the largest, independent study ever undertaken in Europe which specifically
focuses on the commercial circumstances facing high-tech start-ups. We are enclosing with
this letter a brief one page of key research findings to date. In a couple of months, all
respondents will receive a detailed copy of our research results and conclusions.
To ensure the accuracy of our findings, it is imperative that we obtain the highest possible
response rate. We would therefore ask you most sincerely if you would fill in and return the
enclosed questionnaire.
Question:	 Why should you bother to help us?
Answer: Because it is our intention to ensure that the 'voices' of young high-tech
companies are heard clearly in government and other influential circles, including banks and
institutional investors. Our research shows that, in several critical ways, young high-tech
firms are very different from other types of enterprise. Differences which need to be fully
appreciated by policy makers include, for example, the role and importance of exporting; the
means of financing start-up and early growth, and the firms' needs for highly skilled and
innovative labour. The tax breaks for high-tech start-ups recently proposed by a government
working group are just one example of policy initiatives being strongly influenced by
academic research. However, without tangible evidence to demonstrate high tech firms'
material contribution to the British economy and their legitimate needs as young businesses,
their interests are likely to be eclipsed by other more powerful commercial parties.
Many of our respondents have shown considerable dedication and fortitude in order to create
and sustain successful businesses in technologies essential for a modern and competitive
economy.
Please fill in our questionnaire and help us to tell your story!
Yours sincerely,
Dr. Gordon Murray	 Oliver Burgel
Strategic Management Group	 Strategic Management Group
Warwick Business School	 Warwick Business School
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Appendix 6: Regression Table -
Software Subsample Regressions
Subsample Regression - Software Firms
Variable
Model I	 Model II	 Model III
Probit: Decision to	 Tobit: Degree of 	 Cox: Timing of
Internationalise	 Internationalisation Internationalisation
Firm Size (at Start-up) 0.2548 10.4023 0.3816 * *
Age 0.1793 *** 5.4491 *** 0.0990
Work Experience in UK for Multinational 0.1701 9.9967 0.1051
International Work Experience 0.4909 8.0230 0.4349
International Education 0.9781 ** 32.2426 ** 0.7711
R&D Intensity % employees -0.4103 54.0744 -0.558
(R&D Intensity % employees)2 1.3392 54.0743 1.0431
Venture Capital Investment at Start-up 0.0291 -6.1104 -0.8053
Business Angel Investment at Start-up 0.2687 5.1741 0.3238
New Combinations of Existing Technology 1.2136 ** 49.7564 *** 1.3197 **
Novel Technology Developed Externally 1.5802 *** 51.3233 *** 1.6476 **
Novel Technology Developed Internally 1.4395 *** 41.2948 ** 1.5799 **
Customisation Requirement -0.2134 -3.3220 -0.1668 ±
Commercialisation Cost 0.2690 -1.5772 0.1973
No. of Observations 101 99 101
Log Likelihood -47.26 -284.27 -201.13
Chi-square (df): 43.26 (13) **** 40.79 (13) **** 34.44 (13) ****
Pseudo R2 0.314 0.067 0.079
% correct classifications 74.26
maximimum chance criterion 57.43
Note: The reference category is a software firm with more than 20 employees at start-up. The table
shows coefficient estimates.
**** significant at p<0.001, *** significant at p<0.01, ** significant at p<0.05,
* significant at p<0.10, ± significant at p<0.15 (two-tailed tests)
257
8.	 Bibliography
Aaby, Nils-Erik, and Stanley F. Slater (1989), "Management influence on export
performance: A review of the empirical literature," International Marketing Review,
6(4), 7-26.
Acs, Zoltan J., and David B. Audretsch (1991), Innovation and Technological Change: An
international comparison. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Agarwal, Sanjeev, and Sridhar Ramaswami (1992), "Choice of foreign market entry mode:
Impact of ownership, location and internalization factors," Journal of International
Business Studies, 23(1), 1-27.
Aharoni, Yair (1966), The Foreign Investment Decision Process. Boston: Harvard University,
Division of Research.
Allison, Paul D. (1984), Event History Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Amemiya, Takeshi (1981), "Qualitative response models: A survey," Journal of Econometric
Literature, 19(4), 481-536.
Andersen, Otto (1993), "On the internationalization process of firms: A critical analysis,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 24(2), 209-231.
---- (1997), "Internationalization and market entry mode: A review of theories and conceptual
frameworks," Management International Review, 37(Special Issue 2), 27-42.
Anderson, Erin, and Hubert Gatignon (1986), "Modes of foreign market entry: A transaction
cost analysis and propositions," Journal of International Business Studies, 17(3), 1-26.
Anderson, James C., and James A. Narus (1990), "A model of distributor firm and
manufacturer firm working partnerships," Journal of Marketing, 54(1), 42-58.
Anglo-German Foundation (1988), New Technology-Based Firms in Britain and Germany.
London: Anglo-German Foundation.
Armour, Henry. 0., and David J. Teece (1980), "Vertical integration and technological
innovation," Review of Economics and Statistics, 60(3), 470-474.
Armstrong, J. S., and Terry S. Overton (1977), "Estimating non-response biase in mail
surveys," Journal of Marketing Research, 14, 396-402.
Aulakh, Preet S., and Masaaki Kotabe (1997), "Antecedents and performance implications of
channel integration in foreign markets ," Journal of International Business Studies,
27(1), 145-175.
Autio, Erkko (1997), "Atomistic' and 'systemic' approaches to research on new, technology-
based firms: A literature study," Small Business Economics, 9, 195-209.
258
Autio, E. (1995). Symplectic and Generative Impacts of New, Technology-Based Firms in
Innovation Networks: An International Comparative Study. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Technology, Institute of Industrial Management: Helsinki.
Bamberger, Ingolf, and Michael Evers (1994), "Internationalization behaviour of small and
medium-sized enterprises - empirical results," in: Product/Market Strategies of Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises, Ingolf Bamberger (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing.
Barkema, Harry G., and Freek Vermeulen (1998), "International expansion through start-up
or acquisition: A learning perspective," Academy of Management Journal, 41(1), 7-
26.
Barney, Jay (1991), "Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage," Journal of
Management, 17, 99-120.
Barrett, Nigel I., and Ian F. Wilkinson (1985), "Export stimulation: A segmentation study of
the exporting problems of Australian manufacturing firms," European Journal of
Marketing, 19(2), 53-72.
Beard, Charles, and Chris Easingwood (1996), "New product launch: Marketing action and
launch tactics for high technology products," Industrial Marketing Management, 25,
87-103.
Bell, Jim (1995), "The internationalization of small computer software firms - A further
challenge to stage theories," European Journal of Marketing, 29(8), 60-75.
Bilkey, W. J. (1978), "An attempted integration of the literature on export behaviour of
firms," Journal of International Business Studies, 9, 33-46.
Bilkey, W. J., and G. Tesar (1977), "The export behaviour of small-sized Wisconsin
manufacturing firms," Journal of International Business Studies, 8, 93-98.
Blankenburg Holm, Desiree, Kent Eriksson, and Jan Johanson (1996), "Business networks
and cooperation in international business relationships," Journal of International
Business Studies, 27(Special Issue), 1033-1053.
Bloodgood, James M., Harry J. Sapienza, and James G. Almeida (1996), "The
internationalization of new high-potential U.S. ventures antecedents and outcomes,"
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, 20, 61-76.
Bogner, William C., Howard Thomas, and John McGee (1995), "Core competence and
competitive advantage: A dynamic theory based model," Working Paper.
Bonaccorsi, Andrea (1992), "On the relationship between firm size and export intensity,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 23(3), 601-635.
Borch, Odd J., and Michael B. Arthur (1995), "Strategic networks among small firms:
implications for strategy research methodology," Journal of Management Studies,
32(4), 419-441.
259
Boter, Hakan, and Carin Holmquist (1996), "Industry characteristics and internationalization
processes in small firms," Journal of Business Venturing, 11, 471-487.
Braderl, Josef, and Rudolf Schtissler (1990), "Organizational mortality: The labilities of
newness and adolescence," Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 530-547.
Brush, Candida G., and Pieter A. Vanderwerf (1992), "A comparison of methods and sources
for obtaining estimates of new venture performance," Journal of Business Venturing,
7, 157-170.
Buckley, Peter J. (1988), "The limits of explanation: Testing the internalization theory of the
multinational enterprise," Journal of International Business Studies, 19(2), 181-193.
---- (1990), "Problems and developments in the core theory of international business," Journal
of International Business Studies, 21(2), 181-193.
---- (1993a), "Barriers to internationalization," in: Perspectives on Strategic Change, Luca
Zan, Stefano Zambon, and Andrew M. Pettigrew (ed.), Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
---- (1993b), "The role of management in internalisation theory," Management International
Review, 33(3), 197-207.
---- (1996), "The role of management in international business theory: A meta-analysis and
integration of of the literature on international business and international
management," Management International Review, 36(Special Issue 1), 7-54.
Buckley, Peter J., and Mark C. Casson (1976), The Future of the Multinational Enterprise.
London: Macmillan Publishers.
---- (1998), "Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: Extending the internalization
approach," Journal of International Business Studies, 29(3), 539-562.
Buckley, Peter J., G. D. Newbould, and G. Thurwell (1988), Foreign Direct Investment by
Smaller UK Firms. London: Macmillan Publishers.
Burenstam-Linder, Staffan (1961), An Essay on Trade and Transformation. Uppsala:
Almqvist and Wiksell.
Butchart R. (1987), "A new UK definition of high-technology industries," Economic Trends,
400, 82-88.
Calof, Jonathan L. (1994), "The relationship between firm size and export behaviour
revisited," Journal of International Business Studies, 25(2), 367-387.
Calof, Jonathan L., and Paul W. Beamish (1995), "Adapting to foreign markets: explaining
internationalisation," International Business Review, 4(2), 115-131.
Cantwell, John A. (1991), "A survey of theories of international production," in: The Nature
of the Transnational Firm, Christos N. Pitelis, and Roger Sugden (ed.), London:
Routledge.
260
Carpano, Claudio, and Chrisman James J. (1995), "Performance implications of international
product strategies and the integration of marketing activities," Journal of International
Marketing, 3(1), 9-27.
Carpano, Claudio, James J. Chrisman, and Kendall Roth (1994), "International strategy and
environment: An assessment of the performance relationship," Journal of International
Business Studies, 25(3), 639-656.
Caves, Richard E. (1982), "Multinational Enterprises and Technology Transfer," in: New
Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, Alan M. Rugman (ed.), London: Croom
Helm.
Cavusgil, S. T. (1980), "On the internationalisation process of the firm," European Research,
8(6), 273-281.
Cavusgil, S. T., and V. H. Kirpalani (1993), "Introducing products into export markets:
success factors," Journal of Business Research, 27, 1-15.
Cavusgil, S. T., and Shaoming Zou (1994), "Marketing strategy-performance relationship: An
investigation of the empirical links in export markets," Journal of Marketing, 58, 1-21.
Cavusgil, S. T., Shaoming Zou, and G. M. Naidu (1993), "Product and promotion adaptation
in export ventures: An empirical investigation," Journal of International Business
Studies, 24(3), 479-506.
Chetty, Sylvie K., and R. T. Hamilton (1995), "The process of exporting in owner-controlled
firms," International Small Business Journal, 14(2), 12-25.
Collis, David J. (1991), "A resource-based analysis of global competition: The case of the
bearings industry," Strategic Management Journal, 12(Summer Special Issue), 49-68.
Conner, Kathleen R. (1991), "A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five
schools of thought within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory
of the firm?," Journal of Management, 17, 121-154.
Conner, Kathleen R., and Prahalad C. K. (1996), "A resource-based theory of the firm:
Knowledge versus opportunism," Organization Science, 7(5), 477-501.
Cooper, Robert G., and Elko J. Kleinschmidt (1985), "The impact of export strategy on
export sales performance," Journal of International Business Studies, 16(Spring 1985),
37-55.
Coopers & Lybrand, and National Venture Capital Association (1996), Sixth Annual
Economic Impact of Venture Capital Study. Boston, MA: Coopers & Lybrand.
Coviello, Nicole E., and Hugh J. Munro (1995), "Growing the entrepreneurial firm:
Networking for international market development ," European Journal of Marketing,
29(7), 49-62.
Crick, Dave (1995), "An investigation into the targeting of U.K. export assistance," European
Journal of Marketing, 29(8), 76-94.
261
Cyert, Richard M., and James G. March (1963), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Czinkota, M. R. (1982), Export Development Strategies: US Promotion Policy. New York:
Praeger.
Dalli, Daniele (1994), "The "Exporting" process: The evolution of small and medium sized
firms toward internationalization," Advances in International Marketing, 6, 85-110.
Davidson, W. H., and D. G. McFetridge (1985), "Key characteristics in the choice of
international technology transfer mode ," Journal of International Business Studies,
16(Summer), 5-21.
Dichtl, Erwin et al. (1984), "The export decision of small and medium-sized firms: A
review," Management International Review, 24(2), 49-60.
---- (1990), "International orientation as precondition for export success," Journal of
International Business Studies, 21(1), 23-41.
Dierickx, Ingemar, and Karel Cool (1989), "Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of
competitive advantage," Management Science, 35, 1504-1511.
Douglas, Susan P., and Samuel P. Craig (1992), "Advances in international marketing,"
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 9,291-318.
Douglas, Susan P., and Yoram Wind (1987), "The myth of globalization," Columbia Journal
of World Business, (Winter 1987), 19-29.
Dunning, John H. (1980), "Towards an eclectic theory of international production: Some
empirical tests," Journal of International Business Studies, 11(1), 9-31.
---- (1993), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Wokingham: Addison-
Wesley.
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., and Claudia Bird Schoonhoven (1996), "Resource-based view of
strategic alliance formation: Strategic and social effects in entrepreneurial firms,"
Organization Science, 7(4), 136-151.
Eriksson, Kent et al. (1997), "Experiential knowledge and cost in the internationalization
process," Journal of International Business Studies, 28(2), 337-360.
Erramilli, M. K., and C. P. Rao (1993), "Service firms' international entry-mode choice: a
modified transaction cost analysis approach ," Journal of Marketing, 57(July ), 19-38.
Florida, Richard, and Martin Kenny (1988), "Venture capital and high technology
entrepreneurship," Journal of Business Venturing, 3(4), 301-319.
Foss, Nicolai J. (1998), "The resource-based perspective: An assessment and diagnosis of
problems," Scandinavian Journal of Management, 14(3), 133-149.
Franko, Lawrence G. (1989), "Global corporate competition: Who's winning, who's losing,
and the R&D factor as one reason why," Strategic Management Journal, 10(5), 449-
262
474.
Fujita, Masataka (1995a), "Small and medium-sized transnational corporations: salient
features," Small Business Economics, 7, 251-271.
(1995b), "Small and medium-sized transnational corporations: trends and patterns of
foreign direct investment," Small Business Economics, 7, 183-204.
Gatignon, Hubert, and Erin Anderson (1988), "The multinational corporation's degree of
control over foreign subsidiaries: An empirical test of a transaction cost explanation,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 4(3), 305-336.
Gemiinden, Hans G. (1991), "Success factors of export marketing: a meta-analytic critique of
the empirical studies," in: New Perspectives on International Marketing, Stanley J.
Paliwoda (ed.), London: Routledge.
Goshal, Sumantra, and Peter Moran (1996), "Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction
cost theory," Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13-47.
Granovetter, Mark (1985), "Economic action and social structure: The problem of
embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510.
Grant, Robert M. (1996), "Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm," Strategic
Management Journal, 17(Winter Special Issue), 109-122.
Greene, William H. (1980), "On the asymptotic bias of the ordinary least squares estimator of
the Tobit model," Econometrica, 48, 504-514.
---- (1997), Econometric Analysis. New York: Macmillan.
Gulati, Ranjay (1998), "Alliances and networks," Strategic Management Journal, 19(Editor's
Choice), 293-317.
Hall, John, and Charles W. Hofer (1993), "Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new
venture evaluation," Journal of Business Venturing, 8, 25-42.
Hambrick, Donald C., and Phyllis Mason (1984), "Upper echelons: the organisation as a
reflection of its top managers," Academy of Management Review, 9, 193-206.
Hannan, Michael T., and John H. Freeman (1977), "The population ecology or organization,"
Amercian Journal of Sociology, 82, 929-964.
---- (1984), "Structural inertia and organizational change," American Sociological Review,
49, 149-164.
Heide, Jan B., and George John (1994), "Interorganizational governance in marketing
channels," Journal of Marketing, 56(April), 32-44.
Hennart, Jean F. (1989), "Can the 'new forms of investment' substitute for the 'old forms'?,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 20(2), 211-234.
Hennart, Jean-Francois (1990), "A transaction cost theory of equity joint ventures," Strategic
263
Management Journal, 9(4), 361-374.
Hill, Charles W. L., Peter Hwang, and W. C. Kim (1990), "An eclectic theory of the choice of
international entry mode," Strategic Management Journal, 11, 117-128.
Hutt, Michael D., and Thomas W. Speh (1992), Business Marketing Management. Orlando:
The Dryden Press.
Hymer, Stephen H. (1976), The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of
Foreign Direct Investment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Itaki, Masahito (1991), "A critical assessment of the eclectic theory of the multinational
enterprise," Journal of International Business Studies, 22(3), 445-460.
Johanson, Jan, and Lars-Gunnar Mattson (1993), "Internationalisation in industrial systems -
A network approach," in: The Internationalisation of the Firm: A Reader, Peter J.
Buckley, and Pervez Ghauri (ed.), London: Academic Press.
Johanson, Jan, and Jan-Erik Vahlne (1977), "The internationalization process of the firm - A
model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitment,"
Journal of International Business Studies, 4, 20-29.
---- (1990), "The mechanism of internationalization," International Marketing Review, 7(4),
11-24.
Johanson, Jan, and Finn Wiedersheim-Paul (1975), "The Internationalization of the firm -
Four Swedish cases," Journal of Management Studies.
John, George, and Barton A. Weitz (1988), "Forward integration into distribution: An
empirical test of transaction cost analysis ," Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 4(2), 337-355.
Jolly, V. K., Matti Alahuhta, and Jean-Pierre Jeannet (1992), "Challenging the incumbent:
how high-technology start-ups compete globally," Journal of Strategic Change, 1, 71-
82.
Katz, Jerome, and William B. Gartner (1988), "Properties of emerging organizations,"
Academy of Management Review, 13(3), 429-441.
Keeble, David et al. (1998), "Internationalisation processes, networking and local
embeddedness in technology-intensive small firms," Small Business Economics, /1,
327-342.
Klein, Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian (1978), "Vertical integration,
appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process," Journal of Law and
Economics, 21, 297-326.
Klein, Saul, Gary L. Frazier, and Victor J. Roth (1990), "A transaction cost analysis model of
channel integration in international markets," Journal of Marketing Research,
27(May), 196-208.
264
Knickerbocker, F. T. (1973), Oligopolistic Reaction and the Multinational Enterprise.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Knight, Gary A., and S. T. Cavusgil (1996), "The born global firm: A challenge to traditional
internationalization theory," Advances in International Marketing, 8(11-26).
Koberg, Sabine S., Rosse Joseph, and Donald Bergh (1994), "Toward a definition and
typology of high-technology firms," Advances in Global High-Technology
Management, 4(Part A), 3-26.
Kobrin, Stephen J. (1991), "An empirical analysis of the determinants of global integration,"
Strategic Management Journal, 12(Summer Special Issue), 17-31.
Kogut, Bruce (1988), "Joint ventures: Empirical and theoretical perspectives," Strategic
Management Journal, 9(4), 319-332.
---- (1989), "A note on global strategies," Strategic Management Journal, 10, 383-389.
Kogut, Bruce, and Harbir Singh (1988), "The effect of national culture on the choice of entry
mode," Journal of International Business Studies, 19(3), 411-432.
Kogut, Bruce, and Udo Zander (1993), "Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory
of the multinational corporation," Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4),
625-645.
---- (1996), "What do firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning ," Organization Science,
7(5), 502-523.
Leonidou, Leonidas C., and Constanine S. Katsikeas (1996), "The export development
process: An integrative review of empirical models," Journal of International Business
Studies, (Third Quarter 1996), 517-551.
Licht, Georg, and Harald Stahl (1995), "Enterprise panels based on credit rating data," in:
Techniques and Uses of Enterprise Panels, pp. 163-177, EUROSTAT: Brussels and
Luxembourg.
Lim, Jenn-Su, Thomas W. Sharkey, and Ken I. Kim (1991), "An empirical test of an export
adaption model," Management International Review, 31(1), 51-62.
Lindell, Martin, and Necmi Karagozoglu (1997), "Global strategies of US and Scandinavian
R&D intensive small- and medium-sized companies," European Management Journal,
15(1), 92-100.
Lindqvist, M. (1991). Infant Multinationals: The Internationalization of Young, Technology-
Based Swedish Firms. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stockholm: Stockholm
School of Economics, Institute of International Business.
Lippman, S. A., and Richard P. Rumelt (1982), "Uncertain imitability: An analysis of
interfirm differences in efficiency under competition," Bell Journal of Economics, 13,
418-453.
265
Little, A. D. (1977), New Technology-Based Firms in the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany. London, Bonn: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of
Industrial Society.
Madhok, Anoop (1996), "The organization of economic activitiy: Transaction costs, firm
capabilities, and the nature of governance," Organization Science, 7(5), 577-590.
---- (1997), "Cost, value and foreign market entry mode: The transaction and the firm,"
Strategic Management Journal, 18, 39-61.
Mahoney, Joseph T. (1992), "Organizational economics within the conversation of strategic
management," Advances in Strategic Management, 8, 103-155.
Mahoney, Joseph T., and J. R. Pandian (1992), "The resource-based view within the
conversation of strategic management," Strategic Management Journal, 13(5), 363-
380.
Mason, Colin M., and Richard T. Harrison (1995), "Closing the regional equity gap: the role
of informal venture capital," Small Business Economics, 7, 153-172.
Mauri, A. J., and M. P. Michaels (1998), "Firm and industry effects within strategic
management: An empirical examination," Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), 211-
219.
McDougall, Patricia P. (1989), "International versus domestic entrepreneurship: new venture
strategic behaviour and industry structure," Journal of Business Venturing, 4, 387-400.
McDougall, Patricia P., and Benjamin M. Oviatt (1996), "New venture internationalization,
strategic change and performance: a follow-up study," Journal of Business Venturing,
11, 23-40.
McDougall, Patricia P., Scott Shane, and Benjamin Oviatt (1994), "Explaining the formation
of international new ventures: The limits of international business research ," Journal
of Business Venturing, 9(Nov. 1994), 469-487.
McKinsey & Company (1993), Emerging Exporters: Australia's High Value-Added
Manufacturing Exporters. Melbourne: Australian Manufacturing Council.
Meldrum, M. J. (1995), "Marketing high-tech products: The emerging themes," European
Journal of Marketing, 29(10), 45-58.
Melin, Leif (1992), "Internationalization as a strategy process," Strategic Management
Journal, 13, 99-118.
Monteverde, Kirk M., and David J. Teece (1982), "Appropriable rents and quasi-vertical
integration," Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 321-328.
Moon, Junyean, and Haksik Lee (1990), "On the internal correlates of export stage
development: An empirical investigation in the Korean electronics industry,"
International Marketing Review, 7(5), 16-26.
266
Moore, Barry (1994), "Financing constraints on the growth and development of small high-
technology firms," in Finance and Small Firms, Alan Hughes, and David J. Storey eds.
(pp. 112-144). London: Routledge.
Moran, Peter, and Sumantra Goshal (1996), "Theories of economic organisation: the case for
realism and balance," Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 58-72.
Morgan, Robert E., and Constantine S. Katsikeas (1997), "Obstacles to export initiation and
expansion," Omega, International Journal of Management Science, 25(6), 677-690.
Moriarty, Rowland T., and Thomas J. Kosnik (1989), "High-tech marketing: concepts,
continuity and change," Sloan Management Review, (Summer 1989), 7-17.
Murray, Gordon C. (1995), "Evolution and change: An analysis of the first decade of the UK
venture capital industry," Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 22(8), 1077-
1107.
---- (1996), "A synthesis of six exploratory, European case studies of successfully-exited,
venture capital financed, new technology-based firms," Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, 20, 44-60.
Murray, Gordon C., and Jonathan Lott (1995), "Have venture capital firms a bias against
investment in high technology companies?," Research Policy, 24, 283-299.
Nicholls, Matt, and Solveig Nyvold (1995), An Empirical Investigation Into the Logic and
Means by Which Venture Capital Backed, Emerging Technology Businesses in the
UK Internationalise Their Sales Activities. Unpublished MBA dissertation, Warwick
Business School.
Nordstrom, K. A. (1991). The Internationalization Process of the Firm. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, Institute of International
Business.
North, Douglass C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nunally, J. C., and I. H. Bernstein (1994), Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Oakey, R. (1994). New Technology-based Firms in the 1990s. London: Paul Chapman
Publishing.
Oakey, Ray, Roy Rothwell, and Sarah Cooper (1988), The Management of Innovation in
High-Technology Small Firms. London: Pinter Publishers.
Ohmae, Kenichi (1990), The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked
Economy. New York: Harper.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1997), The Oslo Manual -
Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data.
Paris: OECD.
267
Oviatt, Benjamin M., and Patricia P. McDougall (1994), "Toward a theory of international
new ventures," Journal of International Business Studies, 25(1), 45-64.
---- (1997), "Challenges for internationalization process theory: The case of international new
ventures," Management International Review, 37(Special Issue 2), 85-99.
Penrose, Edith T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York: John Wiley.
Peteraf, Margaret A. (1993), "The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based
view," Strategic Management Journal, 14, 179-191.
Pitelis, C. N., & Sugden, R. (1991). The Nature of the Transnational Firm. London:
Routledge.
Porter, Michael (1980), Competitve Strategy. New York: Free Press.
Porter, Michael E. (1986), Competition in Global Industries . Boston: Harvard Business
School Press.
---- (1994), "Toward a dynamic theory of strategy," in: Fundamental Issues in Strategy,
Richard P. Rumelt, Dan E. Schendel, and David J. Teece (ed.), Boston: Harvard
Business School Press. (pp. 163-177).
Preece, Stephen B., Grant Miles, and Mark C. Baetz (1999), "Explaining the international
intensity and global diversity of early-stage technology-based firms," Journal of
Business Venturing, 14, 259-281.
Ramaswamy, Kannan, K. Galen Kroeck, and William Renforth (1996), "Measuring the
degree of internationalization of a firm: A comment," Journal of International
Business Studies, 27(1), 167-177.
Rao, T. R., and G. M. Naidu (1992), "Are the stages of internationalization empirically
supportable," Journal of Global Marketing, 6(2), 147-170.
Reid, Stan D. (1981), "The decision-maker and export entry and expansion," Journal of
International Business Studies, 12(3), 101-112.
Reuber, A. R., and Eileen Fisher (1997), "The influence of the management team's
international experience on the internationalization behaviour of SMEs," Journal of
International Business Studies, 28(4), 807-825.
Roberts, Edward B. (1991), Entrepreneurs in High Technology. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Roberts, Edward B., and Senturia Todd A. (1996), "Globalizing the emerging high-
technology company," Industrial Marketing Management, 25, 491-506.
Robertson, Thomas S., and Hubert Gatignon (1998), "Technology development mode: A
transaction cost conceptualization," Strategic Management Journal, 19, 515-531.
Root, Franklin R. (1994), Entry Strategies for International Markets. New York: Lexington
Books.
268
Rosson, Philip J., and Stanley D. Reid (1987), Managing Export Entry and Expansion. New
York: Praeger Publishers.
Roth, Kendall (1995), "Managing international interdependence: CEO characteristics in a
resource-based framework," Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 200-231.
Rothwell, Roy, and W. Zegveld (1982), Industrial Innovation and Small and Medium Sized
Firms. London: Pinter Publishers.
Sapienza, Harry J. (1992), "When do venture capitalists add value?," Journal of Business
Venturing, 7, 9-27.
Saxenian AnnaLee (1991), "The origins and dynamics of production networks in Silicon
Valley," Research Policy, 20(5), 423-437.
Shanklin, W. L., and J. K. Ryans (1987), Essentials of Marketing High-Technology. Boston:
Lexington Books.
Small Business Research Centre (1992), The State of British Enterprise: Growth, Innovation
and Competitive Advantage in Small and Medium Sized-Firms. Cambridge:
University of Cambridge.
Stinchcombe, Arthur (1965), "Social structure and organizations," in: Handbook of
Organizations, James G. March (ed.), Chicago: Rand McNally.
Storey, David J. (1994), Understanding the Small Business Sector. London: Routledge.
---- (1996), The Ten Percenters - Fast Growing SMEs in Great Britain. London: Deloitte &
Touche.
Storey, David J., and Bruce S. Tether (1998), "New technology-based firms in the European
Union: An introduction," Research Policy, 29, 933-946.
Sullivan, Daniel (1994), "Measuring the degree of internationalization of a firm," Journal of
International Business Studies, 25(2), 325-342.
---- (1996), "Measuring the degree of internationalization of a firm: A reply," Journal of
International Business Studies, 27(1), 179-192.
Tallman, Stephen B. (1991), "Strategic management models and resource-based strategies
among MNEs in a host market," Strategic Management Journal, 12(Summer Special
Issue), 69-82.
Tan, Benjamin, and Ilan Vertinsky (1996), "Foreign direct investment by Japanese electronics
firms in the United States and Canada: Modelling the timing of entry," Journal of
International Business Studies, 27(4), 655-681.
Tapia, Richard A., and James R. Thompson (1978), Nonparametric Probability Density
Estimation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Teece, David J. (1977), "Technology transfer by multinational firms: the resource costs of
transferring technological know-how ," Economic Journal, 87, 242-261.
269
--- (1981), "The market for know-how and the efficient international transfer of technology
," Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, (458), 81-96.
---- (1986), "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration,
collaboration, licensing and public policy," Research Policy, 15, 285-305.
---- (1987), The Competitive Challenge: Strategies for Industrial Innovation and Renewal.
Cambridge: Ballinger.
Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen (1997), "Dynamic capabilities and strategic
management," Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509-533.
Turnbull, Peter W. (1987), "A challenge to the stages theory of the internationalisation
process," in: Managing Export Entry and Expansion, P. J. Rosson, and S. D. Reid
(ed.), New York: Praeger.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1993), Small and Medium-sized
Transnational Corporations: Role, Impact and Policy Implications. New York: United
Nations.
Vernon, Raymond (1966), "International investment and international trade in the product life
cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 190-207.
---- (1979), "The product life cycle hypothesis in a new international environment," Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 41(4), 255-267.
Wagner, Joachim (1995), "Exports, firm size and firm dynamics," Small Business
Economics, 7, 29-39.
Walker, G., and Laura Poppo (1991), "Profit centres, single-source suppliers, and transaction
costs," Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(1), 66-97.
Waters, Malcolm (1995), Globalization. London: Routledge.
Welch, Denice E., and Lawrence S. Welch (1996), "The internationalization process and
networks: A strategic management perspective," Journal of International Marketing,
4(3), 11-28.
Welch, Lawrence S., and Reijo Luostarinen (1988), "Internationalization: Evolution of a
concept," Journal of General Management, 14(2), 34-55.
Wernerfelt, Birger (1984), "A resource-based view of the firm," Strategic Management
Journal, 5, 171-180.
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antritrust Implications.
New York: Basic Books.
---- (1981), "The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach," American
Journal of Sociology, 87(November), 548-577.
---- (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
270
---- (1996), "Economic organisation: the case for candor," Academy of Management Review,
21(1), 48-57.
Wortzel, Laurence H., and Heidi V. Wortzel (1981), "Export marketing strategies for NIC
and LDC-based firms," Columbia Journal of World Business, (1), 51-60.
Yamaguchi, Kazuo (1991), Event History Analysis. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
Yli-Renko, Helena, and Erkko Autio (1998), "The network embeddedness of new,
technology-based firms: Developing a systemic evolution model," Small Business
Economics, 11, 253-267.
Zacharakis, Andrew L. (1997), "Entrepreneurial entry into foreign markets: A transaction
cost perspective," Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice, (Spring), 23-39.
271
